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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS VS. JOHN GACY:
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE AT THE







The conviction of John Gacy in 1980 of 33 counts of murder demonstrates
the limits of the criminal law in a number of significant ways. As one of the state's
prosecuting attorneys put it: "John Gacy now had the singular notoriety of having
been convicted of more murders than anyone in American history."' Mass murder
itself involves crime at the outermost extreme of prohibited conduct. Homicide,
the most serious criminal offense, is multiplied. At the same time, this case
demonstrates the limits of the criminal justice system in providing protection for
the citizen. For four years boys and young men literally disappeared from the streets
of Chicago and its suburbs without any serious efforts by the police to determine
their whereabouts. 2 Family members and friends of the missing persons were unable
to induce effective investigation, and other victims were unable to persuade
authorities to instigate prosecutorial action.3 Even with the conviction of Gacy,
the criminal law has been pushed to the limit in its efforts to fashion a proper
disposition for this offender. Given the psychiatric evaluation of Gacy neither a
criminal sentence nor a program of treatment for a mentally disordered offender
may be adequate or appropriate. The case suggests the need to consider the possibility
of permanent isolation and incapacitation of dangerous persons who are not treatable
nor rehabilitable, nor properly subject to execution.
A case like John Gacy's is most often not the subject of study in a legal
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periodical unless as a result of appeal some significant doctrinal point is estab-
lished. It long has been recognized that legal scholarship and more generally law
study has been focused too narrowly on doctrinal analysis of decisions. 4 This Arti-
cle, however, details the case of John Gacy, his life history, the facts of his crimes,
the public and media response to the case, the operation of police and prosecution,
his trial and conviction, and the appeal made to the state supreme court.
Another feature of this Article is that the authors, with backgrounds in law,
forensic psychiatry, journalism, and social work have joined together in develop-
ing a multi-disciplinary examination of the Gacy case. In addition to a close study
of the legal record, including the trial transcript and briefs on appeal, all newspaper
and periodical articles dealing with the case have been examined, and an analysis
has been made of psychiatric reports and evaluations of Gacy. One of the authors
extensively examined Gacy, by conducting hours of interviews, and testified at his
trial. None of the other authors, however, has had any connection with the pros-
ecution or defense of the case.
The case of John Gacy is particularly valuable in that it presents an opportu-
nity to examine the functioning of the insanity defense in a trial where no other
legal issues were before the jury. The defendant's confessions to police and their
admission at trial5 along with the location of the remains of victims, some located
with the assistance of the defendant, 6 effectively eliminated the alternative plea of
not guilty. Thus, the jury had only to decide the issues raised by the insanity defense.
Lay testimony about the defendant's behavior suggested that to some persons John
Gacy seemed rational, calculating and sane,7 while to others he appeared delusional,
out of control and insane. 8 Both prosecution and defense relied heavily on expert
testimony from psychiatrists and psychologists.9 Defense experts found Gacy to
be suffering from a mental disease and to be insane while prosecution experts found
him to have no mental disease but rather to exhibit a personality disorder. The
case offers an opportunity to examine the basis for diagnoses, the nature of
diagnoses, and the manner in which the various medical evaluations were trans-
formed into legal evidence."0 The case provides fertile ground for which it is ap-
propriate to examine not only the so called "battle of the experts," ' , but also to
' See U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Governmental Research of the Com-
mittee on Government Operations, National Foundation for Social Sciences, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 307
(1967), where Professor Geoffrey Hazard, then executive director of the American Bar Foundation,
observed: "We are so good at doctrinal analysis that we are resistant to the idea that brilliance of
intuition ought in any way to be qualified by going out and finding out what really happens."
See infra notes 420-23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 419-23 and accompanying text.
See Part V.B.3.a. of this Article.
See Parts V.B.3.a., b. of this Article.
See infra notes 430-65 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 430-65 and accompanying text.
" See U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on the Insanity Defense,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982), where Senator Orrin Hatch observed: "The traditional insanity defense
1170 [Vol. 86
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consider the difficulty faced by expert psychiatric witnesses in presenting the evidence
to the jury. 2 Even more, the case allows one to consider the nature of adversarial
use of expert psychiatric opinion. 3
The difficulty faced by the expert witnesses in providing their evaluation of
the defendant in this case was not merely caused by the operation of the adversary
system. For instance, problems arose in connection with establishing a basis for
offering an evaluation of the defendant." There were no eyewitnesses to any of
the murders, and the defendant's post-arrest statement to the police did not reveal
any distinct psychotic symptoms at the times of the murder other than his reference
to another personality named "Jack."I The references to "Jack" did not, however,
lead any of the expert witnesses to a diagnosis of multiple personality.' 6 Further-
more, the reference was denominated by the prosecution as a calculated sham
designed to provide a basis for an insanity defense." Experts were forced to rely
on various psychological tests and their results which required interpretation.
is both a legal anachronism and a concept ill-suited to modern psychological theory. It presents issues-
important issues-that are not susceptible of intelligent resolution in the courtroom. Trials in which
the insanity defense has been raised have often degenerated into swearing contests between opposing
teams of expert witnesses."
11 See generally Prelinger, Dilemmas of the Expert Witness: Reflections on the Insanity Defense,
13 PsYcruTic ANNALS 237 (1983).
11 See American Bar Association, First Tentative Draft, CRMHNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STAN-
DARDS, Standard 7-3.12 (1983).
', It is very important that the expert psychiatric witnesses state with precision the facts upon
which their opinions are based. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
People v. Burress, 1 111. App. 3d 17, 272 N.E.2d 390 (1971). The law in Illinois, where Gacy was tried,
is quite developed in terms of what will properly serve as a factual basis for an expert's opinion. The
need to establish the facts upon which a psychiatric witness bases his opinion is crucial. Where the
facts upon which the opinion is based are not established, the opinion must be disregarded. See People
v. Ford, 39 111. 2d 318, 235 N.E.2d 576 (1968). The expert may testify to a hypothetical question on
the basis of proven facts or facts supported by the evidence and presented prior to the question being
asked. See, e.g., People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968). The expert can give an opinion
based on his examination of the defendant without relying on a hypothetical question. See, e.g., People
v. Zemola, 9 Ill. App. 3d 424, 292 N.E.2d 195 (1972). Such an examination may be based on conversa-
tions with the accused and observations of physical characteristics. See, e.g., People v. Munroe, 15
Ill. 2d 91, 154 N.E.2d 225 (1958). Psychological tests may be used. See, e.g., People v. Myers, 35
Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297 (1966). Also the expert may refer to observed thought patterns, the memory
of the accused, his ability to speak coherently, to concentrate upon tasks, and to grasp concepts. See,
e.g., People v. Muniz, 31 IlN. 2d. 130, 198 N.E.2d 855 (1964). The history of the accused may also
be used by the expert witness so long as those historical facts are properly and indepen lently proved.
See, e.g., People v. Bourlet, 52 Ill. App. 2d 437, 202 N.E.2d 46 (1964).
11 During his confessions Gacy spoke of another personality "Jack" whom he suggested commit-
ted the murders. Record at 1486-87, 1500, 1657-58, 2199. See infra notes 422-23 and accompanying
text.
"6 See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff - Appellee at 179, People v. Gacy, appeal no. 53212
where it is observed: "no one in this case other than Gacy himself ever suggested that he was suffering
from a mental disease characterized by multiple personalities."
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Witnesses were compelled to apply general psychological principles' 8 or to draw
on psychoanalytical theory 9 in order to provide a basis for their diagnoses. Ulti-
mately, the concept of mental disease became the focus of dispute between pros-
ecution and defense witnesses. 2 Often relating descriptions of very similar
symptoms,' defense witnesses found the defendant to be suffering from a psychosis
which they classified as a mental disease, 22 while prosecution witnesses found Gacy
to have a personality disorder which they maintained was not a mental disease. 23
Two additional areas of dispute separated witnesses. The issue of the causal
relation between the identified mental condition and the actual killings became a
subject of examination by counsel.2 ' Some witnesses testified that there was a causal
relationship between the defendant's mental disorder and the crimes with which
he was charged, 5 while others maintained that none was shown.26 Another area
of dispute was whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease continuously
and uninterruptedly during the period of the killings, or whether the diagnosed
mental disease manifested itself only at the time of the killings. Some defense ex-
perts testified that the disease was continuously present 27 while others maintained
" For example, Dr. Richard Rappaport testified that Gacy's superior performance in structured
psychological tests as compared to more abstract, unstructured tests reflected a thought disorder and
was indicative of psychosis. Record at 3317-18. See infra notes 444-48 and accompanying text.
" For example, Dr. Tobias Brocher testified to his observation of the process of projection of
repressed parts of Gacy onto his victims. Record at 4854. See infra notes 461-62 and accompanying text.
20 The statutory test for insanity in Illinois is predicated on the effect of a "mental disease or
mental defect." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84). The statute does not
provide a definition of "mental disease or mental defect."
21 Witnesses for both defense and prosecution described Gacy by using such terms as "paranoid,"
"marked by feelings of sexual inadequacy," "sadistic" and "impulsive." See for example, the testimony
of Dr. Robert Traisman, a defense witness, who described Gacy as suffering from "homosexual con-
flicts, a marked feeling of masculine inadequacy, sexual confusion, a lack of empathy, an alarming
lack of emotional control when under stress, and with a strong potential for emotional or ego disintegration
and expressions of very hostile, dangerous impulses." Record at 3231-33. Prosecution witnesses described
Gacy as suffering from "psychosexual conflict"; as well as being compulsive and paranoid; obsessive-
compulsive and sexually sadistic; and narcissistic. Record at 4311, 4383-85, 4572-73, 4679-80.
22 See for example, testimony of Dr. Richard Rappaport, a defense witness, finding that Gacy
suffered from a mental disease, borderline personality disorder with sub-type psychopathic personality,
and with episodes of paranoid schizophrenia. Record at 3469, 3480-81. See infra notes 444-48 and ac-
companying text.
23 See for example, testimony of Dr. Arthur Hartman, concluding that Gacy was a psychopathic
or antisocial personality with sexual deviation and minor symptoms or characteristics of paranoid hysterical
reactions and that Gacy did not have a mental disease of the type considered a psychotic condition.
Record at 4155, 5159. See infra notes 451-52 and accompanying text.
2, See for example, Record at 4697, 4955-56.
23 See for example, testimony of defense witness Dr. Tobias Brocher who testified that Gacy's
unconscious motivations resulting from his mental illness created impulses which were beyond his con-
trol. Record at 4851-52. See infra notes 461-62 and accompanying text.
26 See for example, testimony of Dr. Leonard Heston who stated that there existed no causality
to support an opinion of lack of substantial capacity to conform to the requirements of the law in
Gacy at the time of the crimes. Record at 3895. See infra notes 449-51 and accompanying text.
2 See for example, testimony of defense witness Dr. Helen Morrison who testified that Gacy
1172 [Vol. 86
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that it manifested itself only at periodic intervals including the time of the
killings.2" Those witnesses who viewed the defendant as subject to a psychotic con-
dition which was continuous relied on some triggering mechanism to produce a
psychotic episode. 9 The prosecution stressed the defendant's apparent normal mental
state in dealing with business associates and friends. Thus, the prosecution main-
tained that there was no evidence to establish the existence of periodic psychotic
episodes occurring at the time of the killings.
3
1
The Gacy case illustrates the limited nature of the insanity defense. Illinois
law has incorporated the legal test for insanity developed by the American Law
Institute.3 ' The state penal code provides: "A person is not criminally responsible
for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect,
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." ' 32 The statute continues to
provide that "mental disease or mental defect" do not include mere "abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. '3 3 Thus, the
simple fact of a number of murders, as those with which Gacy was charged, does
not establish a basis for the insanity defense. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that evidence of a sociopathic personality and a personality disorder are
insufficient to establish the insanity defense . 3 Nor is the presence of a mental disease
had been suffering from a mixed psychosis since at least 1958. Record at 4949-53. See infra notes 462-64
and accompanying text.
28 See for example, testimony of defense witness Dr. Thomas Eliseo who testified that Gacy was
in a psychotic state during the time that he committed the killings, but not during the entire period
when the killings occurred. Record at 2714-15. See infra notes 432-35 and accompanying text.
29 See for example, testimony of Dr. Richard Rappaport who testified that Gacy projected his
repressed parts onto others, whom he then raged against. Record at 3463-64. See infra notes 444-48
and accompanying text.
30 See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee at 127, People v. Gacy, appeal no. 53212 which
while citing the Record stated:
[The] massive evidence of Gacy's normal and reasonably successful business, political, social
and personal life during the period in question is in opposition to long-standing psychosis
or serious mental illness. (Lay opinions of sanity and/or normalcy after drinking at or near
the times of many of the offenses by James Vanorous, a business associate and defense witness
(R. 2556, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2570); Elaine Shields, a friend and defense witness, (R. 4883);
Carole Lofgren, Gacy's second wife and defense witness (R. 2808); Nick DeBlase, friend,
business associate and defense witness, (R. 4913); Ron Rohde, friend and business associate,
(R. 1375, 1376, 1377, 1414); Lillian Grexa, neighbor, (R. 2443, 2457, 2497); and detailed
testimony as to Gacy's condition at or near the dates of several offenses by Cram and Rossi).
, See Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
'z ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 6-2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
'* See, e.g., People v. Smothers, 2 I11. App. 3d 513, 276 N.E.2d 427 (1971), aff'd, 55 I11. 2d
172, 302 N.E.2d 324 (1973); People v. DeSimone, 67 Ill. App. 2d 249, 214 N.E.2d 305 (1966); People
v. Miller, 33 Ill. 2d 439, 211 N.E.2d 708 (1965) (holding that psychopathy, sociopathy and personality
disorders are legally excluded from the class of mental diseases required to establish an insanity defense).
See also People v. Parisie, 7 111. App. 3d 1009, 287 N.E.2d 310 (1972); People v. Jones, 43 Ill. 2d
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or defect sufficient to establish the defense. The insanity defense requires a show-
ing that the defendant was so affected by the presence of mental disease or defect
that he did not understand the criminal nature of his behavior or that he was not
able to conform his behavior to the demands of the law.
One of the problems faced by some of the defense experts in the Gacy case
stemmed from their psychoanalytic orientation. The insanity defense requires a show-
ing that because of mental disease or defect the actor was so affected that he lacked
appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct or lacked the ability to conform
to the law." However, a psychoanalytic approach to understanding an actor's
behavior attempts to identify the unconscious processes which determine a per-
son's behavior.3 6 The witnesses with a psychoanalytic orientation faced the dif-
ficulty, as illustrated repeatedly in the Gacy case, of identifying a specific mental
disease or defect which produced an effect required to be established for the defense.
An additional problem was created by the manner in which lawyers in examining
these expert witnesses attempted to translate the psychiatric explanation into the
terms of the legal defense. This problem can perhaps best be described as an effort
to establish a direct causal link between the mental disorder and the offense. From
a psychoanalytical viewpoint, the whole person must be considered in developing
an explanation of the actor's behavior. 37 On the other hand, the lawyer searches
for the specification of a particular condition which produced a particular causal
result.
38
The expert witness with a psychoanalytical orientation also relies on a general
theoretical framework in which the actor's life and behavior are examined.3 9 While
" See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-1-11 (Smith-Hurd 1982) providing that: "Insanity" means
the lack of a substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform
one's conduct to the requirements of the law as a result of mental disorder or mental defect.
36 See C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PsYcHOANALYsIs (1974). While identifying the
basic tenets of psychoanalytical theory, "the author stated:
Two such fundamental hypotheses, which have been abundantly confirmed, are the principle
of psychic determinism, or causality, and the proposition that consciousness is an exceptional
rather than a regular attribute of psychic processes. To put the latter proposition in somewhat
different words, we may say that, according to psychoanalytical theory, unconscious mental
processes are of very great frequency and significance in normal as well as in abnormal men-
tal functioning.
Id. at 2.
" Id. at 247, where Brenner observes: "Every psychoanalysis is, among other things, a study
of the life history of an individual. It is a search for the chief events of that life, of their connections
with one another, and of both their psychological causes and their psychological consequences.
3 See H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959), where the general observa-
tion is made that: "[Ciriminal law courts have often limited responsibility by appealing to the causal
distinctions embedded in ordinary thought, with their emphasis on voluntary interventions and abnor-
mal or coincidental events as factors negating responsibility." Id. at 292. See also, American Law In-
stitute Model Penal Code comment to § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1962) where the drafters' notes
state: "[W]e think the legal standard ought to focus on the consequences of disease or defect that
have a bearing on the justice of conviction and of punishment."
" See generally A. WVATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968).
[Vol. 861174
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specific events and experiences are incorporated into such an expert's testimony,
there is difficulty in providing the kind of specific empirical facts which the lawyer
seeks to identify to establish the insanity defense.
As a result of these difficulties great reliance was placed on the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM-111f ° adopted by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion. The DSM-III provides findings of observable symptoms which are classified
under mental disorders with defined properties. 4 The categories of disorders have
been tested by follow-up studies of the population pools previously classified.4 2
The objective has been to provide criteria for greater uniformity of expert opinion.4 3
The expert is expected to find observable symptoms of a mental disease manifested
at the time of the crime and to use this as a factual basis for an opinion on the
diagnosis of a specific mental disorder and ultimately as a basis of an opinion on
the question of insanity. The Gacy case, however, reveals significant difficulty on
the part of experts to apply the nomenclature and methodology in DSM-III in a
consistent manner. A broad range of diagnostic terms were applied to the defendant"
and one of the objectives of the defense was to establish that there was a basic
agreement among the experts or that, at a minimum, each of their diagnoses was
consistent with that given by the other defense witnesses."5
40 AMEICAN PsYcIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISrICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III].
1' Id. at 6, where the basic structural premise of the Manual is described in the following terms:
"[I]n DSM-III each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or
psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is typically associated with
either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more important areas of functioning
(disability)."
" Id. at 5 where it is reported that: "[A] series of field trials was conducted, beginning in 1977
and culminating in a two year NIMH-sponsored field trial from September 1977 to September 1979.
In all, 12,667 patients were evaluated by approximately 550 clinicians, 474 of whom were in 212 dif-
ferent facilities, using successive drafts of DSM-III."
41 Id. at 5 where it is noted that: "[Plerhaps the most important part of the study was the evalua-
tion of diagnostic reliability by having pairs of clinicians make independent diagnostic judgments of
several hundred patients. The results, which are presented in an appendix, generally indicate far greater
reliability than had previously been obtained with DSM-II." See generally Fukunaga, Pasewark, Hawkins
& Gudeman, Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion and
Court Verdict, 5 L. & HuM. BEHAVIOR 325 (1981).
" Diagnoses of defense witnesses included: "Pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenic" (Dr. Freed-
man); "Borderline personality with sub-type psychopathic personality with episodes of paranoid
schizophrenia" (Dr. Rappaport); "Borderline personality" (Dr. Brocher); "Mixed or atypical psychosis
consistent with borderline pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenia" (Dr. Morrison); "Surface personality-
borderline schizophrenic and inner personality-paranoid schizophrenic" (Dr. Eliseo); and "Paranoid
schizophrenic and sociopathic personality" (Dr. Traisman). Diagnoses of prosecution witnesses included:
"Antisocial personality" (Dr. Heston); "Personality disorder-narcissistic type" (Dr. Reifman); "Mixed
personality with components including pervasive narcissism, an obsessive-compulsive quality, antisocial
quality, and hypomanic quality"(Dr. Cavanaugh); "Mixed personality with alcohol and drug abuse"
(Dr. Fawcett); " Psychopathic/antisocial personality with sexual deviation and minor symptoms or
characteristics of paranoid hysterical reactions" (Dr. Hartman); "Histerical/histrionic character" (Dr.
Garron); "Obsessive-compulsive disorder and a hypomaniac disorder, with possible sexual sadism."
(Dr. Rogers). See Part V.B.3.a.-d.
" See infra notes 432-48 and accompanying text.
19841 1175
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Apart from the application of the problem of consistent diagnostic classifica-
tion raised by testimony in the Gacy case, an issue arose concerning the meaning
of mental disease itself. The legal principles in the case implicitly accepted, it seems,
that in order to qualify for the insanity defense it was necessary that Gacy be shown
fo be suffering from a psychosis. All participants in the trial seemed to agree that
if Gacy were a psychopath or a sociopath rather than a psychotic it would not
be possible to claim the defense of insanity. There is an assumption that conditions
classified as psychosis have some causal relationship in the manner in which such
a disorder impairs the individual's functioning that makes it proper for him not
to be held responsible." Such a causal relationship is assumed to be absent in the
case of a personality disorder or in the case of psychopathology."' What seems
to be at stake is whether the insanity defense is limited to cases of delusions and
loss of a sense of reality as is the case with psychosis, and whether responsibility
should be charged against those who claim a volitional impairment or lack of con-
trol as the impairment present in the case of psychopathology. 8 A related matter
is raised by the claim of lack of responsibility by one designated to be
psychopathological. Most experts agree that no effective treatment program can
be identified for psychopaths which will assure elimination of possible future criminal
conduct.4 9 This issue could not have been far from the jury's mind in the Gacy
case after they heard testimony from one of the medical experts, that in his opin-
ion not only did Gacy not suffer from a mental disease, but that in all probability
he could not be involuntarily committed if he were acquitted. 0 The medical expert
went so far as to say that if Gacy were committed and if the witness were serving
in the capacity as an examining physician, he would feel obliged to recommend
Gacy's release on the ground that Gacy was not suffering from an identifiable or
treatable mental disorder.' Although efforts are being made to develop effective
treatment programs for persons diagnosed as having an antisocial personality, most
commentators concede that the research into the treatment of antisocial personal-
ity is not scientifically adequate to provide the basis for any firm conclusion about
the possibilities for treatment of the psychopath or sociopath.1
2
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Gacy case is one that is not part
46 See Abrams, Definitions of Mental Illness and the Insanity Defense, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
441, 449 (1979) where it is observed that "implicit in all of the insanity tests . . . is the assumption
that the definition of mental illness should be a causal one, i.e., each test implies that mental illness
serves as an excuse because, in some way, it 'causes' or 'produces' the criminal act."
41 See generally Blair, The Medicolegal Implications of the Terms "Psychopath, " "Psychopathic
Personality" and "Psychopathic Disorder," 15 MED. Sci. & LAW 51 (1975).
4' See Bleechmore, Towards a Rational Theory of Criminal Responsibility: The Psychopathic
Offender (pt. I), 10 METH. U.L. REv. 19, 22-24 (1975).
4' See H. CLECKLEY, THm MAsKs OF SANrY 275-85 (1982).
so Testimony of Dr. James Cavanaugh. Record at 4693-08. See infra notes 457-61 and accompa-
nying text.
"' Record at 4708. See infra note 460.
52 See LeVine and Bomstein, Is the Sociopath Treatable? The Contribution of Psychiatry to a
Legal Dilemma, 1972 WAsH. U. L. Q. 693, 710.
[Vol. 861176
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of the official record, that is the manner in which the jury considered and resolved
the issues raised by the defense of insanity. Apparently little or no consideration
was given by the jury to the defense itself.-3 One juror reported that upon return-
ing to the jury room, with little discussion, a vote was taken which resulted in
a unanimous verdict of "guilty" and only during the time in which the verdict
forms were being signed did the jury actually discuss the question of insanity.1
4
While an examination of the jury's deliberations is beyond the scope of this article,
it is obvious that there is a need for further study of the jury process in cases
involving the insanity defense, especially where the case is notorious or where the
defendant is charged with crimes of great magnitude as was John Gacy. 5
The discussion here will deal with the public record in the trial of John Gacy.
This Article will first examine the life and crimes of John Gacy as they were reported
to the public.16 The Article will provide a detailed psychiatric profile of Gacy based
not only on the public record, but also on psychiatric interviews of Gacy, members
of his family, and one of his surviving victims, as well as on reports of medical
examinations, and psychological test results. 7 Additionally, the Article will pro-
vide a psychiatric assessment of John Wayne Gacy." An account of the findings,
diagnoses, and opinions on the question of insanity with reference to Gacy and
his criminal acts by each of the expert witnesses is provided within the discussion
of the trial itself. In addition to such an account, the Article will examine the legal
proceedings in the Gacy case and the expert testimony given in the case to provide
an opportunity to observe the manner in which it was related to other evidence
and testimony, as well as the way in which the defense of insanity was related
to the other legal issues presented by the case. 9 The final part of the Article will
" Jury's Speedy Verdict Raises Some Doubts, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, March 13, 1980, at
1, col. 1, where it was reported:
A prominent criminal lawyer here says the John Wayne Gacy verdict raises doubts about
the jury. "I'm not saying the verdict's wrong," Sam Adam told the Law Bulletin today.
"I'm saying there's no way the jury could have followed Judge (Louis B.) Garippo's instruc-
tions and returned a verdict in less than two hours."
"I know they (the jury) could not have considered the defense's testimony and given
it the proper consideration it deserved," Adam said. "In most cases it takes the jury that
long /less than two hours to choose a foreman."
Adam said that the Gacy case involved very serious, complex psychological problems.
It seemed the jury had a closed mind he said.
"The jury was under tremendous pressure in the community's eyes," Adam said. "There's
an old saying that 'hard cases make bad laws.' It was true here."
" See infra note 469.
" Studies have been made of jury deliberations in cases involving insanity pleas. See, e.g., R.
SIM N, Tit JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INsANITY (1967). However, these studies have not focused on
cases involving the notoriety or the criminal magnitude of the case of John Wayne Gacy.
16 See infra notes 61-255 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 256-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 293-399 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 430-66 and accompanying text.
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examine some of the arguments on appeal in order to observe the manner in which
the factual issues presented by the case and the problem of accomodating expert
testimony in a trial are transformed into technical issues of evidence, procedure,
and legal standards.60
II. JoIN GACY - THE PUBLIC RECORD
A. The Defendant - His Life
To neighbors and friends, John Wayne Gacy hardly seemed the type of person
capable of committing crimes that were so numerous and horrifying that hundreds
of persons would offer to act as his executioner. 6' Nor could his parents have im-
agined when he was born 2 that their son eventually would be sitting on death row
at Menard Correctional Center in Chester, Illinois, convicted of more murders than
any person in United States history.63 In attempting to understand what led this
man to commit thirty-three" sex-related murders it is important to evaluate Gacy's
entire life. Additionally, it is necessary to determine whether the law has developed
a satisfactory approach to dealing with and responding to a person like Gacy.
Gacy's troubled life began with a difficult birth and fear that he would not
survive.65 Gacy was bothered throughout his childhood by agonizing headaches and
blackout spells that occasionally resulted in hospitalization. 66 As a child, Gacy
developed a fondness for feeling his mother's silk undergarments, which he hid
in a brown paper bag underneath the family's porch.6 7 Throughout his years grow-
ing up in Chicago, Gacy had a very strained relationship with his father, John
S. Gacy, who has been described by his wife as having a "Jekyll and Hyde" per-
sonality apparently precipitated by daily drinking binges in the family basement. 6
Although Gacy had great affection for his father, according to Gacy's mother,
Marion Gacy, this love was not reciprocated and the son never seemed to please
his perfection-minded father.69 Both Gacy's mother and sister, Karen Gacy Kuzma,
testified at trial that the senior Gacy would yell and challenge his son to strike
him but that the son never would. 70
60 See infra notes 474-565 and accompanying text.
Hundreds Offer to Help Illinois As Executioner, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1980, at A69, col. 1.
62 Kneeland, Suspect in Mass Deaths Is Puzzle to All, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at A14, col. 1.
' Snyder, Question on Death Row: Who'll go first?, Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 27, 1980, at 8,
col. 1.
14 Sheppard, Gacy Is Found Guilty In the Murders of 33, Most in History of U.S., N.Y. Times,
Mar. 13, 1980, at Al, col. 3.
61 Galloway, "Still Can't Believe It, " Gacy's Mother Weeps, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 26, 1980,
at 1, col. 1.
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After an argument with his father the 19-year-old Gacy ran away to Las Vegas
where he worked for three months as an ambulance driver and as a watchman
at a mortuary. While working there he would sometimes sleep at night in the same
room with the stored bodies. 7' Gacy returned to Chicago where he obtained work
as a salesman for the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company, which transferred him to
Springfield in 1964 where he assumed the position of manager of one of the com-
pany's retail clothing stores.7" Gacy soon became an enthusiastic member of the
Jaycees service organization in Springfield and was elected first vice-president and
named the chapter's outstanding man of the year in 1965.1 3 During this time, Gacy
began to manifest certain bizarre behavior. For example, one day on his way to
work he was issued a traffic citation for cutting into a funeral procession and join-
ing the mourners. 74 After a nine month courtship, Gacy married Marlynn Myers
a co-worker at the clothing store. In 1966 the newlyweds moved to Waterloo, Iowa,
where Gacy worked for his father-in-law, who ran a number of Kentucky Fried
Chicken franchises. 7" Gacy and his wife led an apparently conventional life in
America's heartland as she tended after their young son and daughter and he worked
long hours cooking chicken and cleaning counters. Gacy also thrust himself into
the activities of the local Jaycees chapter, where he became chaplain. 76 Despite his
seeming success, Gacy developed a strong dislike for his father-in-law, whom he
felt overworked him.
Outside of work, Gacy engaged in the Jaycees' public service activities and
indulged in private wild evenings of watching explicit sex films and exotic dancers
with his friends. 77 Gacy associated with members of the Jaycees, some of whom
disliked Gacy because of his boastfulness. Others found Gacy to be affable and
energetic. In 1968 Gacy ran for the presidency of the chapter.78 However, later
that year Gacy's life was shattered when a Black Hawk County grand jury indicted
him for forcing two teenage boys into committing sexual acts with him.
79
Edward H. Lynch, Jr., an employee at one of the fried chicken outlets, testified
to a grand jury that Gacy attacked him with a knife, and later chained his hands
and choked him.8" Donald E. Voorhees, the other person who had been subject
7' See infra note 77.
" Kneeland, supra note 62.
73 Id.
71 Mathews & Maier, Double Life of a Clown, 93 NEWSWEEK 24 (Jan. 8, 1979).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Dr. Helen Morrison, "Psychiatric Analysis of John Wayne Gacy," Jan. 25, 1980 (psychiatric
report submitted to the court).
" Kneeland, supra note 62.
, Fritsch, Gacy Attacked Me in '67: Witness, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 1, 1980, at 2, col. 5.
80 Id. Lynch told the jury that Gacy tried to attack him with a carving knife but that he was
able to disarm Gacy. However, Lynch stayed at Gacy's house that night after the attack because "he
was my boss . . . I was 16 and gullible."
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to sexual attack, testified that Gacy told him that he was the head of a sex commit-
tee from Illinois studying sexual behavior.8' Both youths stated that they engaged
in sex acts with Gacy. 82 Gacy pleaded guilty to the charge of sodomy83 and was
given the maximum sentence allowable at the time; ten years at the state refor-
matory in Anamosa. 8 On the day that Gacy was sentenced, his wife filed for divorce,
citing cruel and inhumane treatment that endangered her life and health in viola-
tion of the couple's marriage vows. 85
Gacy adjusted to prison life extremely well.16 According to fellow inmates, he
proved to be a shrewd manipulator who avoided trouble with other inmates while
garnering power and influence by dispensing favors to his friends as a result of
his position as one of the prison's chief cooks.8 7 Gacy even found time in prison
to organize a chapter of the Jaycees, recondition toys for poor children at Christmas,
build a miniature golf course on prison grounds,8 8 and run a loan sharking
operation.' 9 Gacy developed a reputation as a model prisoner.98 Gacy fell into a
severe depression, however, when he learned that his father had died on December
19, 1969, and that he would be unable to leave the prison grounds to attend the
funeral. 9' Gacy's sister later testified that she thought her brother felt that he had
caused his father's death because of the shame of the sodomy conviction. 2 Never-
theless, Gacy survived the dangers of prison life and was paroled after serving
eighteen months of his ten year sentence. 9" Among the reports received by the Iowa
parole committee was one from Correctional Counselor Lyle Eugene Murray, who
wrote that Gacy needed further counseling but, if returned to live with his family,
"would very likely not be involved in the same type of offense as he is presently
incarcerated for." 9 Another report submitted by psychiatrist Dr. Richard Lee,
recommended paroling Gacy since "[t]he likelihood of his again being charged with
and convicted of antisocial conduct appears to be small."."
" See H. Morrison, supra note 77. Besides assaulting Voorhees, Gacy hired a young man to
beat up Voorhees in order to intimidate him into dropping the charges.
12 Galloway, Gacy Implicated in Iowa Attack, Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 1, 1980, at 6, col. 3.
93 Id.
" Id.
C. Linedecker, THE MAN WHo KILLED Boys 40 (1980).
" Fritsch, supra note 79.
I d.
, Mathews & Maier, supra note 74.
" Fritsch, supra note 79.
90 Kneeland, supra note 62.
Fritsch, Ex-Wife Testifies, Gacy Breaks Down, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1980, at 3, col.
1. Carole Lofgren testified that she had seen her ex-husband cry, usually around Christmas, the time
of year his father had died.
92 See H. Morrison, supra note 77.
"3 Kneeland, supra note 62. Warden Calvin Auger later said, "He [Gacy] had no particular prob-
lem during his stay. His adjustment was exceptionally good. He was a good worker, a willing worker
with only one minor disciplinary thing on his record, just a hassle with another resident with nobody
injured."
94 T. SULLIVAN & P. MAIKEN, KILLER CLOWN 252 (1983).
11 Id. at 253.
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After his parole, Gacy returned to Chicago where he lived with his mother96
and worked as a cook at a downtown restaurant." With the financial help of his
mother, he purchased a small bungalow near O'Hare Airport. 8 Gacy started his
own contracting firm called PDM (for painting, decorating and maintenance)
Contractors. 9 In June of 1972, Gacy married Carole Huff, his sister's former
schoolmate. Carole had previously been divorced and had two young daughters. 0 0
According to Carole, Gacy was a very good father to her daughters.'0 ' Although
Gacy did have a temper and sometimes would throw furniture during arguments,
he never struck Carole or her children.'
0 2
The couple's sexual relations had slowly dwindled after their first year of mar-
riage until on Mother's Day, 1975, Gacy told his wife that it would be the last
time that they would engage in sexual intercourse.'0 3 Gacy had told Carole before
their marriage that he was bisexual, but she said at the time she had not believed
him.' 40 However, after their marriage she began to suspect that Gacy had homosexual
interests when she found books in their home containing pictures of nude men
and several wallets that apparently belonged to teenage boys.' °5 The couple was
divorced on March 2, 1976, but continued to see each other socially.',
6
Many of Gacy's neighbors knew the stocky contractor as a hard-working man
who kept late hours and gave lavish annual parties. 07 Gacy took great pride in
the five theme parties he hosted in his backyard at which Gacy and others were
costumed. These parties were attended by as many as 400 friends and
acquaintances.' 0 "John loved to entertain. He loved people around him," accord-
ing to Jim Van Vorous, a business associate who co-hosted three of these summer
parties. 0 1 Next-door neighbor Lillian Grexa called Gacy "better than a neighbor,
he was a good friend .... Our house was his house; his house was our house.""'
Mr. and Mrs. Grexa and their six children met Gacy a few months after he moved





10I Fritsch, supra note 91.
102 Id.
103 Id.
Id. Gacy also told his ex-wife that he would die a violent death before he would reach 40
years of age. See Linedecker, supra note 85, at 161.
101 Included among the numerous books were such titles as BIKE Boy, PEDERASTY, SEx BETWEEN
MEN AND Boys, TWENTY-ONE ABNORMAL SEx CAsEs, TIGHT TEENAGERS, TiE AmERicAN BICENTENNIAL
GAY GUIDE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE.
10 Galloway, Gacy and Ex- Wife Break Down in Tears, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 24, 1980, at
3, col. 1.
0' "I Do Rotten, Horrible Things," 113 TIME 23 (Jan. 8, 1979).
'o' Ogintz & Axelrod, John Gacy's Neighborhood "It Will Never Be the Same, " Chicago Tribune,
Jan. 7, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
109 Id.
I Fritsch, Neighbor Calls Gacy "Very Brilliant, " Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
19841 1181
13
Herman et al.: People of the State of Illinois vs. John Gacy: The Functioning of
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in. Gacy visited the Grexa home on Christmas Eve with a basket of fruit and in-
vited them to spend some of their Christmas Day with him, his mother and his
sister."' Mrs. Grexa helped prepare Polish sausage for Gacy's 150 wedding guests
in 1972.12 Mrs. Grexa did, however, notice some strange things about her neighbor.
Gacy sometimes left the house as late as 2:00 a.m., and he rarely trimmed the
eight-foot hedge that separated their houses and prevented the Grexas from seeing
into Gacy's backyard." 3
Although Gacy hardly ever found time to trim the hedges, he had boundless
energy for other activities. He loved to entertain children as Pogo the Clown, dressed
in a self-made clown outfit.'" Gacy increasingly became involved in civic and
political activities. He served as a trustee of the Norwood Park Township Street
Lighting District,"' and performed many tasks for the Norwood Park Democratic
organization."6 "He was always available for any chore, washing windows, setting
up chairs for meetings-even fixing someone's leaky faucet," according to a
Democratic Party Committeeman, Robert Martwick."I Gacy was continually
remodeling and expanding his home. " As part of his home improvement activity,
ostensibly to provide for drainage and sewer lines, Gacy employed several young
men who worked for his contracting firm to dig trenches in the crawl space beneath
his house." 9
As Gacy's contracting business grew, he developed a specialty for remodeling
drug stores, which apparently gave him ready access to a large quantity of drugs,
some of which he apparently pilfered, then shared with his young employees while
they all drank beer and played pool.'2° A large part of Gacy's work force consisted
of high school boys in search of extra spending money.'' Gacy's penchant for
hiring young workers concerned a number of people close to him. His wife Carole
urged him to start hiring older men: "I used to always tell John that he should
hire older, bigger men.""'2 One of Gacy's closest friends, contractor Ronald Rohde,
once remarked to Gacy: "John, I can't understand why in hell you hire all these
kids. ... They don't have experience. They don't know what they're doing."''
It has been suggested that Gacy recognized that the boys worked for low wages.
Id.
,,2 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 58.
" Fritsch, supra note 110.




" Linedecker, supra note 85, at 83.
"' Fritsch, A Portrait of John Gacy, as Drawn From His Life, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1980
at 16, col. 3.
"I Mustain, "Lucky" Gacy Victim Tells of Drugs, Assault, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 7, 1979,
at 7, col. 1.
,' Linedecker, supra note 85, at 79.
,22 See Dr. Helen Morrison, supra note 77.
'z Linedecker, supra note 85, at 76.
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Additionally, given Gacy's sexual preference there were clear reasons "for main-
taining close personal contact with a steady stream of firm-bodied adolescent
boys. 124
B. The Crimes
The darker side of John Wayne Gacy's personality revolved around the young
men and boys whom he brought to his modest home. Soon after he moved into
his house, Gacy began to cruise the streets of Chicago during the late night hours,
looking for boys with whom he might engage in sexual activity.'23 Gacy claimed
that the first murder he committed occurred one such night, 2 6 when the young
man he picked up at the Greyhound bus station in downtown Chicago and took
to his home for sexual activity attacked him with a knife the following morning. 27
Gacy said he disarmed his attacker and stabbed him to death.' 28 In a confession
to the police following his arrest, Gacy maintained that he did not kill again until
two years later because his mother-in-law was living with him and his wife. 2 9 Begin-
ning in 1974, Gacy typically would cruise through Bughouse Square (a Chicago
area frequented by male prostitutes) in a black Oldsmobile outfitted with police-
type spotlights and a radio scanner. 31 Word quickly spread among the street hustlers
in the area that the man who drove the big black Oldsmobile enjoyed particularly
rough sado-masochistic activities and that he should be avoided.' 3'
Yet, Gacy continued to find willing participants who bartered their bodies for
money. According to Gacy, many of these transactions occurred without any physical
attack or threat of killing.' 32 However, if the person Gacy picked up raised the
price originally agreed upon for sex, Gacy claimed he would murder him. 33 Gacy
first would incapacitate his victim by handcuffing him, usually telling the victim
that he was a clown and would show him a trick. 34 Then Gacy would tell his cap-
tive that he had just one trick to show him-the rope trick,' 35 whereupon Gacy
12, Id. at 77.
,25 Mount, Gacy Car to be Auctioned to Pay Legal Bills, Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1979, at
1, col. 3.
126 Galloway, Gacy Had Planned Concrete Graveyard, Prosecutor Says, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb.
21, 1980, at 8, col. 2. Gacy's statements to police contained many contradictions, including the fact
that he first said his initial killing took place on January 3, 1972, and later said this killing occurred in 1974.
127 Id.
121 Id.
129 Fritsch, Gacy Said "Jack" Did Killing, Witness Says, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1980, at 2,.
col. I.
30 Id.
"I, Linedecker, supra note 85, at 109.
132 Fritsch, supra note 129. Gacy told one police investigator that he had 1,500 bisexual relation-
ships within a five-year period.
133 Id.
"14 113 Tmm 23 (Jan. 8, 1979). After Gacy had his victim securely handcuffed, he would tell him
that the trick to getting the handcuffs off was to have the key to the handcuffs.
2I Galloway, Officer Relates How Gacy Read Victim a Psalm, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 16, 1980,
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would create a garrote by placing a rope around the victim's neck, tieing a series
of knots, and inserting a stick between the knots."3 6 As the victim would convulse,
the rope would tighten around his neck.
37
Twenty-nine victims were buried under Gacy's property, twenty-six in the crawl
space, where Gacy would pour lime to cut the odor and to create a powerful acid
to hasten decomposition of the bodies.' 38 The shallow graves in the crawl space,
arranged in the formation of spokes on a wheel, were dug by Gacy and a number
of his employees. 1 3 Although Gacy told his employees that he needed the holes
dug so that he could put in drain tiles, he said in his confession to police that
he had his employees dig holes so that he "would have graves available."' 4 A
number of bodies were found with wads of cloth, paper, or underwear stuffed
in their mouths' 4' and some had plastic bags wrapped around their heads to stop
the victims' bleeding from their mouths and noses, according to Gacy.' 4 2 When
discovered, a number of the corpses had ropes still tied around their necks.' 4 3 Cook
County Medical Examiner Dr. Robert Stein raised the possibility that some of the
victims may actually have been buried alive, after they had been choked to un-
consciousness and appeared dead to Gacy. '44
In his confession, Gacy said he killed his victims, not only if they raised the
agreed upon price for sex, but also if they posed a threat to him, either by exposing
his activities to friends and neighbors or by showing remorse after the completion
of a homosexual act.'4 1 It was into this category that 15-year-old Robert Piest,
Gacy's final victim fell.' 4 6 Piest was an employee of a suburban drug store in Des
Plaines, Illinois. Gacy apparently went into the store and mentioned to Piest that
he was looking for workers, and would pay about twice what Piest was then
making.' 7 Piest left the drug store on that mid-December night in 1978 after tell-
ing his mother, who had come to drive him home, that he was going to talk to
a contractor about a job and would be right back.' 48 When Piest did not return,
at 4, col. 1. Gacy used a rosary and a pen to demonstrate the rope trick to assistant state's attorney
Lawrence Finder, pretending that Finder's wrist was a victim's neck.
336 Fritsch, Hint to Gacy Jury: Some Buried Alive, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20, 1980, at 4, col. 3.
'" Galloway, supra note 126. Gacy said that the rope trick created an affect whereby the victims
killed themselves because the rope would grow tighter as the victims would move their necks.
ISS Galloway, Gacy Called "'Rational, Evil Man" Who Slew 33 Like "Swatting Flies," Chicago
Sun-Times, Feb. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
"I Fritsch, Personality Traits Detailed at Trial, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Ac-
cording to Gacy, one of his employees, Gregory Godzik, "Dug his own grave."
, Fritsch, supra note 129.
"' Sullivan & Maiken supra note 94, at 206.
142 Id. -
"I Fritsch, supra note 136. The fact that Gacy buried the bodies in his crawl space caused in-
vestigators to undertake a painstaking recovery effort to identify the skeletons properly.
1" Id.
"' Sullivan & Maiken supra note 94, at 206.
146 Id. at 208.
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his family searched for him and finally called the Des Plaines police, who, after
checking with the manager and other employees of the pharmacy, identified Gacy
as the contractor with whom Piest supposedly went to talk.' 9 Upon learning of
Gacy's sodomy conviction, the police began a surveillance of Gacy which continued
until his arrest.' 5 With information about the Piest boy's apparel and personal
possessions, the police secured a search warrant.' 5 ' On the basis of items obtained
from the search, police were able to establish that Piest had been in Gacy's house.1 52
After obtaining a second search warrant, police discovered the graveyard that was
Gacy's crawl space.1 53 Upon being taken into custody, and in the presence of counsel,
Gacy made a rambling statement and confessed to more than thirty killings, in-
cluding that of Robert Piest, whose body was discovered sometime later in a river,
where Gacy had disposed of at least four bodies.' 54 Investigators soon determined
that Gacy's victims looked strikingly similar; all in the mid-teens to mid-twenties
with blond or light brown hair and slender build. All were white males.1 55
Although most of what police and prosecutors know about John Gacy and
his killings came from Gacy's own statements,' 56 further information about Gacy's
violent behavior has been revealed by those who survived the attacks and avoided
what Gacy called his "burial grounds."' 5 7 One victim, Jeffrey Rignall, wrote 29
Below,'5' a book about his brush with death. Rignall tells of a night of sexual
mistreatment and torture suffered at the hands of John Gacy,' 5 9 and of the insen-
sitivity of police and prosecutors to his ordeal.' 60 According to Rignall, his
nightmarish plight began while walking on Chicago's near north side about 1:30
a.m. on March 22, 1978. Gacy drove up in his Oldsmobile, offered him a mari-
juana cigarette and a ride to a nearby bar.' 61
Soon after Rignall willingly entered Gacy's car, he felt a chloroform-soaked
149 Id.
"' Crimmins, The Cops Who Closed in on John Wayne Gacy, Chicago Tribune Magazine, Aug.
24, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
I" Id. at 26, col. 2. Judge Marvin Peters later said that the major reason why he signed the search
warrant was the fact that Robert Piest had told his waiting mother "I'll be right back."
" Id. at 27, col. 1. The key piece of evidence proving that Robert Piest was in Gacy's house
was a receipt for a roll of film that was found in Gacy's wastebasket during the first search by police
and which police soon learned had been in Piest's jacket pocket the night of his disappearance.
'5 Id. at 28, col. 1. Gacy, while sitting on Death Row, remarked: "The only thing I should have
been convicted of was operating a funeral parlor without a license." Petacque & Hough, Feds Zero
in on AFL-CIO "Envoy," Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 15, 1981, at 9, col. 2.
"' Fritsch, Gacy Sentenced to Death, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 14, 1980, at 1, col. I.
'" Gacy told police that all of his victims were willing sex partners; however, this assertion was
not seriously believed since a number of them were known to be heterosexual. Petacque & Hough,
Gacy Says Fear Motivated 32 Slayings, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
6 Galloway, supra note 138.
"' Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 207.
J. RIONA.L & R. WILDER, 29 BELOW (1979).
1"9 Id.
1"0 Id. The handling of Rignall's case by police and prosecutors will be fully discussed in Part
II.B. of this Article.
" Id. at 65-67.
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rag being pushed against his face and he lost consciousness. " The 27-year-old
Rignall was driven to Gacy's suburban house, where he was brutally sexually
attacked" 3 by Gacy, who apparently was aided at one point by an accomplice.' "
After the attack, during which Rignall claimed to have suffered agonizing pain
and repeatedly was knocked unconscious by chloroform, he was driven by Gacy
to the Lincoln Park area of Chicago and dumped at the base of a statue." 5 Doc-
tors determined that Rignall had sustained serious injuries in the attack, including
permanent liver damage from the chloroform, facial bums from the chloroform,
and rectal bleeding.1 6 Through his own investigative efforts, 6 Rignall found out
that his attacker was Gacy. Rignall accepted an out-of-court settlement of $3,000
that covered roughly one-half of his medical expense at that time.'
6
Nineteen-year-old Robert Donnelly underwent a similar night of sexual abuse
and torture at the hands of Gacy. 6 Gacy was cruising the northwest side of Chicago
on December 30, 1977, when he noticed Donnelly, a college student, walking to
a bus stop." Gacy turned his Oldsmobile's spotlight on Donnelly and told him
that he was a policeman and that he'd better get into the car. Gacy handcuffed
Donnelly and drove him to his house.' At his house, Gacy tortured Donnelly
sexually, held a gun to his head and continually spun the cylinder and fired (unknown
to Donnelly, it was filled with blank cartridges), and attempted to drown Donnelly
in the bathtub. 2 After the attack Gacy drove Donnelly back into Chicago and
dropped him off at a department store, warning him not to go to police because
they would not believe him.'1 3 Donnelly did go to the police, but they refused to
process a complaint against Gacy. '1
162 Id. at 69.
263 When asked at Gacy's trial to recount the attack, Rignall vomited and began sobbing loudly.
Galloway, Man Claiming Rape by Gacy Collapses, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 22, 1980, at 8, col. 3.
264 No one aside from Gacy was arrested in connection with the attack on Rignall.
26, Rignall & Wilder, supra note 158, at 81-82.
266 Id. at 110-11.
267 Id. at 119-35. Rignall had remembered that after he was chloroformed in Gacy's car, that
Gacy had driven on the Kennedy Expressway and exited at Cumberland Avenue. Rignall, sometimes
accompanied by friends, sat at the Cumberland Avenue exit waiting to see the black Oldsmobile that
Gacy had driven. After spotting Gacy's car one day, Rignall followed the car to the house at 8213
West Sumnerdale Avenue and later checked public records for the name of the owner of the house-
John Gacy.
263 Galloway, supra note 163.
163 Fritsch, Gacy Witness Tells of a Night of Terror, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 4, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
170 Id.
1 Id.
17 Id. Donnelly also recounted that Gacy "reached around my neck, and he pulled something
around my neck, and he started twisting it," while saying "My, aren't we having fun tonight."
273 Galloway, Victim Quotes Gacy: "Having Fun," Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 4, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
", Id. Gacy phoned Donnelly several times after the attack to taunt him because the police did
not believe he had been brutalized by Gacy against his will. Royko, A Word for Justice, Chicago Sun-
Times, Nov. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1. The handling of Donnelly's case by police and prosecutors will be
fully discussed in Section III infra.
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Following Gacy's arrest the police identified a number of other victims who
survived Gacy's attacks. Undoubtedly there are others who have not been iden-
tified. In fact, soon after Gacy was released from prison in Iowa and placed on
one year probation until June 18, 1971, he was accused of forcing men on two
separate occasions to perform homosexual acts with him in violation of his
probation. 7 5 However, the Iowa Parole Board was never informed of these allega-
tions and Gacy was released from probation after a year.171 It was not long after
these two incidents that Gacy again was brought to the attention of police. Twenty-
four-year-old Jackie Dee accused Gacy of forcing him to perform fellatio.'77 These
charges were dismissed, however, after investigators determined that Dee was try-
ing to extort money from his alleged attacker.'7
There were two other incidents involving Gacy that could have provided grounds
for criminal charges. However, police did not learn about these incidents until after
Gacy was arrested. Michael Reid testified that he had lived with Gacy for a short
time in 1971, but had moved out after Gacy hit him on the head with a hammer
during an argument. 79 Jack Pyssler worked for Gacy's contracting firm and ac-
companied Gacy on a business trip to Florida. Pyssler later accused Gacy of hav-
ing raped him in Florida. Rather than report the incident to police Pyssler took
his own revenge by physically attacking Gacy."' As a result, Pyssler was found
guilty of battery and sentenced to one year probation.' 8' Anthony Antonucci was
apparently the victim of an attempted sexual attack in 1975, when Gacy showed
him the handcuff trick. Antonucci was able to free himself from one of the hand-
cuffs so that when Gacy began to undress him, Antonucci was able to tackle the
contractor and place the handcuffs on him. 82 Within a few minutes Antonucci
freed Gacy after Gacy laughed off the incident as a joke." 3 Robert Sipsuich met
Gacy at a northwest side Chicago bar frequented by working-class people and went
to Gacy's house after being offered some drugs. Sipsuich was chloroformed and
sexually molested." 4 Jamie, a 19-year-old prostitute, met Gacy in Bughouse Square
and was driven to Gacy's house where he was beaten.'15 Jamie told his hustler
friends, but not the police, about this incident."'
'71 Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 254.
176 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 53.
"77 Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 15.
"7 Id.
,79 Galloway, supra note 163.
10 Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at.68.
" Despite this incident, Gacy included Pyssler's name on a list of possible witnesses the defense
might want to call to testify as to Gacy's character.
" Fritsch, Youth Tells of Grappling With Gacy, Chicago Tribune.
"' Id.
'" Mustain, supra note 120. Sipsuich later learned that Gacy had taken photographs of him sprawled
nude while he was unconscious in Gacy's family room.
" Id.
"' Linedecker, supra note 85, at 53.
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In 1976, the Chicago police were alerted to the disappearance of a nine-year-
old male prostitute. Other boys told police that the missing boy might have gone
with the man in the big black Oldsmobile. 187 Police quickly identified Gacy as the
man, placed him under surveillance for two weeks and questioned the endless stream
of young boys that seemed to go in and out of the Gacy house."' The surveillance
was ended when police could not link Gacy to the disappearance of the youth." 9
At the opening of Gacy's trial for the 33 murders, one of the policemen assigned
to trail Gacy during those two weeks reflected on the tragic turn of events. "It
makes me sick to think about it," he told a newspaper reporter. "Maybe if we
could have gotten something on the guy, we could have saved an awful lot of
lives."" 0
C. Victims' Complaints, Missing Person Reports and Police Investigation
After the capture of John Wayne Gacy, the Chicago Police Department came
under criticism for not linking the disappearance of the youths to Gacy sooner
than it did."' Likewise, the police and the state's attorney's office were criticized
for their handling of the cases involving the complaints of Jeffrey Rignall and Robert
Donnelly." 92 Rignall claimed that the police were so uncooperative that he had to
spend weeks tracing the identity of his attacker.' 9 3 Even after he determined that
Gacy was the man who had attacked him, Rignall said police were hesitant to serve
an arrest warrant. Rignall was told that he would have to wait until Gacy was
stopped for some other minor offense such as a traffic violation.19 Rignall believed
police treated his case as routine after he told officers that he was homosexual
and after they found out that he previously had been arrested for possession of
marijuana. ' Rignall claimed that when he complained about the sexual assault,
the police treated him as if he were on drugs, even though the police knew that
Gacy previously had served a prison sentence for sodomy. 196 After Gacy was ar-
rested for the assault on Rignall, the prosecutor allegedly told Rignall and his at-
torney that the state's attorney's office would not pursue a criminal conviction.
This prosecutorial decision was made despite the fact that Gacy had been convicted
of sodomy and had twice been accused of sex offenses in 1972.19
Robert Donnelly also found the state's attorney's office unwilling to pursue
1,7 Id. at 110.
l' Kneeland, supra note 62.
Id. The nine-year-old later turned up alive in California. See Linedecker, supra note 85, at 187.
110 Keegan, They Lined Up to Hear of the Killings, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
"I See Sullivan & Maiken supra note 94, at 213-14; Linedecker, supra note 85, at 92-97.
192 See generally 29 BELow, supra note 158; Royko, supra note 174.
191 Rignall & Wilder, supra note 158, at 119-37.
194 Id. at 176.
'9, Galloway, supra note 163.
96 Gorman, Gacy Seized Year Ago but Freed, Records Show, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 7, 1979,
at 22, col. 1.
" Rignall & Wilder, supra note 158, at 218-20.
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a criminal prosecution against Gacy. 198 The prosecutor apparently accepted Gacy's
story that the sexual encounter was consensual, despite Gacy's prison sentence and
Donnelly's injuries. 199 In both cases, the state's attorney's office exercised pro-
secutorial discretion in determining whether to pursue a conviction and whether
to pursue a misdemeanor rather than a felony conviction."' Recognizing that pro-
secutorial discretion is necessary to keep the prosecutor's caseload at a manageable
level, 0 ' the failure to press charges in rape cases and sexual attack cases often ap-
pears to result from prejudice against the victim, rather than from a principled
judgment about the merits of the case against the accused.20 2
The Chicago Police Department also came under attack from the parents of
a number of victims for the seemingly routine fashion in which the sudden disap-
pearance of their sons were treated. 20 3 Unlike the Des Plaines police officers, who
doggedly pursued Gacy after determining that Robert Piest's disappearance did not
fit the pattern of. a typical runaway case, 20 4 Chicago police officers frequently told
family members making missing persons reports that their sons probably had run
away.2 5 This was true of the police action in the case of Gregory Godzik. Despite
the fact that Godzik's parents told police that their son led a pleasant home life,
that he had a girlfriend, a good job and that the car he was so protective of was
found abandoned and unlocked,20 6 police treated the report routinely. John Szyc's
parents also were told their son probably was a runaway, even though there was
apparently no basis for making such an inference. 20 7 Syzc had never worked for
Gacy's contracting firm, but police discovered that Gacy was in possession of Szyc's
car and questioned him about it. 2°8 Gacy's name also was tied to the disappearance
of John Butkovich, who had been an employee of Gacy. °9 Butkovich's father Marko
had told the police that his son was owed back pay from Gacy and that the con-
'" Galloway, supra note 173.
"' Royko, supra note 174.
20 See generally Cox, Discretion-A Twentieth-Century Mutation, 28 OKmA. L. Rv. 311 (1975).
201 Id.
202 Id.
"I The mother of one missing youth, John Szyc, said that she and her husband "were deeply
distressed by what they thought was the lack of either interest or competence on the part of the police
and the fact that, after a dozen follow-up calls, they still had not found her son." Sullivan & Maiken,
supra note 94, at 50.
20, Crimmins, supra note 150.
200 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 92-97.
200 Id. at 92-93.
207 Id. at 96-97. The Chicago Police Department halted their investigation into the disappearance
of John Szyc after a number of his friends (apparently erroneously) reported seeing him. Sullivan &
Maiken, supra note 94, at 213.
2*8 Id. The author states: "A few days after investigators talked with Gacy, police sent a letter
to Szyc's parents advising them that although they had been unable to locate the boy, they had learned
that he had sold his car and told the buyer he needed the money to leave town. The police made no
effort to explain why, if Szyc needed money, he had left behind two paychecks, all of his personal
belongings, and had purchased new license plates for the car on January 20, the day he vanished."
209 Mathews & Maler, supra note 74, at 24.
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tractor might have been responsible for his son's disappearance. ',0 The police's
failure to connect Gacy to his son's mysterious disappearance caused the elder
Butkovich to remark after Gacy's arrest: "If the police had only paid attention
to us they might have save many lives... they can't put two and two together."'II
Another disturbing aspect of the police investigations is that although the name
of John Gacy almost immediately was connected to the disappearance of Godzik
and Butkovich, this common denominator was not discovered by the police because
the disappearances occurred in different Chicago police districts and information
of this type was not listed on the police missing persons computer." 2 Furthermore,
the police officers investigating these disappearances did not bother to check whether
Gacy had a prior arrest record.2 3
The police department responded to criticism that its officers did not adequately
follow up on the missing persons investigations of Gacy's victims by pointing to
the high volume of persons reported missing each year. 214 In 1977, for example,
19,455 men, women and children were reported missing to Chicago police, of which
at least 6,700 were under the age of seventeen. 215 In 1982, 11,958 youths under
the age of seventeen were reported missing to Chicago police and an estimated
one million children were reported missing nationwide. 21 6 In response to critics,
Chicago police scanned through their missing persons files from 1972, the year
in which Gacy claimed to have first killed, through the date of Gacy's arrest in
1978, and determined that there were 45,000 case reports on file that contained
descriptions of possible victims of Gacy.
217
There is a need to improve police processing of missing person complaints.
Better information systems relating such reports and other information about per-
sons possibly responsible for foul play in connection with missing persons need
to be developed. In response to the Gacy case, the Chicago Police Department
announced plans to include more pertinent information in its computer files of
missing persons so that common denominators among cases can be ascertained.21 8
Independent of a developed information system on missing persons, as one com-
mentator has suggested, the routine nature in which many of the disappearances
210 Id.
221 Id. Marko Butkovich sued Gacy for $6 million for causing his son's death. Dead Youth's Dad
Sues Gacy for $6 Million, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
2,2 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 93.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 129-32.
225 Id. at 129.
226 Henry, More Kids Leave Home-But Most Regret It, Chicago Sun-Times, July 24, 1983, at
19, col. 1.
22, Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 213.
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were treated, including the failure of police to check into Gacy's criminal
background, showed "incredible incompetence." '19
Some responsibility must, however, be placed on those parents who did not
report their sons missing, 20 and on those young men and boys who were molested
by John Gacy, but never reported the incidents to police for one reason or another.",
According to one commentator, there are three factors that a victim will consider
in determining whether to report a criminal incident to police: (1) his relationship
to his assailant; (2) the seriousness of the attack; and (3) whether the victim as
well as the assailant could be implicated in the attack.222 The balancing of these
factors by Gacy's victims who survived attacks or attempted attacks may help ex-
plain how society can effectively respond to the victim's plight and encourage reports
of victimization to the police.
Gacy allegedly made homosexual advances to many of his employees. 23 The
fact that the employees had a personal relationship with Gacy (employer/employee),
that many of the employees would joke about Gacy's sexual preferences, and that
most of the sexual overtures were not serious physical threats perhaps explains why
none of the advances were reported to police. Additionally, the relationships may
explain why none of the employees would say anything derogatory about Gacy
when police questioned them about the disappearance of a few youths. 2 ' Likewise,
the balancing of the relationship of the victim to the assailant and the seriousness
of the attack may have influenced Michael Reid, who had lived with Gacy, and
Jack Pyssler and Anthony Antonucci, who both had worked for Gacy, not to report
the criminal incidents to which they were subjected to the police. 22
A number of Gacy's victims may have been persuaded not to contact the police
after attacks because they believed that they could be implicated in the crime.22 6
Robert Sipsuich, for instance, willingly went with Gacy to his house in order to
take narcotics. 2 7 Another victim, Jamie, was a prostitute, who had willingly gone
29 Bill Treanor of the National Youth Work Alliance in Washington, D.C. also said: "Ten minutes
spent looking at the pattern of sudden disappearance in some routine reports could prevent a lot of
these crimes." Behind Growing Worry Over Runaway Youths, 86 U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT 63
(Jan. 15, 1979).
220 For instance, two victims that Gacy threw in rivers after murdering them, James Mazzarra
and Timothy O'Rourke, never were reported missing to police.
221 For reasons why victims of crimes are hesitant to report the crime to police, see generally
Block, Why Notify The Police, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 555 (1974).
222 Id. at 560.
223 Elson, Suspect's Former Employees Tell of Sexual Advances, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 23, 1979,
at 4, col. 5.
22 Kneeland, supra note 2. Anthony Antonucci, reflecting on the time Gacy tried to remove his
clothes after attempting to handcuff him, said he thought the incident was a "joke." Fritsch, supra
note 182.
223 Block, supra note 221, at 561.
226 Id. at 556.
22, Mustain, supra note 120.
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to Gacy's house to engage in sexual acts for money.228 Another victim, also a male
prostitute, had an additional reason not to report to police Gacy's sexual attack
and attempt to kill him-he had heard through the homosexual grapevine that Gacy
was a policeman. 229 "A victim who believes either that his testimony will be dis-
counted by police (a cost) or that he is nearly as likely to be arrested as his assailant
(a cost) is not likely to notify police of an attack." ' Thus, street hustlers, admit-
ted homosexuals, and persons with arrest records are less likely to report attackers
such as Gacy to police. With fewer persons reporting attacks to police, law en-
forcement authorities are less able to discern a pattern of criminal behavior that
will lead to the arrest of the perpetrator. Furthermore, the negative tone of police
reaction to complaints of victims, serves to make other victims of serious assaults
less likely to report criminal attacks to the police.23' Thus, the reporting of crimes
by victims could be enhanced by a greater sensitivity to victims of crime and by
overcoming police and prosecutor prejudice toward minorities and persons with
nonconventional life styles.
D. Media Coverage
The horrors that occurred inside John Gacy's house initially were made public
as the first bodies were being unearthed by evidence technicians. 232 Soon afterward,
the treatment by the media, particularly the print media, of Gacy's crimes and
his legal defense became an issue in itself. Chicago's two major daily newspapers,
the Chicago Tribune and the Sun-Times, tried to "scoop" each other with little
regard for Gacy's right to a fair trial.2 33 Although media coverage did not create
a circus-like atmosphere, like the ones which arguably developed in the trials of
Sam Sheppard 234 and Billy Sol Estes; 235 daily media coverage, nevertheless, posed
serious legal and administrative problems. For instance, Cook County Medical Ex-
aminer Dr. Robert Stein, who directed the unearthing of the bodies from Gacy's
229 Id.
211 Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 221.
230 Block, supra note 221, at 562.
231 Id.
232 Mount & Koziol, 4 Slaying Victims Found; 28 More are Feared Dead, Chicago Tribune, Dec.
23, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
233 Simon, Should You Know all that about Gacy, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 2, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
23, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, the Supreme Court overturned defen-
dant's conviction for murder because of numerous abuses of power by the presiding trial judge and
the prosecutor. Among the trial judge's action included his allowing one television station to stage
an interview with him as he entered the courthouse; his allowing the jury to pose for newspaper
photographers one day before rendering a verdict; his allowing two jurors to remain on the jury despite
their having stated in open court that they had heard a broadcast accusing the defendant of fathering
an illegitimate child; his allowing a radio station to broadcast next to the jury room; and his allowing
the press to cram inside the bar during the trial and repeatedly interrupt the proceedings. The media
further contributed to the defendant being denied a fair trial by disseminating unsubstantiated rumors
as fact and by inflaming the public mood with venemous editorials decrying the defendant's legal rights.
233 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The Supreme Court overturned the defendant's swindling
conviction based on prejudicial media coverage, including the televising of the trial.
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crawl space, in a taped interview on a Chicago radio station, stated that the crimes
could have been committed by a sane person who could be sent to the electric
chair.236 Although a circuit court judge rejected a petition by Gacy's lawyers for
an injunction against the broadcast of the interview, 237 the possible taint on pros-
pective jurors by such a broadcast could have been great in view of Dr. Stein's
official position, particularly since the question of the defendant's sanity was to
be a crucial issue at trial.
Similar concerns were expressed by Gacy's lawyers and by commentators who
were concerned that Gacy receive a fair trial when the media repeatedly reported
privileged information allegedly gained from Dr. Stein and from the Cook County
Sheriff, Richard Elrod. 238 The handling of the Gacy case by police and prosecutors
was even raised during a political campaign involving Cook County State's At-
torney Bernard Carey. 239 Friction developed among various police authorities, as
the local city police and the county sheriff's office jockeyed to capture the media
spotlight. 240 Perhaps the most vocal criticism of the media for its handling of the
Gacy case was uttered by the Chicago homosexual community, which was outraged
by the continued reference to Gacy as "an avowed homosexual" in early press
reports of the crimes.24' The newspapers eventually discontinued this reference, but
the Chicago-based Gay Life newspaper expressed concern that "the taint is already
there, the damage already done. ' 242 Gay Life, one of the largest circulated and
most respected newspapers which reports to the midwest gay community, itself can
be faulted for underreporting the issues raised by the Gacy case, particularly those
that affected homosexuals, including the fact that many of Gacy's victims were
216 Simon, Gacy Case Becomes Legal Nightmare, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at 4. col. 1.
:37 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 203.
11s Simon, supra note 236; Sneed, Gacy Attorney Threatens to Sue Elrod in "Leaks," Chicago
Tribune, Jan. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
239 Royko, supra note 174; Koshner, Royko Column "11th-hour Smear:" Carey, Chicago Sun-
Times, Nov. 2, 1980, at 44, col. 1.
20 "Since the sheriff's police had taken command of the scene at Summerdale, their vehicles were
prominently displayed in the glare of television floodlights, and their activities were getting the major
share of the (news) coverage. The Des Plaines police simply didn't know how to react" as their officers
became resentful of being pushed outside media coverage. Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 182.
"Resentment in the (Des Plaines) community had been simmering. Residents of Des Plaines were rightfully
proud of their police department and of the fine investigative work that had broken open a case that
its much larger and presumably more sophisticated and better trained brother organization in Chicago
had bungled, despite several encounters with the suspect. . .. Now, suddenly, it seemed to some residents
of the suburb that after all their hard work, the investigators responsible for breaking the case were
being crowded out by larger agencies anxious for positive publicity." Linedecker, supra note 85, at 202.
" Commentary, Gacy Trial Accuses all Gay People, GAY LIE, Feb. 1, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
242 Id. One letter to the editor in the Chicago Sun-Times summed up the feelings of many in
the Chicago gay community by stating that; "the gay community does not share guilt for these slayings
any more than other members of Gacy's profession, remodeling contractors, do. Despite the fact that
the suspect once told police he is a homosexual, the slayings should not be looked upon as 'homosexual
murders,' but simply 'murders.' " Letters: Homosexuals Fear Being Brunt of More Repression, Chicago
Sun-Times, Jan. 12, 1979, at 46, col. 1.
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homosexual, and that a number of bodies had not been identified. Gay Life made
no effort to aid in the identification process or to encourage any of its readers
who were victimized by Gacy to come forward." 3 Similarly, the arrest and convic-
tion of John Gacy received scant reporting in the nation's news magazines, despite
the fact that Gacy was convicted of more murders than any person in the country's
history and that his case raised compelling legal issues."
The Chicago media's massive coverage of the crimes and emphasis on grisly
details caused an additional problem-this one for Gacy's neighbors."" Not only
did the stories of the crimes bring hordes of reporters to the 8200 block of West
Summerdale, but also hundreds of curious onlookers who braved cold weather and
heavy snow to watch the removal of the bodies." Even two weeks after the first
bodies were removed, one reporter wrote: "The diehards still come, many with
children, just to stand watching the house. Some have lined up their families in
front of Gacy's house to take photographs, as if they were at Disney World,
neighbors say incredulously. Some gawkers even have shown up in wheel chairs." 4 7
Likewise, hundreds of persons flocked to the courthouse to witness Gacy's trial."
One journalist wrote: "It has been years since the old high-ceilinged, marble Criminal
Courts Building . . . had held such a crowd. Not since the days of the pretrial
hearing for Richard Speck and the sensational trial of cigar-chomping Mafiosi." 49
The public interest in Gacy and his crimes, spurred by media accounts, ex-
tended beyond the gawkers at Gacy's house and trial. When defense attorneys pro-
posed to raise money to defray the costs of Gacy's defense by auctioning Gacy's
"prowl" car which had been used to transport at least one corpse, that of Robert
Piest, Gacy's attorneys said: "We have people offering far more than the (car and
van) are worth, presumably because [the items] are Gacy's."250 Even with all of
the publicity surrounding Gacy's crimes and the number of unidentified victims,
2I The authors of this Article could find only two articles based on Gacy's trial and crimes in
Gay Life from December 1978 to July 1980. However, there were approximately one dozen articles
concerning the shooting deaths of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and city council member Harvey
Milk, an avowed homosexual.
244 The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature from 1978 through 1982 showed only four articles
in national periodicals about Gacy.
24I Gacy's crimes and his neighborhood on West Summerdale Avenue even prompted the perfor-
mance of a play in a New York city warehouse theater. The play, called "The House Across the Street",
deals with the reaction of neighbors to the raping and murdering of young boys by resident "John
Wayne Cooper." One reviewer wrote that the playwright was prompted to write about the crimes after
"she was amazed by the throng of curious spectators that paraded past the roped-off house, the long
lines of cars circling slowly around the block." Doyle, "Sick, Funny" Play About Fictional Gacy
Neighbors, The (Arlington Heights) Daily Herald, Feb. 17, 1982.
246 Id.
214 Ogintz and Axelrod, supra note 108. Gacy's next-door neighbor, Lillian Grexa, remarked, "Can
you imagine, some lady wanted to take MY picture the other day. I just couldn't believe it."
2,1 Keegan, supra note 190.
2.9 Id.
2,0 Mount, supra note 125. Defense attorney Robert Motta said that he had been offered as much
as $50,000 for Gacy's car. Paintings done by John Gacy in prison also proved to be popular. The
1194 [Vol. 86
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss4/8
INSANITY DEFENSE
the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office received fewer than three hundred
dental records and X-rays from around the country. 5 ' One police official suggested
that many parents did not send in dental and medical charts on their missing sons
because they did not want to find out that their children had been involved in
a case with homosexual overtones. 52
Although authorities received relatively few responses to their request for den-
tal and medical charts of missing youths, they were overwhelmed by offers from
persons who volunteered to act as John Gacy's executioner. 25 3 Illinois Department
of Corrections officials received hundreds of offers after Gacy was sentenced to
death and after the Department of Corrections stated that it did not want any
member of its staff to perform the execution.25 ' Persons ranging from a minister
to a prisoner volunteered to pull the switch on this country's most prolific con-
victed murderer. As one volunteer wrote, expressing the sentiments of many others,
"Nothing would give me greater pleasure than pulling the switch on John W.
Gacy." 2"5 The expressed desire for "vengeance," of course, runs counter to the
objective of the criminal law, which is to inflict deserved punishment on responsi-
ble persons. The only issue raised by Gacy's trial was whether he was a criminally
responsible person or insane. To make that determination, the law necessarily turned
to psychiatrists.
The next section of this Article is an effort to draw on the insights of psychiatry
for an understanding of Gacy, and consider the relevance of those insights for mak-
ing the legal determination of his guilt. This discussion will be followed by an ac-
count of the criminal trial of John Gacy and of the various expert opinions offered
at trial about Gacy and the nature of his mental disorder. Attention is given to
the manner in which these psychiatric insights were transformed into legal evidence
at Gacy's trial.
III. JoHN GAcY-A PSYCHIATRIC PROFILE
A. Family History2'5
In an interview, Marion Gacy, John's mother, described the childhood of herself
and John's father, John S. Gacy, as happy and carefree. John S. Gacy was 38
paintings, 33 in all, were sold for $35 each at the Illinois State Fair in August 1982. Thompson's Ban
too Late: Gacy Paintings are Sellout, Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 12, 1982, at 24, col. 1.
25, Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 212.
252 Linedecker, supra note 85, at 187. See also, Sullivan & Maiken, supra note 94, at 210.
21 N.Y. Times, supra note 61.
214 Id.
.. Id. One volunteer, a prison inmate, wrote: "I will soon be appearing before the board of
parole and I do need a job, plus a new start in life."
26 The information contained in this section of the Article is derived from three sources: (1) Inter-
views and psychiatric evaluations of Mrs. Marion Gacy, January 1980 and July 1983; (2) Interview
and psychiatric evaluation of Karen Gacy Ku ma, January 1980; and (3) Interview and psychiatric evalua-
tion of John Wayne Gacy, January 1980. Each person studied was aware of the collection of this data
and its use for scientific exploration and study. All information was audiotaped and transcribed. It
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and Marion was 30 years of age when they married. John Gacy Sr. had been
wounded in World War II. The injuries he received were to contribute to his history
of hospitalizations. The marriage of Gacy's parents was described by his mother
as good, despite several instances of physical abuse by her husband. The Gacy's
had three children, two daughters, one older and one younger than their son John.
Marion Gacy indicated that her husband was just like her own father, "a great
fisherman, a man, not a mollycoddle." She stated that her husband was a "strict
guy, perfection personified." Marion Gacy described her son as being just like his
father. Gacy's father had multiple physical problems related to his war injuries
and various additional illnesses. Some hospitalizations were related to his daily drink-
ing bouts in the family's basement. The family did not admit to these bouts. Mrs.
Gacy referred to her husband's suspiciousness and jealousy in their marital rela-
tionship. She attributed this behavior to an alleged inoperable brain tumor. Accord-
ing to Mrs. Gacy the alleged tumor contributed to her husband's changeable "Jekyll-
Hyde" behavior. Believing that he could not help himself, Mrs. Gacy and her
children accepted all aspects of John Gacy Sr's. behavior. They tried to avoid upset-
ting Mr. Gacy by avoiding loud noise and unruly behavior. Mrs. Gacy said she
had been told by the physicians that her husband could "go out of his head,"
and "be verbally or physically abusive," but that she "would have to live with
it." During the early years of the marriage, Mr. Gacy was hospitalized for com-
plaints ranging from total paralysis to headaches. John S. Gacy died on December
19, 1969 at age 69 of cancer (according to his wife) or cirrhosis of the liver (accord-
ing to his daughter). At the time of his father's death John Wayne Gacy was 28
and an inmate in an Iowa state prison. According to his sister, John Gacy felt
that his father died because of the "shame" of the crime for which he was
incarcerated.
The disciplinary methods used by John S. Gacy included extensive inquiries
into the whereabouts of his children. The father required that the children, before
leaving home, write not only the name of the place where they were going, but
also the address and telephone number as well. Gacy's mother felt that her hus-
band imposed this requirement because he did not trust anyone.
Marion Gacy disclosed many confrontations between her husband and son.
John's sister noted that on one occasion, her brother wished to take a bath, but
her father complained it would cost too much for the pilot light to heat the water.
She reported that her father regularly shouted at her brother, taunting him to hit
him, but that her brother never would strike the father. She explained that John
did not have a temper.
Marion Gacy perceived that her son was just like his father in his ability to
work with his hands, to be organized, to be a good worker, and to be dependable.
was agreed that any publication or presentation of information would be made available to the subject
if so desired. Dr. Helen Morrison, one of the authors, conducted the interviews.
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However, she believed her son was most like herself. Like herself, Mrs. Gacy
reported that her son could not sleep longer than four hours, was overweight, had
great concern for others and did not like to be alone. Illustrations of Mrs. Gacy's
"so close" relationship with her son merit mention. According to her, one night
she put her young son to bed and the next morning observed that he had acquired
a birthmark. The mark had disappeared from the same location on her arm. Another
time, Mrs. Gacy discovered one of her teeth in the same location in her son's mouth.
The tooth had disappeared from her mouth.
B. Developmental History257
Mrs. Gacy, age 75 at the time of her son's trial for murder, stated that her
son had problems prior to his birth. He supposedly had defecated before birth,
causing respiratory problems. His birth had been rapid and Mrs. Gacy perceived
that her son was blue in color at the time of delivery. Several days after birth,
Mrs. Gacy observed that her son developed increasing breathing difficulties and
an apparent allergy to milk. She applied rectal suppositories to her son to decrease
what she believed to be the possibility of additional respiratory problems. Medica-
tions were prescribed by Mrs. Gacy herself, since she had trained and worked as
a pharmacist. The medications were used "all the time" through the first three
months of her son's life.
John Gacy's development is noteworthy because of his physical complaints and
his mother's observation that he was slower to develop an ability to walk than
was his sister. At age two, John began to exhibit sleepwalking behavior, and was
apparently unaware of his actions or surroundings during these episodes. When
John was age three or four Mrs. Gacy was searching for certain missing items of
her silk underwear. She located the items in a paper bag under a sandbox where
John had hidden them. At age six John developed a fear of sirens.
John's sister, Karen Gacy Kuzma, described her relationship with her brother
by stating that they were always together. Although there was sibling rivalry, she
felt that they were close. John Gacy visited his father's grave on his father's birth-
day, on Memorial Day, and during the winter.
Regarding his health, Karen reported that John had appendicitis, that "he got
hit in the head with a swing lots of times, had lots of blackout spells, he had some
at school." On one occasion, during a party in 1971 or 1972, he passed out and
could not remember anything. In 1970, he passed out at the top of the stairs, did
not remember where he was and acted like "someone who was drunk." Karen
had felt at the time that John was "faking" because his "talking was not real,
2" The information contained in this section of the Article is derived from two sources: (1) Inter-
views and psychiatric evaluations of Mrs. Marion Gacy, January 1980 and July 1983; and (2) Interview
and psychiatric evaluation of Karen Gacy Kuzma, January 1980.
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something in his voice was different. It was not his voice." On another occasion,
when John passed out, doctors at the hospital wanted to place him in restraints.
According to Karen, John was having a "fit," ripping the straps "like he had the
strength of ten men." The doctor recommended that John should be "in
psychiatry." After medication, "he begged and cried like a baby" to avoid con-
sultation or psychiatric hospitalization, but later acted as if nothing had happened.
Gacy's sister recalled a similar incident when their mother said John "snapped,"
starting hitting, then jumped out of the car and started hitting the car. When he
walked into the house later, he was completely different.
When she saw John in later years, Karen said: "he was extremely tired, far
away, like gazing" and he appeared depressed. John also expressed the opinion
that he had leukemia. There was no medical basis for this fear. As to the crimes
with which her brother was charged, Karen stated that it was not her brother "who
did those things."
John's mother said that her son had never fought with anyone, even when
severely provoked by his father or others. She stated that until the summer of 1978,
he had never verbally abused her. At that time he began verbally abusing her, swear-
ing at her, misidentifying the persons around him, and generally being quite "unlike
himself."
Fellow workers reported a frankness on John's part about his sexual orienta-
tion, and an apparent ability to function well both socially and as a worker. One
co-worker stated that he met John in 1974 or 1975 at a Christmas party but that
he "didn't get social until we did a job together." John had admitted that he was
bisexual, stating: "I can have just as much fun with a man as with a woman."
According to this fellow worker, John was always "helpful, an achiever" and there
was "nothing I saw bad about him."
C. Educational History
5 8
John Gacy's educational records indicate that he attended Chicago Public
Schools from 1947 through 1952. His academic functioning included failure in
behavior and scholarship from grade three. Achievement tests performed in 1951
note that John at age 10 displayed a mental age of 9.9, and an intelligence quotient
of 98. Specific subject scores included the following: reading 3.0, arithmetic 3.6,
spelling 2.1. All of these results were below grade level 5.0. John Gacy transferred
to a Catholic school in 1952. From 1957 through 1959 John attended four different
vocational schools. John dropped out of school in February of 1960. According
to his records Gacy left school because he was "over age." According to a letter
from his parents, John left because "to continue [vocational school] is a waste
" The information contained in this section of the Article was drawn from the following sources:
(1) Chicago Public School Records, 1947-1952; (2) Saint Francis Borgia School Records, Chicago, Il-
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of time, not only for him but for you also seeing as nothing can come of it."
Gacy's academic record during the vocational school period indicates excellent grades
in science, failing grades in mathematics, and inconsistent grades in other subjects.
D. Medical History259
Past medical records for John Gacy are available from 1958. Family members
reported that John had a tonsillectomy and an appendectomy in 1957. In 1958,
at age 16 he was admitted to a hospital with complaints of shortness of breath
after fainting at a friend's home. The diagnosis was coronary insufficiency. A
psychiatric consultation noted that he was "upset easily, describes father as paranoid,
iatrogenic cardiac neurosis fostered by hyperventilation, dependency, aggressive per-
sonality features with somatization."
Three months later, he was admitted to the same hospital following a physical
collapse caused by a temperature change. Again the diagnosis was coronary insuf-
ficiency. During this hospitalization, an "Accident in Hospital Report" was filed
stating that: "[The] Patient [was] found on floor, complained of headache, patient
appears disoriented and confused about what happened and why he did it. He is
laughing to himself and will not answer any questions relating to accident." Eleven
days later, the records note that he was "having a shaking spell." Records for
the next day state that "he wants other patient out of his room, unable to sleep,
patient wants doctor and parents called to come and take him home, father very
angry and won't wait for the doctor." He was discharged against medical advice
and signed out by his father.
One day later he was admitted to another hospital because Qf recurrent syn-
cope [loss of consciousness], dizziness, difficulty in breathing, a sensation of being
choked, pain below the xiphoid process and pain in the left arm. Hospital records
reported as a part of his history that John, in 1953, had been hit by a friend in
the epigastric region, after which he passed out because of pain. Gacy was discharged
from this hospital eight days later.
Six weeks later, he was readmitted with symptoms of sudden loss of con-
sciousness again related to temperature changes. This time the hospital diagnosis
was a convulsive disorder. John was placed on antiseizure medications and released
the following day. Six weeks later, John was examined after he apparently passed
out in school; he was diagnosed vasomotor syncope.260
I" The information contained in this section of the Article was drawn from the following sources:
(1) Northwest Hospital Medical Records, Chicago, Illinois, 1958; (2) Norwegian American Hospital
Medical Records, Chicago, Illinois, February 23, 1959, February 6, 1960 and January 23, 1962; (3)
St. John's Hospital Medical Records, Springfield, Illinois, December 1964; (4) Edgewater Hospital Medical
Records, Chicago, Illinois, June 23, 1973, August 27, 1974, November 4, 1976, and August 12, 1978;
(5) Loretto Hospital Medical Records, Chicago, Illinois, August 12, 1978; (6) Interview and psychiatric
evaluation of Mrs. Marion Gacy, January 1980 and July 1983; (7) Interview and psychiatric evaluation
of Karen Gacy Kuzma, January 1980.
21* Vasomotor syncope is commonly known as a fainting spell.
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The following year, August 1959, John was again examined after fainting while
sitting in a chair, but was discharged against medical advice that same day. In
February 1960, John was examined after a fall in which he sustained multiple mus-
cle and ligament injuries. Two years later, at age 20, Gacy was admitted to a hospital
with a diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy following complaints of sharp back pain
and generalized headaches. Records from. this hospitalization reflect a history of
"hysterical" blackouts during which John "remembers nothing but others said he
began to shake intermittently and it took 3 to 4 people to hold him down." The
hospital records indicate that large doses of sedative-hypnotic drugs caused him
to "snap out of it, [that he] became conscious and coherent, had been placed in
four-way restraints." Additional notes show an "[a]ccute convulsive episode last
night with loss of consciousness and violent thrashing about." Later that same
day, it is reported that Gacy was "[tialking normally and acting normally and sud-
denly developed extreme restlessness after complaining of chest pain, then patient
impossible to handle." Six days later, a notation was made that the patient had
"no knowledge of attack, 14 short episodes of convulsive seizures within 10-15
minutes." He was discharged two days later. Six days after this discharge John
Gacy was seen in the same hospital emergency room for alcoholic intoxication
followed by an "acute combative stage of excitement with loss of consciousness."
One year later, at age 21, Gacy again was hospitalized due to a "seizure of
unconsciousness with consecutive epileptiform movement. 2 61 Records show Gacy
had a seizure, shouted, struggled, demonstrated strong resistance to ambulance per-
sonnel, and had "no memory of events until after admission here." During this
hospitalization, Gacy was given major psychotropic medication. On the day of ad-
mission, he was noted as being "combative, restless, crying, not attending to anyone,
trying to get up, medication needed." The following day he was noted as having
suffered from "acute behavior disorder initiated by severe cramps in legs, especially
the left, followed by uncontrollable thrashing about in a purposeful fashion, rip-
ping wires, hitting those nearby." Nevertheless, he was discharged the same day
with antiseizure medication. A year later Gacy was seen in the emergency room
of another hospital after he "became numb all over, hyperventilated and passed
out."
No further hospital records are available until 1973 when Gacy was 31 years
old. At that time his wife reported that he complained of pain, and "[a] half hour
later he was gagging, then unconscious, then cold, did not answer." Seven days
later he was discharged. In 1976, Gacy was admitted to a hospital with complaints
of frontal headache. At this time, Gacy was diagnosed as suffering from smoke
inhalation, acute bronchitis, and obesity. He was discharged six days after admis-
sion. In 1978, Gacy was transported to a hospital by police as a battery victim.
Gacy was admitted with a diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction. However, Gacy
left the hospital against medical advice on the same day he was admitted. One
261 An epileptiform movement is a seizure-like or jerking movement.
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day later he entered another hospital stating that he had a "cardiac arrest of sorts"
at the previous hospital. Following a complete medical examination Gacy was




The record of John Gacy's sexual history and development begins with his
report that at approximately age four or five he began to take items of clothing
from his mother. He stated that he liked the feeling of her silk underwear. His
practice was to hide these garments under the porch until his mother discovered
the missing items.
At age 5 or 6, Gacy reportedly experienced a sexual incident with a girl, aged
12 to 15 years, whom he described as mentally retarded. She took him into a
bedroom and explored his genitals until his mother came into the room. The girl
was punished but he was not. Until the age of 10, when the family moved to another
home, Gacy shared a bed with his sister. Gacy stated that he had no sexual interest
in his sister. At age 6 to 8, Gacy engaged in sexual exploration consisting of visual
examination of a female friend. This behavior was interrupted by the girl's father,
and resulted in John being spanked by his father. The behavior expanded to in-
clude mock marriage ceremonies although no sexual activities accompanied these
ceremonies.
At age 9, Gacy had some "bad" experiences with a male contractor. Accord-
ing to Gacy, this contractor would come and take him for a ride in his truck. The
contractor would tell Gacy that he would show him a new wrestling hold which
resulted in Gacy's head being caught between the man's legs. Gacy reported no
sexual feelings or excitement about this activity and he avoided the contractor after
these activities had occurred.
2. Adolescence
At age 12, Gacy again began taking items of underclothes (pants) from his
mother and also neighboring clotheslines. He used these items for self-stimulation
throughout his adolescent and early adult years. He preferred certain types of
material, and would avoid other fabrics. He remembered his mother threatening
to make him wear the underwear if he did not stop taking the clothing.
At age 11, John's best friend was a male who was described by John's sister
as "odd." According to her, the friend was gay and "liked antiques and old things,
62 Unless otherwise noted the information contained in this section of the Article is derived from:
(1) Interviews and psychiatric evaluations of Mrs. Marion Gacy, January 1980 and July 1983; (2) Inter-
view and psychiatric evaluation of Karen Gacy Kuzma, January 1980; (3) Interview and psychiatric
evaluation of John Wayne Gacy, January 1980.
12011984]
33
Herman et al.: People of the State of Illinois vs. John Gacy: The Functioning of
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
didn't like girls." This relationship reportedly lasted until sometime in the early
1970's.
One of Gacy's duties during his early adolescent years was to go to the drugstore
to buy sanitary napkins for his sister. He reported that this was uncomfortable
for him. He did not want to do it, but it was expected of him. According to his
mother, he would carry the items home without wrapping them.
Gacy apparently began to date girls when he was between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen. He reported increased sexual activity ranging from kissing through
petting. His first experience with intercourse occurred at age 18. Gacy claimed this
was a nervous time because he "didn't want her to think it was my first time."
He reported that the experience was pleasurable. Although Gacy reported sex was
never discussed with his parents, he did remember his mother stating that "sex
is very beautiful and it shouldn't be forced." Gacy also reported that he engaged
in sexual exploration with two cousins.
3. Adult
At age 19, Gacy began to take items of women's underwear from the inven-
tory of the store where he worked. He stated that he took many pairs and would
use them for self-stimulation.
When Gacy was 22 be became engaged to his first, wife, and reportedly had
his first sexual activity with another male. The man was an acquaintance with whom
Gacy had gone out for the evening. The two consumed a great deal of alcohol
and returned to the man's apartment where Gacy fell asleep. He awoke to what
he described as a pleasurable experience of the man performing a sexual act to
which Gacy did not protest. Gacy stated that he never mentioned being aware of
this behavior to his friend after the incident.
In 1964, Gacy married. In 1965 his first child, a son was born and in 1967
his daughter was born. Gacy reported that the sexual frequency initially was quite
great in his marriage. By 1967, this situation had expanded to wife swapping usually
following the watching of explicit sex films with acquaintances. He spoke of this
activity with anger, however, referring to his wife's filing for divorce following
his sodomy conviction. He stated that "I could have had her on eleven counts
of adultery." According to Gacy, the change in the couple's sexual activity could
have been related to his increased hours of working.
John Gacy had moved from Illinois to Iowa in 1966.3 He was indicted in
April 1968 for sexual acts with two males of minor age.'" The sexual acts occurred
in the latter half of 1967 after Gacy had reportedly notified each boy that he was
263 Deposition of John Wayne Gacy taken September 1968.
"' Anamosa Reformatory Records, 1968-1970.
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the head of a sex committee in Illinois and, as such, knew all aspects of male-male
sex. One minor reported that the initial sexual interaction at the home of Gacy
followed the viewing of stag films, the type allegedly used at private meetings of
fellow members of the Jaycees. Gacy pulled a knife and backed the victim into
a bedroom. Gacy struggled with the victim and cut him on the left arm, at which
point the minor agreed to be chained." 5 Then Gacy reportedly began choking the
victim who, after going limp, was later unchained and released.16
Gacy's deposition story was very similar to the one he told after his arrest
in Chicago regarding two of the persons he reportedly killed. 67 He discussed an
alleged homosexual relationship he had with a male couple he called Rick and
Rack.2" Gacy was convicted of sodomy and sentenced to the state reformatory
in Anamosa, Iowa. 69 Reportedly, Gacy was released from Anamosa after his mother
filed a petition alleging hardship. 7
Upon his return to Chicago, Gacy began to see a woman who had known his
family for many years. They married in 1972. Reportedly, Gacy told his new wife,
Carole Hoff Gacy, of his arrest and conviction and of his bisexuality prior to the
marriage."' Initially, the couple's sexual relations were satisfactory to both part-
ners, but deteriorated in frequency until Mother's Day in May 1975, when Gacy
told his wife there would be no further sexual relations between them. They were
divorced in February of 1976 after approximately four years of marriage.
Following this second divorce, Gacy increasing engaged in sex with male part-
ners. He also began dating another woman. One evening he took this woman home
and began to engage in foreplay. As he reached into her slacks he found what
he described as "something I'd never felt." In the bedroom, as she removed her
clothes, he saw a "plastic bag, a, a what, anyway, she'd had an operation." He
stated that his initial reaction was a lessening of his sexual arousal, but that he
was able to complete the act. This sexual relationship deteriorated because Gacy
"was always afraid the bag would come off."
Gacy continued to engage in homosexual acts. He also continued to take
feminine underclothes. In addition, male partners who wore "feminine" under-
things would have their underclothes taken. According to Gacy, the activities with
male sexual partners were becoming less pleasurable and appeared to involve more
of a drive than a genuine sexual satisfaction or pleasure.
,61 Deposition of Donald E. Voorhees, May 24, 1968.
SId.
Deposition of John Wayne Gacy taken September 1968.
61 Id.
Anamosa Reformatory Records, 1968-1970.
Id.
Interview with Carole Hoff Gacy, February 1980.
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F. Employment History27"
At age 14, Gacy began working as a helper at a grocery store. At age 19, he
worked in Las Vegas, Nevada for approximately three months as an ambulance
driver. He was also a night watchman in a mortuary where he would sleep. Return-
ing to Chicago at age 20, Gacy worked as a delivery boy, then as a salesman for
a shoe company which subsequently transferred him to Springfield, Illinois. One
year later, in 1966, he moved to Iowa and began working at a fast food store as
manager. Following his incarceration at Anamosa reformatory, Gacy returned to
Chicago and worked at a restaurant until he started his own contracting firm. Gacy
operated the firm until his arrest.
G. Criminal History Prior to Arrest for Murder
During the time of Gacy's incarceration at Anamosa, prison records note an
evaluation by Dr. Leonard Heston, a psychiatrist, who stated in an evaluation that
"persons similar to Mr. Gacy seem to do best when there are firm, consistent,
external controls on their behavior . . . [he is] in fact, bisexual." 213 During his
imprisonment, medical reports on Gacy indicate coronary occlusion, mild cardiac
enlargement and hypertension.27 In 1969, Gacy's records report "emotional in-
stability" and involvement in individual therapy for five weeks followed by group
therapy for seventeen weeks.275
Following Gacy's release from prison, police records show that in 1972, Gacy
displayed a police badge and picked up a boy to whom he made sexual advances.
The boy reportedly resisted the advances, 276 but eventually consented to sexual ac-
tivity. The youth later ran away from Gacy and fifteen days later signed a com-
plaint against Gacy for aggravated battery and reckless conduct. 277 One month later,
after allegedly threatening phone calls by the boy to Gacy, authorities observed
an extortion attempt by the boy and all charges were dropped. 2"
In 1977, another boy reported to the police that Gacy had attempted to hit
him on the head with a hammer.2 79 The boy reportedly asked Gacy what he was
doing. According to the youth, Gacy answered that: "He didn't know what came
over him but he wanted to kill him. '280 The boy noted that no argument preceded
272 The information contained in this section of the Article is derived from an interview and
psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy, January 1980.
273 Anamosa Reformatory Records, 1968-1970.
27 Id.
275 Id.
2,6 Chicago Police Department investigative reports of alleged assault on Jackie Dee in 1972.
277 Id.
278 Id.
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the attack. Rather, Gacy "just snapped. ' 28' However, the boy stated that Gacy
never forced him to engage in sexual acts.
2 82
Again in 1977, another boy reported that he was picked up by Gacy and taken
to Gacy's home.2 8 3 The boy told the police that he was handcuffed and had leg
chains placed on him. Sodomy was performed on the boy followed by the insertion
of objects by Gacy.28" An Assistant State's Attorney's investigation, preceding the
decision not to prosecute, noted that the victim had a history of mental illness,
that he had stayed with Gacy for more than seven hours, that John Gacy "was
too nice, gave the person his name" and that Gacy drove the boy back to his apart-
ment the next day.
28 5
After Gacy's arrest for murder, an interview was conducted with another vic-
tim of an alleged attack by Gacy which occurred in 1978.286 The victim stated that
he was approached by Gacy and was offered a ride. His impression of Gacy was
that he was a "super, very nice person, very friendly, very likeable.""2 1 His next
memory is of being on an expressway, turning off at an exit and arriving at Gacy's
home. He awoke from what he described as "being chloroformed," to find John
Gacy behind a bar. 8 8 Gacy reportedly handed him a drink, and appeared "so nice,"
but then "suddenly turned into an animal." The victim had no idea what caused
the change. Following what he described as multiple sexual assaults by Gacy, the
victim awoke at the base of a statue in a park, suffering from rectal bleeding and
facial burns. 8 9 The victim reported the incident to the police and after learning
the identity of Gacy filed a complaint. 9 ° There was a delay before arrest. Subse-
quently, a court date was set for January, 1979.291
H. Report of Psychiatric Interview of John Gacy
292
In describing his own life, John Gacy reported his earliest memory to be at
age 4 when "a neighborhood girl took off my clothes." He also reported awareness
of his first train ride to Springfield and getting a whipping from his father for
having "messed up his car parts." He reported his memory of beginning school
and of a fear of sirens beginning when he was five. At age 6, he reported, he received
281 Id.
282 Id.
2 Chicago Police Department investigative reports of alleged assault on Robert Donnelly in 1977.
284 Id.
285 Id.






292 The information contained in this section of the Article is derived from an interview and
psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy conducted by Dr. Helen Morrison in January 1980.
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stitches in his right hand for an injury at play, and remembered "being afraid of
a kid's game, the blackhand." He remembered sexual activity with a neighborhood
girl and a contractor who took him for rides and "messed with" him. Gacy
remembered changing from public to parochial school at the age of 8. Gacy re-
called that his father had a back operation, and that his mother "scared us kids
that she was leaving." He described a medical diagnosis in 1951, stating that he
had a "bottled heart." At age 10, he described as a "happy adventure" the move
by his family to a new home. He remembered that on a fishing trip with his father
in 1953, he felt blamed for everything that went wrong. He reported no memories
from age 12. He described being absent from and failing school at age 13, and
changing to the vocational school and beginning to work at the age of 14. During
this period of early adolescence, he remembered being put down repeatedly by his
father. Gacy recalled a series of operations and accidents at age 15. At age 16,
Gacy reported being first in his class, receiving the American Legion Scholarship
Award, starting high school and being ill. He remembered being hospitalized in
1959. In 1960, he said that he received his first car and suffered a fall from a
second story building from which he received a spinal injury. He stated that he
was requested to leave school at age 19 because of health risks and illnesses. He
reported that he left home at age 20 and felt depressed and lost. He returned home
after three months. One year later, he reported, he was working as a store manager.
He remembered 1964 as the year in which his sister married, his parents celebrated
their 25th wedding anniversary, his girlfriend died, he married, and he had his first
sexual experience with another male. After he moved from Chicago to Springfield,
he remembered running a large Christmas parade. The following year, he felt that
he was having "a great married life," that he was pleased to have been honored
as an outstanding local Jaycee, receiving third place in a statewide competition.
He also was pleased to have been honored as Jaycee's man of the year in Springfield.
He moved to Iowa in 1967, and again was honored as man of the year. In Iowa,
however, he stated he developed a hatred for his father-in-law, for whom he was
working.
Gacy reported that the following year, at age 26, he was imprisoned for sodomy
and was divorced. In 1969, his father died. Gacy incorrectly reported the date of
his father's death as December 25, 1969. During 1969, according to Gacy, he suf-
fered a heart attack and completed a high school equivalency examination. In 1970,
he stated, he again was honored as Jaycees man of the year at the Anamosa refor-
matory, where he had developed a Jaycees Chapter. Upon a first application, Gacy
was denied parole. Subsequently, he was paroled and permitted to return to Chicago.
The following year, he moved to his home at 8213 West Summerdale in Norridge,
and at age 30 married for the second time. By 1973, he had problems with his
mother-in-law and reported that he suffered multiple sicknesses. Gacy expressed
pride in having hosted yard parties in 1974 and 1975. In his private life, Gacy
reported marital problems arose. However, in his public life he was meeting with
success. Gacy was appointed to the lighting district board, became Pogo the Clown
entertaining children at various events, and met with good business success. Gacy
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reported that he nonetheless was "confused, not happy." His divorce became final
in 1976, which depressed him. He reported that he had another lavish yard party,
yet continued being unhappy despite a "booming business." By 1977, business was
skyrocketing and he had his fourth successful yard party. He said he was lonely,
confused, unhappy, and he broke off an engagement to marry. In 1978, while
business was good, he still felt lonely and depressed. He learned that his ex-wife
was pregnant and that she married in November. During 1978, he managed the
Polish parade and had his photograph taken with Rosalynn Carter, the President's
wife.
Gacy was arrested in December 1978; he reported that at that time he felt con-
fused. In 1979, prior to his trial, he reported being lonely, lost, confused, with
no will to live and that, "on December 25, [he] died."
Gacy described his victims and his attitude toward them in various terms in-
cluding: "lonely, sorry, lost, wanting to help, younger, son treatment, dumb, stupid,
nieve (sic), trusting, teach, greed, curious, innocent, punishment and weak." Gacy
was consistent in the application of these terms to his victims during the interview.
The inconsistencies noted throughout this self-defined history will be elaborated
upon in a later section.
IV. PSYCHATRIC ASSESSMENT
A. Personality
What and who is John Gacy? Based on examinations and case-studies of
nonspecific mass murderers, the most general observation to be made is that John
Gacy appears similar to previously studied mass murderers. 293 The information con-
cerning John Gacy, matches the profile of the mass murderer first published in
1979 by one of the authors of this article. 29' This profile was elaborated upon at
the trial of John Gacy in 1980.291
During the interviews conducted with Gacy, he appeared essentially alert and
cooperative. 296 Prior to beginning the interviews, John Gacy was notified of the
nonconfidential nature of the interviews and of the evaluations being made. He
consented to these conditions and rules governing the interviews and evaluations.
His intellect was judged to be above average. Throughout the evaluation there were
291 See H.L. Morrison, Psychiatric Evaluation and Correlations: Panel on the Richard Macek
Homicide Cases, Presentation to the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (St. Louis, Missouri,
1978); H.L. Morrison, Application of Previous Research in Mass Murders to the Atlanta Child Murder
Cases, Reuters News Services (Washington, D.C. 1981); Morrison, It Couldn't Happen to You, Could
It... ?, SHE MAoAznqE (London, England 1980); H.L. Morrison, Attempts at Understanding of Atlanta
Mass Murder Cases, Jeffrey St. John, WRC Radio Station (Washington, D.C. 1981).
21, Morrison, Psychiatric Observations and Interpretations of Bite Mark Evidence in Multiple
Murders, 24 J. FoRENsIc ScrENcas 492 (1979).
9I Record at 4917-75 (testimony of Dr. H.L. Morrison).
219 Interview and psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy by Dr. H.L. Morrison, January 1980.
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brief and transitory periods of lack of contact with the examiner and the work
at hand. These episodes occurred without any precipitating event. However, these
episodes seemed to relate to requests by the examiner for the defendant to do
nonstructured or unexpected tasks. These episodes' also were accompanied by in-
creased, rapid verbalization having little connection with the tasks. Paranoia,9" was
evident throughout the evaluation.
What also appeared in the context of the evaluation was Gacy's inability to
identify himself with the external reality in the evaluation. Such inability was coupled
with an unusual paucity of affect298 in regards to emotionally meaningful subject
matter. There is a subtle, bizarre quality present in John Gacy's interpersonal in-
teractions. This includes a lack of consistent perception of the examiner.
Gacy has a handwriting and printing style that is similar to other mass
murderers.29 9 In the way he presents himself, Gacy has a colorless type of appearance
and is well dressed and groomed. He is extremely organized and enters every detail
of his life in a log book.
Gacy's personality and psychological structure is complex. He appears to be
superficially cooperative and pleasant and seems to relate in an appropriate and
adequate manner. He also seems to show a good deal of control, both over his
internal thoughts and his impulses. This impression is maintained by every person
who sees him only for a limited amount and intensity of time. However, this im-
pression is misleading and incorrect and results from too limited an exposure to
the subject200 Gacy's easy-going and accommodating style tends to increase the
discomfort of being with him. He primarily shows a surface picture of persuasiveness
and smoothness.
Gacy attempted to relate to the examiner in an overcontrolled, pendantic man-
ner. However, a great deal of underlying tension and some hostility and agitation
were noted. He is wary and sensitive to the responses of others. There is a good
deal of ambivalence toward the significant persons in his life, and he shifts from
one appraisal of them to another with little awareness of his inconsistencies. Gacy's
personality structure manifests itself dynamically as a diffuse obsessional,30 ' phobic3'2
297 Id.
2 9 Affect involves a person's emotional tone and its outward manifestations. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY: Tin MEANINO OF TERMS FREQUENTLY USED IN.
PSYCIATRY 11 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as PSYCmATRIC GLOSSARY].
291 Interview and psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy by Dr. H.L. Morrison, January
1980. See H.L. Morrison, The Application of Developmental Theory to the Study of Homicidal Behavior,
"As it Happens" (News Program of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, Canada 1979).
:00 Record at 4917-75 (testimony of Dr. H.L. Morrison).
o Obsessive compulsive personality is a disorder characterized by excessive concern with confor-
mity and adherence to standards of conscience. Individuals with this disorder may be excessively organized
and exhibit repeated acts. Such individuals may be rigid, overinhibited, overconscientious, overdutiful,
indecisive, perfectionists and unable to relax easily. PsYcHATRIc GLossARY, supra note 298, at 119.
302 Phobia involves an obsessive, persistent, unrealistic, intense fear of an object or situation. The
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and hypochondriacal3 3 picture which underlies his show of toughness and defiance
on occasion. He displays anxiety along with chaotic antisocial and sexual behavior.
His anxiety is not absorbed by his acting out. He is obsessed with fearful fantasies
of death and disintegration. When Gacy admits to committing criminal acts, he
expresses superficial guilt based on a faulty concern. This affable facade covers
a type of attitude which is disquieting in its very simplicity and blandness. Emo-
tional instability has been present throughout his life and is exaggerated markedly
by the underlying thought process disturbances. His affect 3 4 is shallow and nonex-
istent. There are periods of apparent euphoria alternating with periods of depres-
sion. Both at times are severe and agitated. He is suspicious and has ideas of
reference with outbursts of unsystemized paranoid delusions. These delusions are
usually grandiose and are linked with ideas of persecution.
Gacy's hypochondriacal fears often are connected with the paranoid ideation
30 5
and usually are inappropriate to his physical status. They indicate great underlying
anxiety concerning disintegration and annihilation. Gacy shows a mixed clinical
picture. Depending on environmental circumstances, he shifts from one pattern to
another of antisocial behavior. His early behavior included repeated truancy, ag-
gression, and destructive behavior, more bizarre than that of the sociopath. Gacy's
work record is one of extreme instability with irregular, unreliable and sporadic
work. There were frequent job changes. This pattern is observed in the attempts
of other mass murderers to support themselves through gambling, robbery, dealing
in drugs and other illegal activities. 6 Many of these type of activities were part
of Gacy's past history. Socially his behavior is erratic, impulsive and irresponsible.
He relates to others on a superficial and exploitative level. His marital adjustment
was poor. Gacy has a poorly integrated concept of sexuality. Varieties of perver-
sions were practiced in keeping with bizarre, aggressive, and sado-masochistic fan-
tasies which he did not differentiate from his own actions.3 0 7 Gacy has experienced
full-blown psychotic episodes.3 0 8 These psychotic episodes differ from dissociative
behavior" 9 in that they do not occur as a reaction to environmental situation, but
fear is believed to arise through a process of displacing an unconscious or internal conflict to an exter-
nal object symbolically related to the conflict. PsYcMIATRic GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 120.
303 Hypochondriacal involves a neurosis characterized by a preoccupation with the body and with
fear of presumed diseases of various organs. PsYcHIATRIc GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 108.
' See supra note 298.
10 Paranoid is characterized by an intense suspicion of others. PSYCMATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note
298, at 115.
30 H.L. Morrison, Mass Murderers: Patterns of Behavior and Developmental Deviations, Presen-
tation to the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (1980); Interview and psychiatric evalua-
tion of Richard Macek by Dr. H.L. Morrison, April 1977.
' For example, Gacy was unable to act on female, male concepts of sexuality. See interview
and psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy by Dr. H.L. Morrison, January 1980.
S0S A psychotic episode is characterized by a loss of touch with reality.
'11 Dissociation is a defense mechanism, operating unconsciously, through which emotional
significance and affect are separated and detached from an idea, situation or object. PsYCmATRIC
GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 44.
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rather seem to develop spontaneously from internal stimuli. Close examination
reveals that the reactive elements310 stem from stimuli within the individual which
exacerbate the continuous disordered thought process. The psychotic episodes vary
in symptomatology. There is an aggravation of underlying clinical symptoms-
namely, marked emotional dysregulation,3 ' regression,3 1 2 and stereotyped
behavior.'1 3 If the psychotic break is not sufficiently apparent to require medical
intervention, the underlying disorder is evidenced in the basically dereistic14 and
autistic315 life approach, in the varying degrees of disturbance of affect and in-
terpersonal relationships, and in the profusion of other symptomatology. Gacy
returns quickly to a relatively compensated psychotic level.3 16 These episodes fre-
quently were evident in the evaluation process.
Several features of Gacy's thinking processes are noteworthy. His language is
an odd mixture of formal, somewhat awkward constructions interspersed with gross
syntactical errors and crude slang. Along with his rather pretentious language, Gacy's
use of slang is jarring and betrays deep feelings of contempt. In addition, he has
a way of reeling off strings of adjectives, all with essentially similar meanings, or
responding with a chain of concrete associations. This is demonstrated by Gacy's
answers to one series of research questions which asked him to explain what is
happening in these situations: "Arthur threw the ball into the woods. Barbara was
very angry. ' 3 7 Gacy responds:
It seemed to me that Arthur and Barbara were playing ball and that Arthur threw
the ball into the woods. She may have thought that he did it on purpose (sic).
The (sic) again it may be that she was his mother, and thought that he was being
disobedient (sic). She may have told him not to throw it in the woods and he was
showing that he was going to do what he wanted. There is alot (sic) of things a
person could take from the two sentences. Maybe if Arthur was too young to under-
stand, that it was an accident, I can't see why she became very angry, unless she
was drinking or not feeling well. Everyone is not perfact (sic) and can make mistakes.
Barbara was very angry, maybe she missed the ball herself, and thats (sic) why
she was mad. The question doesn't tell if Barbara was angry at Arthur, it just
310 Reactive elements are unconscious defense mechanisms wherein attitudes and behavior are adopted
that are the opposites of conscious impulses.
311Emotional dysregulation is characterized by an inability to regulate one's emotional state.
3,2 Regression involves the partial or symbolic return to primitive or the earliest states of emo-
tional functioning and psychological structure. PsYcIATRIc GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 134.
3 Stereotyped behavior is characterized by persistent mechanical repetitive behavior. PSYCHIATRIC
GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 144.
'" Dereistic describes mental activity that is not in accordance with reality, logic or experience.
PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 43.
3 An autistic life approach involves a form of thinking marked by extreme self-absorption and
egocentricity. Such an individual is withdrawn and removed from interpersonal relatedness. PSYCHIATRIC
GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 17.
36 Compensated psychotic level means one has the ability to function in a superficial, behavioral
way but remains out of contact with reality.
I" Interview and psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy by Dr. H.L. Morrison, January 1980.
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assumption (sic). Maybe they are both older and the ball came into there (sic) back
yard and instead of throwing it back he through (sic) it into the woods out of
spite, and his wife got angry at his action, because he took such action.3"'
For Gacy it is only a slight step from the pretentious to very primitive and
concrete modes of thought and expression." 9 Sentence structure breaks down into
concrete chunks of thought which have a driven, impulsive quality.32 This type
of impulse-driven cognition may be best described as deriving from an early cognitive
defect in which concrete, action-based modes have a fragile overlay of more super-
ficial delay-oriented cognitive structures.32" ' This is associated with a vulnerability
to affective and impulsive storms and "blasts." '322 Gacy has an action-dominated
style with few cognitive restraints. Impulses and wishes fail to achieve stable inter-
nal meanings, and are probably experienced as powerful forces, stimulated and
felt as coming from outside himself. This makes Gacy extremely vulnerable to ex-
ternal stimulation. He is overwhelmed by complexity and by too many people. The
crudeness of his language and syntax suggests both chronicity323 and
accommodation 324 to such a style. Reflective critical capacities are minimal with
disruptive consequences. When mistakes go unnoticed by Gacy, the plan with which
he starts falls apart and ends in aimiess thrashing about. Even though this does
not reach a point of blanking out, his experience is of being overwhelmed and
debilitated as well as somehow charged up. The major aspects of his cognitive
style-the impulse-ridden and concrete orientation, 325 the unreflectiveness, and the
superficial adroitness with words-speak to the character with explosive potential.
Coupled with this crude language and thinking style is a paranoid-like sharp-
ness and vigilance which appears to be at a much higher developmental level. Gacy
reads and draws conclusions from minor, concrete details. While he attempts to
substantiate his conclusions thoroughly, the net effect is one of being captured by
his inferences. Data are bent to fit conclusions to which he firmly and idiosyn-
cratically is committed.
Gacy's potential for violence requires more comment. Underlying his apparently
pleasant and cooperative way of relating to persons is a chilling lack of regard
for human form. While he may be able to relate along a conventional, stereotyped
social line in some situations, humans seem not to be fully human to him. Even
his obvious capacity for contempt and callousness may be superficial. Gacy seems
not to have developed a sense that human objects are different from inanimate
3" See supra note 299.




33 Chronicity means a long-term pattern.
34 Accommodation means that one sees no abnormality in one's patterns and use of language.
32. Impulse-ridden and concrete orientation mean that one is unable to control one's acting on
wishes and has a lack of thought preceding action, not using abstract theory.
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matter. Evaluation responses reflect this deep fault in his development. While he
debates whether someone is alive or dead, this differentiation is not a firm one.
It is in this context that Gacy is chilling. Impulses take over. There is no strong
evidence for his being dissociated during such rages, but it would fit with his cognitive
style, however, for his memories are basically kinesthetic3 26 and concrete. 32 The
concrete memories might have to do with an internal sense of storm, with little
sense of the setting, circumstances or object.
The content of his rage is difficult to specify, in part because it has not developed
into a structural, cognitive framework, i.e., it has a diffuse, chaotic quality. He
mentions revenge, not to whom or for what. There are obvious signs of mixed
sexual, masculine and feminine identification. One wonders if Gacy is so disturbed
by such stirrings that he focuses negatively on people who arouse in him or
demonstrate to him passive feminine aspects. There is a high incidence of oral or
oral-sadistic imagery in the testing which also is seen in clinical contact with him.
There also was the presence of rapid changes between these contradictory states
and other behavior. This behavior was noted to parallel the inconsistent and fluc-
tuating perceptions. There superficially appeared to be a manipulative quality.
However, further evaluation noted a lack of awareness of contradiction from state
to state. Gacy was unable to relate realistically, and his relatedness appeared to
be based on primitive defenses. 321 When faced with internal danger, he
characteristically showed a pathologic omnipotence. There also was noted in Gacy
an inability to develop a separate and distinct identity from his mother and an
identification with primitive superego forerunners.3 29 This was on an oral aggressive-
sadistic level. 330 From early infancy, he has been characterized as a child who ex-
perienced traumatic overstimulation. 33' His bisexuality relates to a developmental
arrest.3 32 Characteristics of this include the continuation of primitive mental
mechanisms, 333 concomitant fears of all boundaries of the ego with the sexual act 334
transiently stabilizing his sense of self. 335 The need to defend against this loss of
self led to repetitions of the act. The necessity of doing the act overrode reason
and judgment, and did not permit him to choose between right and wrong, nor
did it permit him to control his conduct. He was impaired in cognition and voli-
326 Kinesthetic means that something is based in motion and movement.
327 Concrete memories are those based in the earliest modes of thinking.
311 Primitive defense means not organized beyond the earliest forms of psychological structure.
329 Identification with primitive superego forerunners is characterized by the taking in and identi-
fying with parent psychological structure.
"' Oral aggressive-sadistic level means the earliest phases of psychological functioning of an infant.
331 Traumatic overstimulation is the inability to modify one's reception of stimuli from the outside
world and one becomes overwhelmed by the stimulation.
32 Developmental arrest means that one does not proceed to a more appropriate sexual identity
because of an inability to reach psychological maturity.
33 Primitive mental mechanisms are the unorganized and earliest forms of psychological function.
3 Fears of all boundaries of the ego means that one fears the loss of identity of self.
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tion, incapable of choice. His sexual acts were frequent yet without known pro-
vocation. He was incapable of controlling his sexual activity, continuing aspects
of the alleged crimes, or the unlawful acts of murder.
Although superficial evaluation 36 would not permit the development of anything
other than an almost simplistic view of the mental disease of the defendant, a con-
tinuing evaluation shows a complexity of profound psychopathology not limited
to one diagnostic category. Indeed, there is an incomplete recognition in the
psychiatric diagnostic literature of the complexity and exact nature of the
psychopathology.3 37 Gacy may be said to be suffering from a psychosis with
paranoid, intermittent delusional thought processes, 3 that is layered by a borderline
syndrome39 of extremely low level functioning. One could reasonably conclude that
his results in a profound impairment that severely affected his ability to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirement of law.
B. Standard Profile of Nonspecific Mass Murderer
Nonspecific mass murderer includes persons responsible for a series of murders
committed on one individual at a time .34  The victims are generally not well known
to the murderer and are chosen preconsciously; although there is an uncanny
resemblance to a previous victim. 4' The murders are violent, sadistic, sexual, brutal
and recognizable in their similarity across time and situation .34  Multiple methods
and injuries are often noted in each victim. Most frequently seen are strangulation,
mutilation, and stabbing or ritualistic cutting.34 3 The period of occurrence of the
crimes is limited only to the number of years before the murderer finally is
identified.3 44 It can be postulated that many of the murders remain undetected.
Reviews of the histories of these murderers often show them to be identified by
others as quiet, nonassuming persons not usually considered to be a lethal
neighbor. 34 The act of homicide is not externally precipitated. Rather, some inter-
nal stimulus precedes the act. 46
336 R. AuLT & J. REESE, A Psychological Assessment of Crime Profiling, 49:3 F.B.I. Law En-
forcement Bulletin 22-25 (March 1980).
:37 See DSM 1, 1, and.11.
338 Psychosis with paranoid, intermittent delusional thought processes means one is out of contact
with reality as evidenced by Gacy's fixed but false belief that he was suffering from leukemia.
"I Borderline syndrome is a primitive relatedness and psychological functioning.
310 See supra notes 293, 294, 306; H.L. MopiusoN & R.N. Ross, Language Structure Analysis
of Psychiatric Interviews: Correlations with Violent Crimes Against Self and Others, Presentation to
the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (San Diego, California 1981).
141 See Chicago police investigative reports of alleged assault on Jackie Dee (1972); Chicago police
investigative reports of alleged assault on Michael Reid (1977); Chicago police investigative reports of
alleged assault on Robert Donnelly (1977); Chicago police investigative reports of alleged attack on
Jeffrey Rignall (1978).
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The focus in this discussion will be on twelve major subcategories of physical
characteristics and psychological structure demonstrated by these mass murderers,
including psychological,3 47 neuropsychological, 348 neurological, 349 genetic,"10
medical"' and psychiatric." 2 Theoretical psychological formulations have been
developed by one of the authors on the basis of the process of reconstruction,
transference and experience in the one-on-one interview which averaged 400 hours
per case, six to twelve hours at a time, facilitating regression3", and the emergence
of primitive functions. 354 No one else was present during these evaluations and in-
terruptions were kept at a minimum. The goal was the elucidation of the nature,
timing, emergence or interruption of stages of development. 35 In addition to inter-
views, data was obtained from multiple sources, including, but not limited to, family,
educational, vocational and medical sources.
Attempting to answer the question, "Why?," demands connections between
the internal and external worlds of mass murderers. The probability that a specific
individual can be one of these mass murderers is based on the total personality,
involving a degree of conflict unlike that seen in other classes of murderers, and
an inability of the personality to manage or modify these conflicts. In considering
an overall, superficial and symptomatic description of these murders, one can note
curious contradictions. On a purely descriptive basis, these individuals sometimes
strike one as having odd components of traditionally male and female attributes.
Cooperative, helpful, confident, accommodating, easygoing and nearly jovial in-
teractions are often characteristic behaviors. These behaviors are balanced by a
notable facility with words and organization directed toward superficial, facile
manipulation of the external world. These external observations contrast with the
known activity of repetitive murder. They generally describe themselves as being
good providers, good fathers and good workers who primarily consider the welfare
of others and the achievement of success. Overall diagnostic impressions made by
a number of examiners consider primary diagnosis of schizophrenic or psychopathic
character disorders. 35
6
Careful behavioral investigation often notes suspicion and depressive features
in these subjects. Deficits in psychological structure result in extreme impulsive out-
bursts. Hypervigilance characterizes thinking to a paranoid degree. Noteworthy









311 Interview and psychiatric evaluation of John Wayne Gacy by Dr. H.L. Morrison, January
1980.
... Psychiatric report submitted to the Iowa courts by Dr. L. Heston, November 4, 1968.
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of words in formal, awkward constructions interspersed with gross errors in syntax
and the use of slang. Sentences disintegrate into concrete chunks of impulsive, driven
qualities of thought. For example, in response to the question, "How many senators
in the United States Senate?," one subject replied, "nineteen." The response was
given immediately, with confidence, because "[t]he thought just flashed through
my mind. 35 7 Action generally dominates their style and few restraints are seen.
Impulse driven thoughts are associated with vulnerability to impulsive and emo-
tional "storms." Capabilities for self-reflection are minimal. Sexual identity, often
miscategorized as homosexuality or bisexuality is a reflection of the primitive lack
of definite character.
The paranoid-like sharpness and vigilance speak of a somewhat higher develop-
ment level. The content of their rage is nonspecific. Beneath the pleasant, cooperative
relatedness is a chilling lack of regard for human form. This is the primary quality
which the interviewer found to provide occasions of uneasiness and discomfort.
Stereotyped, conventional social behavior is evident, yet to those subjects, humans
are not human. This is illustrated in dreams and projective stories where a mass
murderer debates whether someone is dead or alive. Memories are kinesthetic and
concrete. Although they state they cannot remember, this is not dissociative or
"blanking out," but rather overwhelming external stimulation. Sadistic images
related to the earliest development states appear in evaluations frequently as hooks,
jagged edges and claws.
The attempt to focus on more specific structured defects in areas of function
should guide cdntinued study in areas including organic function, 35 8 self-object
differentiation,3 59 development of core identity, 360 object constancy,3", ego
functions,3 6 defense mechanisms,363 control, 36 modulation of affective and im-
pulse expression 365 and capacity for relatedness.
3 66
"' See supra note 293.
'" Organic function is the function of the physical aspects of a person.
Self-object differentiation is the ability to psychologically separate the identity of oneself from
others.
"80 Core identity is the viewing of oneself in cohesive, internal structural manner.
161 Object constancy is the maintenance of a dependency relationship to others based on one's
earliest experiences of parenting.
362 Ego functions refer to the ability to observe, control the responses of, and adopt to behavioral
demands of the world. In psychoanalytic theory the ego represents the sum of certain mental mechanisms,
such as perception and memory, and specific defense mechanisms. The ego serves to mediate between
the demands of primitive instinctual drives (the id) of internalized parental and social prohibitions (the
superego) and of reality. The compromises between these forces achieved by the ego tend to resolve
intrapsychic conflict and serve an adaptive and executive function. PSYCHATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note
298, at 48-49.
33 Defense mechanisms are unconscious intrapsychic processes serving to provide relief from emo-
tional conflict and anxiety. PsYcmiAiac GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 40.
3" Control refers to the ability to adapt oneself to the external world.
363 Modulation of affective and impulse expression refers to one's ability to manage and control
emotional behavior.
366 Capacity for relatedness refers to one's ability to relate to others in an interpersonal way.
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1. Organic Function
The study of the relationship between brain and behavior defines the basis of
study of the nonspecific mass murderer as proceeding from the thesis that the brain
and behavior are inseparable. The nervous system of the human, like other systems,
has an inborn potential for development. Although genetic factors largely deter-
mine this potential; change occurs depending on environmental conditions. There
is evidence in neurological and psychological testing that mass murderers exhibit
a sufficient number of "soft" signs of nervous system difficulties to make it im-
possible to rule out a physical involvement. The consideration of these results, reflect-
ing some type of brain system discharge, is a continuing focus of investigation.
2. Psychological Structure
The contribution of disruptions in development which may play a role in the
definition of the character of the mass murderer provides another area for study.
Understanding the initial developmental periods of these persons as children re-
quires the empathic observation and evaluation of behavior.
Current psychiatric theories, whether primarily psychoanalytic, learning or
biologic in orientation, may not accommodate the data gathered during the study
of character development and behavioral expression in the mass murderer type
character. The goal set for the study of the characters or psychologic makeup of
these persons should be to clarify what makes it possible for this specific individual
to have the potential for mass murder. The impression is that no single factor in
development will be found to account for the subsequent development outcome.
Neither purely biologic nor purely psychologic factors will be identified. More likely,
a combination of these elements will be found to be contributory. While the use
of language in the field of psychiatry to attempt to explain a process or a
characteristic often is made complex beyond need or desire, various descriptive words
or phrases have some commonality in our current psychiatric practice and can be
used advisedly.
In the psychological sphere, one seemingly basic characteristic of the mass
murderer type is the inability to differentiate early life with later world organiza-
tion. The inner world of the mass murderer type is reflective of the earliest typical
danger for the infant-traumatic overstimulation. In John Gacy, this is illustrated
by the daily enemas and suppositories given by his mother from three days of age
throughout the first three months of life. Such an experience results in an inner
world experienced as dark, shadowy, and persecutory. These fears are later ex-
pressed as death, fragmentation and total helplessness. Early trauma interferes with
the ability to proceed in the development of appropriate identification processes
with a resultant lack of reality testing. Lack of representational cognitive ability
in the infant partially accounts for the lack of form in the "memories" or
"blackouts" experienced by the mass murderer type. Differentiation between family
and environment is not possible as a consequence of depriving or violent experiences.
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Objects become an extension of self. 67 Traumatic, by definition, is an event or
situation occurring in an individual's life which is intense, incapable of being
responded to adequately by the subject and/or assimilated into the psychic organiza-
tion, having long-lasting, devastating effects.
3 68
A second general characteristic of the mass murderer type is object relations
based on projection of parts of the self. Objects are defined in three ways: (1)
It is the thing by which an instinct is satisfied; (2) It is a relation between the whole
person and the totality of another person where love or hate exists; or (3) It is
simply whatever is a source of attraction. Behaviorally, this relationship can in-
volve an incapacity to relate to others. For example, the inability to develop a
separate identity from the caretaker. Relatedness to an object is based, in the mass
murderer only by use of the defense projection, which then must be controlled
either by possessing or by destroying the object. The victim becomes the persecutor,
the persecutor becomes the victim. All boundaries cease to exist while disintegra-
tion of ego differentiation 369 between earliest aggressive and libidinal drives
370 oc-
curs. Chaotic and fragmentary projective distortions characteristically are present.
Such a condition is illustrated by John Gacy's mother, who talks of her son as
if he and she were the same person.
In the theoretical stage of development, the "good enough" mothering of the
infant provides an experience of being satisfied. Satisfaction becomes a prototype
of the wish for a specific object. Object constancy is maintained only in partial,
unstable ways. No consistent inner psychological cohesiveness exists. Identification
is only with highly sadistic and primitive superego forerunners. The basic need is
to seek out objects that reflect power. This characteristic is connected with the
characteristic of grandiose omnipotence to be discussed later in this section.
Inconsistent perception of others is reflected in inconsistent functioning and
relatedness in all aspects of the mass murderer's life. Nearly instantaneous fluctua-
tions are exhibited between defenses of projection and introjection. 37' This, in turn,
creates shifts in the organization of the self and representation of objects. Others
are perceived in variable and grossly inconsistent ways. The murderer is unaware
of the contradictions which exist from state to state. Paralleling these rapid fluc-
tuations is volatility of behavior and unpredictability.
36 S.I. GREENSPAN, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND ADAPTATION IN INFANCY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD: PRIN-
CIPLES OF CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS AND PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION (1982).
"I S. FREUD, 18 INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS AND ANXIETY (1926).
369 Disintegration of ego differentiation refers to the inability to maintain contact with reality.
"I Earliest aggressive and libidinal drives refers to one's inability to separate impulses or actions
related to sex and aggression.
"I Projection is a defense mechanism, operating unconsciously, whereby that which is emotionally
unacceptable in the self is unconsciously rejected and attributed to others. Introjection is a defense
mechanism, operating unconsciously, whereby loved or hated external objects are taken within oneself
symbolically. Both may serve as defenses against conscious recognition of intolerable hostile impulses.
PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 125-26.
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Self objects" become substitutes for missing superego3 3 and ego functions.""'
This is illustrated by the excellent assimilation in correctional settings where the
mass murderer often functions in what appears to be self-defined commanding
"roles" such as trustee, "jailhouse lawyer," counselor or teacher. For example,
prison authorities in Iowa reported that John Gacy operated in a cooperative man-
ner, and did not engage in any known sexual activity while in prison. The self
objects do for the mass murderer what he is unable to do for himself. Loss of
the self object is a loss of part of the self. 37" Potential disruption of this perceived
nucleus of the self is a continual threat outside the total institutional setting. The
threat is of inner fragmentation and the risk of a dissolution. Attempts are made
to stabilize these perceptions and to regain the sense of definition of the self. Sadism
is often a maladaptive response to these threats, helping to organize the personality.
Pathologic omnipotence 376 has been noted to be developmentally promoted by
factors in child and caretaker. This is illustrated by over-, under-, or inappropriate
responsiveness. Omnipotence may be defensive and, like perceptual inconsisten-
cies, alternates between omnipotent control or withdrawal and devaluation. Magical
fantasies of omnipotence are implied by self-idealization. The mass murderer even-
tually will receive all that he is entitled to without discomfort, the passage of time
or frustration. Perfection, often mistaken for obsessive symptomatology and
organization, is a behavioral expression of this omnipotence. The keeping of
meticulous diaries by John Gacy, for example, and the ability to continue to com-
mit crimes without detection reflect this omnipotence. He must be omnipotent;
he is unable to depend on others.
Primitive psychotic defense mechanisms are most evident during extended
periods of evaluation. These mechanisms include projective identification, 1 7 cold
paranoid rage, 37 18 splitting,379 intermittent- delusional thought processes, 380 denial and
reliance on action in dealing with conflicts.
Projective identification and ingratiation are modes of projection. Projection
is an archaic mental mechanism which is needed to control, use and tame aggressive
impulses. Projection is a painful idea expelled from the self to the external world.
It is present in paranoia.3 1' Projective identification can be defined as a mechanism
by which the subject inserts himself into the object in order to harm, possess or
"I Self objects are related to the relationship of the self with other identities.
371 Superego is that part of the personality structure associated with ethics, standards, and self-
criticism. PsYcmIATRIc GLOSSARY, supra note 298, at 145.
", See supra note 362.
7 M. BALINT, PRIMARY LovE AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE (1952).
376 Pathological omnipotence refers to seeing oneself as the most powerful in the world.
3" Projective identification occurs when one uses primitive psychological structure to possess, control
or harm another person.
Cold paranoid rage is a disorder wherein disturbances in mood, behavior, and thinking result
from generally persecutory or grandiose delusions.
3,1 Splitting occurs when one sees others as "all good" or "all bad."
Intermittent delusional thought processes occur when one has periods of fixed and false beliefs.
3' See supra note 305.
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control it.3 82 This mechanism is an early prototype of an aggressive object relation. 313
Cold paranoid rage is an expression of the emotional disintegration threatened
by the external world. Rage accompanies the maladaptive response of sadism. Rage
occurs when the victim becomes a personification of irrationally perceived threats
of disintegration. The emotion is a complex one and consists not only of rage,
but of vengeance, anxiety and relief.
Denial of psychic reality, an unconscious denial, is associated with the
mechanism of splitting. Splitting was a term used by Freud to denote a very specific
mechanism characteristic of psychoses. 8 ' Freud noted that two mental attitudes
are to be found: one which takes account of reality, the other, under instinctual
influence, detaches the ego from reality.385 This leads to a reality based on delu-
sion; however, this is not an ego defense.3 8 6 The mechanism is operative in certain
types of nonremembering states. 7 Splitting could help account for nonrecognition
of the responsibility for the act of murder. Mass murderers often do not believe
they are the murderers. 88 Intermittent delusional thought processes exist and are
illustrated by the belief held by John Gacy that contrary to medical evidence, he
had leukemia.
3 89
Defenses against anxiety become very evident in these persons. The mass
murderer is safe from the persecutory images if he can control his world. The
murderer may exhibit control by overactivity. Frantic activity may provide the only
sense that he is alive. Tension overwhelms already fragile control mechanisms and
impulsive, explosive behavior results. Somatic concerns and obsessive behavior rise
to the fore. If the active behavior is prevented, the murderer panics. The external
restraints on behavior which can defend against anxiety further weaken reality ties
and psychotic mechanisms emerge. Sexual acts are needed, in part, to transiently
stabilize the self and ensure survival of the ego. The acts also ward off primitive
paranoid fears of incorporation.3 9 The act of murder too has as its aim the
maintenance of the equilibrium of the mass murderer. The murders must be repeated
with increasing frequency to ward off the paranoid and incorporative fears. Defenses
against inappropriate caretaking are related to pathological omnipotence which helps
to avoid conflicts related to early needs. Fears of being engulfed and further loss
of boundaries between self and others, contribute to the use of the act of murder
as a way of avoiding these deeper anxieties. Sporadic destructiveness becomes an
3 See supra note 377.
"' Aggressive object relation is a primitive relationship based on aggressive impulses.




388 See supra note 342.
3:3 See interview and psychiatric evaluation of Karen Gacy Kuzma, January 1980 and John Wayne
Gacy, January 1980 by Dr. H.L. Morrison.
3"0 Primitive paranoid fears of incorporation are fears of being swallowed or losing one's identity
and bounds in another.
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indispensable requirement for maintaining contact with reality and sense of self.
The action masters the tension and anxiety.
Paranoid fears are equated with destruction and persecution.3 9 Overcoming
the paranoid position depends on the strength of infantile libidinal instincts.,92 In-
corporation characterizes earliest development stages and becomes a mode of rela-
tionship to the object. Passivity, ambivalence and bisexuality demonstrate other
early conflicts. Aggression, the final category in this discussion, is expressed by
the mass murderer in terms of polar opposites. One intended victim of Gacy who
survived, graphically described this characteristic of rapid and dramatic shift in
behavior of hateful, evil, powerful destructiveness alternating with impotent, weak
and helpless vulnerability. 9' Predispositions to unhampered release of aggression
are related to interference with appropriate identification processes,1 94 and failure
of the ego to differentiate early drives with resolved elements of aggressiveness from
early sadistic stages of development where a single object receives destructive, am-
bivalent impulses. 9' Aggression remains unresolved because of aggressively con-
taminated internalized objects which cannot be distinguished from external objects.396
3. Application of Mass Murderer Profile to John Gacy
The examinations of John Gacy by various psychiatrists and the psychological
testing reported by the psychologists may appear to differ in the diagnostic
conclusions. 97 The psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Gacy, however,
do not differ in their reports on the essential behavioral demonstrations of his
functioning. 398 All noted their perceptions of Gacy as being in an unsafe world,
being highly intelligent and suspicious, with confused sexual identity, self-
centeredness, severely obsessive-compulsive behavior, over-talkative, with episodes
of confusion, lack of human feeling and disorder and unformed psychological struc-
ture. However, the uniformity of the behavioral characteristics was not focused
upon at the trial by the lawyers.
Utilizing the psychiatric profile of the mass" murderer and based on the evalua-
tion of John Gacy, it becomes obvious that he is not treatable or potentially
rehabilitatable. Treatment of any type requires, at the least, a motivation for change
based on self-awareness, the capability of using knowledge acquired in the treat-
ment process to change behavior and the ability to perceive the internal and exter-
'9, Destruction and persecution refers to the fear of being destroyed.
"9 Infantile libidinal instincts occur when one is parented in such a way that as an infant he is
protected from trauma.
'9 Impotent, weak and helpless vulnerability refers to helplessness in the behavior of mass murderers.
Appropriate identification processes refers to the ability to relate to internal psychological status
of one's parents.
311 For example, Gacy was unable to separate himself from his aggressive acts, thus, acting in
a nonpersonalized way to the world.
396 All persons are viewed as aggressive.
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nal world in relation to each other.399 The inability to relate later adult life to in-
fant life is based in the multiple character defects. No research has been conducted
into potential therapeutic interventions in such cases. No individual or group ap-
pears capable of accepting responsibility for the release of this type of mass murderer.
No psychiatrist can be the sole determinant in these cases. There is a need for the
development of a complex of legal, psychiatric and criminological expertise to devise
a proper response to the mass murderer himself and the danger he presents to society.
V. PROCEDURES, EVIDENCE, TESTIMONY AND EXPERT WITNESSES: THE
INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE TRIAL CONTEXT
A. Pretrial Activity
The pretrial investigation had an extraordinary quality and all but eliminated
any issue as to Gacy's causal responsibility for thirty-three deaths.' ° Gacy was
charged with thirty-three counts of murder,"0 ' one count of deviate sexual assault,"0 2
one count of taking indecent liberties with a child," °3 and one count of aggravated
kidnapping.4"4 Prior to the trial, the defense offered to stipulate as to the fact of
the killings by Gacy and to restrict the proceeding to the issue of insanity, but
the prosecution refused.1
05
19 See supra notes 293 and 294.
400 See R. Simon, Should You Know all that About Gacy?, Chicago Sun-Times, January 2, 1979,
where a newspaper commentator wrote two weeks after Gacy's arrest: "Let's get it out into the open.
Is there anyone out there who really doesn't believe that John Gacy brutally murdered all those young
boys?" Nevertheless, less than two weeks later the same columnist in a column entitled Beating the
Raps-Gacy's Options, Chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1979, suggested the possibility of the use of
the defense of insanity. In a companion article entitled, Proving Gacy Is Guilty Will Be No Cinch,
Chicago Sun-Times, January 14, 1979, the writer suggested a number of defenses that Gacy might raise:
How good were the search warrants that allowed police to go into Gacy's home? . . . Did
the police have probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed? And did they
have probable cause to believe that John Gacy committed the crime? . . . If the Gacy war-
rants were not proper, those bodies become 'the fruit of a poisoned tree' and cannot be
used against him. Without the bodies, the state has virtually no evidence against Gacy.
But what about the confession?
The admissibility of those confessions will rest on a couple of things: Was Gacy coerced
into making them? Was he advised of his rights? Was he told he could have a lawyer before
confessing? And most importantly, was John Gacy sane enough to understand these rights?
If it is found that Gacy is not sane enough to have understood what he was doing by
talking to police, his confession could be thrown out.
There are further difficulties that the state must overcome. It is not sufficient to drag
skeletons into a courtroom to convict a man with murder. Gacy is charged with specific acts
of murder against specific persons. If the defense can show that the skeletons have not been
identified properly, or that there is reasonable doubt to the actual identity of the particular
skeleton, Gacy cannot be convicted of that murder.
,0, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
'0' ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 11-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
,0S ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 11-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
404 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
405 Editor's note: In the interests of brevity and the practical recognition that the reader will, in
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1. Surveillance
Police activities which connected Gacy with the murders included a week-long
period of surveillance, the execution of two searches of his home, and a series of
interrogations which produced incriminating statements and confessions. The
surveillance was unusual because Gacy was quickly made aware of it and, in fact,
developed a friendly relationship with the police,40 6 who followed him. Gacy not
only engaged in conversations with police, but also drank and dined with them
at restaurants, and even invited them into his home for a meal.40 7 Before leaving
his home, Gacy would inform officers of his destination,40' and at other times would
tell bystanders that the officers were his paid bodyguards. 09 On one occasion, Gacy
talked about posing as a clown to entertain children and remarked: "People don't
really look at a clown as a person . . . clowns can get away with murder." 10 At
another point during the surveillance, Gacy remarked sarcastically to an officer
that he had to remove "two bottles of booze and three bodies" from the trunk
of his car.4 '
The very circumstances of Gacy's initial arrest manifested in very peculiar and
erratic behavior on his part. While officers observed him, Gacy passed a clear plastic
bag of marijuana cigarettes to a gas station attendant." 2 Later, at trial the defense
406 See T. SULLIVAN & P. MAIKEN, KILLER CLOWN: THE JOHN WAYNE GACY MURDERS 70, 101-02
(1983) [hereinafter cited as KILLER CLOWN] which gives examples of Gacy's friendly exchanges with
police. Sullivan, one of the prosecuting attorneys in the case, and Maiken, a journalist, report that
Gacy was in the process of filing a suit to enjoin further surveillance.
In his suit, Gacy named the City of Des Plaines and several police officers, including Chief
Lee Alfano, Kozenczak, Vande Vusse, and Albrecht, as well as others whose identities Gacy
didn't know. Gacy complained that the police had deprived him of his rights by holding
him captive in the police station the previous Wednesday and not allowing him to talk to
his attorney for five hours. He also complained about the search of his house, the seizure
of his vehicles, and the presence of the surveillance units, which were harassing him, detain-
ing his friends, and ruining his business dealings. As a result of all this, the complaint said,
Gacy had suffered severe mental anguish, loss of use of his personal property, loss of reputa-
tion, expenditures of money, and deprivation of his liberty, his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and his right to privacy. The suit asked for a temporary
restraining order, putting an end to police harassment.
Id. at 125-26.
40, See C. LINEDECKER, THE MAN WHO KILLED Boys 165 (1980) [hereinafter cited as THE MAN
WHO KILLED Boys] where it is reported that:
Gacy's attitude toward the policemen who were trailing him blew hot and cold. He alter-
natively shot photographs of them, led them on rambling car chases in apparent efforts to
lose them, and invited them into his house. In the early evening of the day the [harrassment]
suit was filed, Gacy approached two officers parked in a police car near his driveway and
invited them into his home.
408 See KILLER CLOWN, supra note 406, at 59.
400 Id. at 72.
"' See generally Galloway, Cop as Gacy Guest "Found Odor of Dead, " Chicago Sun-Times, February
14, 1980 at sec. 1, p. 8, col. 1.
"' Id.
43 See also KILLER CLOWN at 138-145.
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attempted to show that such bizarre behavior during the surveillance was evidence
of a delusioned mind and an erratic personality affected by mental disease."1 3 But
the prosecution maintained that Gacy's actions were those of a rational but ar-




Five search warrants were executed and produced most of the tangible evidence
that formed the basis for the prosecution's case.4 5 The first warrant was part of
the investigation of the disappearance of Robert Piest.1 6 It authorized the search
"' See generally Galloway, Cop as Gacy Guest "Found Odor of Dead," Chicago Sun-Times,
February 14, 1980, at sec. 1, p. 8, col. 1.
414 Id.
"I One warrant was issued on December 13, 1978 (R.C. 5535-5536); one on December 21, 1978
(R.C. 5547); two on December 22, 1978 (R.C. 5552, 5658, 5664); and one on December 29, 1978 (R.C.
5670).
416 The affidavit in support of the search warrant included in part the following statement of
the investigating officer:
[T]he following information was received, that Piest was last seen at 1920 Touhy Ave. in
Des Plaines in Nisson Drugs where he works by Kim Beyers a fellow employee. Beyers stated
that Piest approached her and said, "Come watch the register, that contractor guy wants
to talk to me, I'll be right back." At which time Piest went outside of the store to meet
with John Gacy. Mrs. Elizabeth Piest, the missing boy's mother, was also in the store at
this time and was waiting to pick up her son from work. Prior to leaving the store her son
requested that she wait a few minutes while he spoke to a subject about a summer construc-
tion job. Mrs. Piest waited over twenty minutes in the store and then began looking for
her son. Robert Piest left the store at approximately 2100 hours and has not been seen or
heard from since.
On the date in question John W. Gacy was observed in the store at 1920 Touhy Ave.
on two different occasions. Once at 6 P.M. and a second time at 8 P.M. at which time
he stayed in the store until 8:50 P.M. which was the approximate time that the missing per-
son Robert J. Piest disappeared from the store location. During the course of my investiga-
tion it was found that John W. Gacy is in fact a contractor and owner of same, which is
under the name PDM Construction Company located at 8213 W. Summerdale, Norridge,
Ill. which is his residence.
During the course of my investigation I learned that John W. Gacy was arrested and
convicted in Waterloo, Iowa in 1968 for Sodomy and sentenced to 10 yrs. in prison. The
Sodomy arrest involved 15 and 16 year old youths. In 1968 John W. Gacy was arrested for
Conspiracy-Assault with attempt to commit Felony of 15 and 16 year old youths . . . also
arrested on June 22, 1972 by the Northbrook Illinois police [for] Aggravated Battery and
Reckless Conduct, which was a sex related offense.
On appeal Gacy has argued that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized
as a result of the December 13, 1978, warrant on five grounds including that:
1. The information contained in [the officer's] complaint for [the] search warrant failed to
satisfy the "basis of knowledge" test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
2. The complaint underlying the search warrant .. . failed to disclose sufficient facts to
establish probable cause.
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of Gacy's home and three vehicles identified by markings or by make and license
number. The warrant authorized seizure of the three vehicles, and miscellaneous
items of clothing. Three vehicles and fifty-seven other items were ultimately seized.
Among these items were a receipt for film from Nisson Drugs, a high school ring
and a photograph of a room in Gacy's house which showed a television set. The
defense argued that the seizure exceeded the scope of the search warrant,"" while
the prosecution maintained that the items were in plain view."" In any event, the
film receipt tied Gacy to the missing Piest boy since it had been placed in the boy's
jacket by a fellow worker. The ring and photograph of the television set linked
Gacy to another missing person, John Szyc.
Gacy's unusual conduct during the surveillance provided police additional
grounds for the warrant. One of the officers Gacy invited into his home used a
washroom in the house where he detected "the unmistakable odor of decaying
human flesh" in the air blowing through a heating vent. Based on the discovery
of the film receipt in Gacy's house, and the officer's detection of the odor of decay-
ing flesh, a second warrant was issued authorizing the search of the Gacy house
and the seizure of "the body of Robert Piest and/or the remains thereof."41 9 This
led to the discovery of human remains in the crawl space below Gacy's house which
indicated that more than one body was buried there.
As a result of the discovery of the decomposed remains, and incriminating
statements made to police by Gacy three other search warrants were issued authoriz-
ing the search of Gacy's house. The affidavit for one of the warrants included
a statement by Gacy that he had buried one of his victims under the concrete floor
of his brick garage. Twenty-nine bodies were recovered from the crawl space and
other places on Gacy's property. Four other bodies were recovered from Des Plaines
River following Gacy's statements to police that he had thrown a number of his
victims into the river from a particular bridge.
3. Interrogations
The third area of police investigation involved a series of interrogations which
produced incriminating admissions, and ultimately two confessions. Gacy was first
questioned by police on December 12, 1978, when two Des Plaines police officers
4. The search warrant is invalid because it failed to describe with particularity the items to
be seized.
5. The evidence seized must be suppressed since the police officers exceeded the scope of
the search warrant.
Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant at 21-41.
," Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant at 37-38.
," Brief and Argument of Plaintiff-Appellee at 36-43.
On appeal the defense challenged the validity of the December 21, 1978, warrant on the basis
that it rested upon the illegal search and seizure of the film receipt, that the affidavit was otherwise
insufficient to constitute probable cause and failed to describe with particularity the items seized. Brief
and Argument for Defendant-Appellant at 42-50.
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visited his home to investigate the disappearance of Robert Piest. Gacy admitted
that he had been at the pharmacy where the boy worked the previous day, but
stated that he could not remember talking to any boys. Gacy also told the officers
that he had gone to a hospital the previous night upon learning of his uncle's death.
Gacy refused to accompany the officers to the police station immediately, but pro-
mised to go later. Two days later, Gacy went to the station and gave a statement
denying any involvement in the disappearance of Robert Piest. During the time
that Gacy was making his formal statement to the police at the Des Plaines police
station, officers were executing the first warrant at his house.
Gacy was arrested on December 21, 1978, after giving marijuana cigarettes
to a gas station attendant in full view of officers. Gacy was then taken to the Des
Plaines police station, where he complained of chest pains. He was transported
to a nearby hospital, and when medical authorities found no evidence of a heart
attack he was returned to the station. Gacy learned that the police were searching
his home and digging in the crawl space. He was thereafter informed that he was
under arrest for murder.
Gacy's first interrogation followed a standard Miranda waiver; two officers
questioned him for thirty to forty-five minutes, outside the presence of counsel,
and obtained incriminating statements. 2 ' Gacy informed the officers that he had
told everything to his attorneys the night before and stated that there had been
bodies in the crawl space for a long time. 2' He did not know exactly how many
bodies were there, but stated that Piest was not among them. The officers urged
Gacy to tell them where he had placed the boy's body so that he could be given
,' On appeal, the defense maintained that this interrogation was conducted in violation of Gacy's
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present at the interrogation. This argument
is based on trial testimony by one of the interrogating officers that on December 19, 1979, two days
before his arrest, Gacy told the officer that if and when he was arrested, the police should contact
his attorneys. The defense argued on appeal that this statement sufficiently invoked the right to counsel,
and that a standard Miranda waiver was not sufficient to permit interrogation. Brief and Argument
for Defendant-Appellant at 52.
2I Prior to his arrest and during the day of December 21, 1978, Gacy had visited a number of
his friends and informed them that he had told his lawyers that he had killed about thirty people.
Three of these friends, Ronald Rohde, David Cram, and Michael Rossi testified at trial that Gacy
had confessed to them on December 21 that he had committed about thirty murders. See also J. Fritsch,
Told Story of "Blackmail," Chicago Tribune, February 15, 1980 at sec. 1, p. 2, col. 1, reporting that
Ronald Rohde, a cement contractor, testified that:
[H]e last saw [Gacy] on Dec. 21, 1978, when Gacy "cried on my shoulder like he was trying
to get the guilt off his shoulders for a change." Gacy was arrested later that day and charged
with murder after police discovered the first of 26 bodies buried in the crawl space under
his home. Gacy, looking "kind of ragged," had stopped by Rohde's Norridge home that
morning.
"I really came to say goodbye to my best friend for the last time," Rohde quoted Gacy
as saying.
Then he walked up and put his hands on my shoulders and he started crying. He said
"Ron, I've been a bad boy. I killed 30 people, give or take a few," Rohde said.
122519841
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a decent funeral, but Gacy refused. Gacy admitted that he had killed Piest by plac-
ing a rope around his neck and twisting it tight. He further stated that all of his
victims had been strangled, but none had been tortured; he said that all of his
victims in fact had killed themselves because they sold their bodies for twenty dollars.
Gacy said that there were more bodies other than those on his property. He stated
that he was bisexual, not homosexual, and that he had never used force to compel
sexual relations.
Gacy terminated the first interrogation indicating that he would continue his
statement when his lawyers were present. Gacy's lawyers arrived and talked to him
in private. The lawyers told the officers that Gacy had been advised of his constitu-
tional rights, understood those rights, and wished to make a further statement.
At the second interrogation in the presence of his attorneys, Gacy admitted
that he had killed twenty-five to thirty young men and had either buried the bodies
in the crawl space beneath his home or had thrown them in the Des Plaines River.
He said he had sex with all of the victims before killing them, but that he had
not hurt them during sex. Gacy had picked up his victims in an area frequented
by homosexuals while posing as a police officer named Jack Hanley."
22
Gacy stated that he stabbed his first victim to death but all subsequent victims
were killed by what he called his "rope trick." He observed that some of his vic-
tims convulsed for an hour or more before dying. Gacy stated that most of them
were buried in the crawl space but because of space limitations there, the last four
victims were thrown into the Des Plaines River. Gacy described the killing of Robert
Piest in some detail.
The same day Gacy initiated a conversation with an assistant state's attorney
present at the police station. Gacy again described how he had killed Robert Piest;
he stated that fellatio had been performed on Piest before he died and that perhaps
"Jack" had sodomized Piest. Gacy drew a detailed diagram of the crawl space
showing the location of the bodies.
Several days later, Gacy again requested to talk to the same state's attorney.
The state's attorney administered the Miranda warning in the presence of one of
Gacy's lawyers, who stated that Gacy knew his rights and wanted to talk. The
subsequent discussion was the last of Gacy's confessions. Gacy began by explain-
422 During his first interrogation, Gacy had volunteered that there were four different "Johns,"
but that he did not know all of his personalities. Gacy also spoke of "Jack" in the third person, saying,
for example, "Jack does not like homosexuality." After drawing a diagram of the crawl space he remarked,
"What's going on. Jack drew a diagram of the crawl space." During his second interrogation, Gacy
said that during the day he Was John Gacy, but at night when he went cruising he was Jack Hanley.
An officer named Hanley, who resembled Gacy, testified at trial. Gacy had met the real officer Hanley.
The prosecution argued throughout the trial that this suggestion of multiple personalities was a fabrica-
tion and was developed to serve as a basis for his insanity defense, but had no support in any of
the expert psychiatric testimony. See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee at 178-81.
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ing that he did not want to be blamed for every body turned up by police. Gacy
said that he was John by day and Jack by night. He again mentioned that all his
victims were persons who sold their bodies for money. Gacy told of stabbing his
first victim in 1972, and of killing his other victims with the "rope trick," often
after placing handcuffs on them. He denied having stuffed clothing down the throats
of any of his victims. 23 Gacy explained that he usually killed either because the
victim demanded more money than originally agreed upon, or because the victim
threatened to report Gacy's sexual activity. Gacy told of two killings in one night,
identified other victims by name, and identified a photograph as one of his vic-
tims. He said that he planned to pour concrete over the crawl space.
B. The Trial
Gacy's case went to trial about a year after his arrest 24 In order to counter
pretrial publicity, the jury was selected from Winnebago County, some ninety miles
from Chicago.42 The trial lasted twenty-eight days and involved the testimony of
101 witnesses.4 26 The only real issue presented at trial was that of Gacy's sanity.
The defense offered to stipulate to Gacy's causal responsibility for the deaths but
the State refused. The refusal allowed the prosecution to establish the brutality
of Gacy's crimes; the fact that they were related to sexual activity and that Gacy
otherwise engaged in apparently normal rational daily activity. Throughout the trial
the prosecution sought to develop sympathy for Gacy's victims and their surviving
families and relatives. In general, the State sought to produce an identification of
the jury with the family and relatives of the victims. The general character of the
prosecution's presentation was to produce a picture of Gacy as an evil and dangerous
man. The defense sought to establish that Gacy was a victim of mental disease,
that his daily life was riddled with delusions and bizarre behavior, that he lost con-
trol of his own humanity during his sexual activity, that he was a strange mixture
of good and evil impulses, and that most fundamentally, his crimes were the conse-
quence of his insanity.
4"' Cook County Medical Examiner Dr. Robert Stein testified that one victim was stabbed, several
were killed by strangulation by rope, and others were suffocated from cloth stuck in their throats.
See, P. Galloway, Gacy Discovery Recounted, Chicago Sun-Times, February 19, 1980, at sec. 1, p.
4, col. 2, reporting Dr. Stein's testimony:
Stein said that 30 remains of bodies he examined were young males and all were victims
of homicide .... Stein said six remains were found with ropes around the neck and were
killed by strangulation. He said pieces of cloth or clothlike materials were found in the mouth
and throat regions of 13 victims. These, Stein said, died by suffocation, although they could
have been strangled first. One victim died from stab wounds, Stein said, and 10 died from
undetermined causes because no rope or cloth were found with the remains.
424 Gacy was arrested on December 21, 1978; the jury was selected on January 28-31, 1980; and
the trial took place in Chicago February 6 through March 13, 1980.
I2 See J. Fritsch, What's Rockford Like? Gacy Lawyers Need to Know, Chicago Tribune, January
20, 1980, at sec. 3, p. 4, col. 1.
426 See N. Sheppard, Gacy is Found Guilty in the Murders of 33, Most in History of U.S., N.Y.
Times, March 13, 1980.
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1. Prosecution Case-in-Chief
The prosecution presented the testimony of twenty-six "life and death"
witnesses, relatives or friends"" of the known victims who provided identifications
and accounts of the activity of victims prior to their disappearance. Testimony
established that about half of the known victims were married, engaged or had
girlfriends,428 while others were shown to be homosexuals living with male lovers.
Three persons who were in the Nisson Pharmacy with Robert Piest testified about
the circumstances of his disappearance. In addition, five Des Plaines police of-
ficers and two private individuals testified about the investigation and apprehen-
sion of Gacy and the search of his home following the disappearance of Piest.
No individuals were called who actually witnessed any of the killings, but five
surviving victims of sexual assault by Gacy were called in an effort by the prosecu-
tion to establish the manner of the killings.42 9 The first witness testified that Gacy
had offered him employment, entertained him with drugs and alcohol, made a wager
over a pool game by which the loser would perform fellatio on the winner. Two
former employees of Gacy reported sexual advances and subsequent efforts by Gacy
to rape them after he placed handcuffs on them. One of the victims testified of
the forceful sodomy which led to Gacy's Iowa conviction but was unable to con-
tinue his testimony after becoming emotionally upset on the witness stand.
Two of the victims provided detailed accounts of attacks by Gacy. Both of
these victims had complained to police. While Gacy had been arrested because of
their complaints to police, in each instance he convinced police that no felony charges
should be filed. One of these witnesses testified for the prosecution that while he
was waiting for a bus on the north side of Chicago, Gacy pulled up in what looked
like a police car, and demanded identification. Gacy then pulled a gun and forced
him into the car, drove him to a house where he was handcuffed, threatened with
death and forcibly sodomized. The witness further testified that Gacy put something
around his neck and twisted it, forced his head under water in a bathtub nearly
drowning him, urinated on him, and played Russian roulette by pointing a revolver
at the victim's head, spinning the cylinder, pulling the trigger until a blank cart-
ridge was discharged. The witness stated that during this torture, Gacy said to him:
"How does it feel knowing you're going to die." Gacy released his victim alive.
One of Gacy's former employees testified that Gacy had ordered him to dig
trenches in the crawl space beneath his home with the explanation that they were
... See P. Galloway, A Mother Collapses While Testifying at Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, February
8, 1980, and Galloway, Gallery of Grief. The Parents Testify, Chicago Sun-Times, February 10, 1980.
The prosecution apparently sought to show that the employment and student status of a number of
the victims precluded their being male prostitutes.
,2" The prosecution apparently made an effort to show that not all of Gacy's victims were homosex-
ual, and thus that his stated reason for killing them because they were homosexuals and sold their
bodies for money was false.
•' The prosecution, of course, had Gacy's own statements describing the manner of the killings.
The defense did not object to admission of these confessions and incriminating statements.
1228 [Vol. 86
60
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss4/8
INSANITY DEFENSE
needed for drainage pipes. Another former employee linked Gacy to one of the
victims. He testified that Gacy gave him title to a car formerly registered to the
deceased person, and that on the day of Gacy's arrest, Gacy confessed to him that
he had killed about thirty people. Another witness, a friend of Gacy for more than
five years, testified as to Gacy's apparent normality, and about Gacy's kindness
to his family, but stated that on the day of his arrest, Gacy confessed to him that
he had killed about thirty people.
The prosecution then called police officers from Des Plaines and Cook County
to recount the investigation, surveillance and activities surrounding the arrest of
Gacy. The state's attorney testified about the detailed account of the killings pro-
vided by Gacy on December 22, 1978 and January 3, 1979. The final prosecution
witnesses were police officials and medical experts who testified about the recovery,
examination and identification of bodies recovered from the Des Plaines River.
In all, the prosecution's case-in-chief involved thirteen days of testimony from
sixty witnesses. After the State rested, the defense moved for directed verdicts. The
trial judge granted a defense motion for a directed verdict on a count charging
aggravated kidnapping of Robert Piest, but denied the motion as to all other counts.
2. Defense Case-in-Chief
Gacy relied exclusively on the insanity defense. The first witness was Jeffrey
Rignall, who testified that he was attacked by Gacy on March 21, 1978. Rignall
provided a detailed account of his experience with Gacy, its subsequent effects on
his life, and his general assessment of the case. Rignall was the first in a series
of witnesses called by the defense in an effort to show that Gacy often times lost
control of himself and did not know what he was doing. Rignall said that he had
been walking down a street in Chicago when Gacy drove up, offered him a ride,
and a marijuana cigarette. Once Rignall got into the car, Gacy placed a rag covered
with chloroform over his face, and drove him to Gacy's house where Rignall was
restrained. Then Gacy and an unknown third person forcibly engaged in oral and
anal sex acts with him. He recalled that he later found himself abandoned at the
foot of a statue on Chicago's north side, "half-dressed ... in total pain." Rignall
stated that, in his opinion, Gacy was not capable of controlling himself or under-
standing the criminal nature of his acts. Rignall said he based this on "the beastly,
animalistic way he attacked me." On cross-examination, Rignall was read a por-
tion of his book, 29 Below, where he described Gacy as being "methodical" and
a man who "seemed to plan" his actions. Rignall agreed that he had written the
passages but maintained that they were being read out of context. Rignall said that
he had written that he believed Gacy was crazy "in so many words."
In contr-ast to Rignall's testimony, Gacy's next-door neighbor Lillian Grexa
testified that Gacy was a very nice person, very warm, generous and considerate.
She said he was "better than just a neighbor, he was a good friend;" and observed
that "He isn't smiling now, but I have never seen John without a smile on his
face before today." On cross-examination, the neighbor gave her opinion as to
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Gacy's sanity stating: "There is no way I'm going to say John is crazy. I think
he is a very brilliant man." Mrs. Grexa's general view of Gacy was that he was
a hard worker, affectionate stepfather, generous host, and unfailingly chebrful per-
son. The effect of such widely varying perceptions of and experiences with Gacy
suggested a personality and pattern of behavior associated with the "Jekyll-Hyde"
metaphor to which other defense witnesses and defense counsel in argument referred.
In its attempt to establish there were periods when Gacy lost control and showed
little awareness of what he was doing, another defense witness, who worked with
Gacy, lived in his home and performed sexual acts for money, testified about an
episode when Gacy struck him with a hammer. He stated that when he asked Gacy
what he was doing, Gacy looked at him, put the hammer down, and said that
he didn't know what had come over him. When asked by defense counsel whether
in his opinion Gacy could control himself or understand the criminality of his acts,
the witness stated: "I don't think he knew what he was doing."
Other witnesses were called to show that while there were times when Gacy
lost control and seemed delusional, at other times he lead an apparently normal
life. An officer of the Cook County Department of Corrections testified that Gacy
was restrained at the prison hospital after being found under his bed with one part
of a towel around his neck and the other tied to his bed. Another employee at
the hospital testified that on one occasion, while EKG needles and leads were being
applied to him, Gacy tore out the EKG monitor. The owner of a gas station which
Gacy patronized testified that, on one occasion, Gacy told him that he was work-
ing with the FBI to protect the wife of the president of the United States, and
on another occasion that a local gangland leader served on the board of directors
of Gacy's company. In sharp contrast, two of Gacy's business associates testified
that he was a hardworking, conscientious, and reliable businessman. One of them
also offered that Gacy was a good father to his children, and capable of genuine
emotion; that he was active in the community, in politics and charity work. This
witness further reported that Gacy had admitted that he was bisexual, and that
in his opinion, the John Gacy he knew was sane.
Gacy's second wife testified that Gacy was good to her and her children. She
said generally he appeared sane to her, but did recall that he had an apparent stroke
or seizure in bed one night and appeared dead. She described his declining interest
in marital sex which culminated in his announcement on Mother's Day, 1975, that
he was having sex with her for the last time. Further, she testified that one night
after their divorce, Gacy initiated sexual activity but broke down and cried, stating
that he was afraid that he was going more "the other way."
Gacy's mother, Marion Gacy, testified about his childhood, including his medical
and physical problems, and his relationship with his father. This laid the founda-
tion for later testimony by expert medical witnesses called by the defense. Marion
Gacy told of John's sickly childhood, and the history of physical and psychological
abuse of both herself and her son by John's father. Mrs. Gacy testified that her
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husband never showed love or affection to her son, and according to her: "You
had to be perfect for him." Nevertheless, she said John loved his father.
Gacy's younger sister testified that in her opinion the brother she knew was
not evil, but sweet, loving, understanding and generous. She corroborated the
mother's testimony about extensive psychological and physical abuse of John by
his father, and recounted an incident the night before her wedding, when her father
attacked her brother for no apparent reason, daring 'John to hit him. She also
testified that he criticized John's friends, called one "a fairy" and predicted John
would soon be like that. Testimony by one of Gacy's childhood friends reemphasized
the abuse by his father and his history of seizures.
The sister also recalled one incident when her brother lost complete control
of himself. Shortly prior to her marriage, she and John were in a car with her
fiance, when John became enraged at something the fiance said and lunged at him.
Gacy could not be calmed down. He got out of the car, pounded on the roof,
and then walked a short distance to their home. After a few moments, he acted
"fine, as if nothing had happened."
3. Translating Psychiatric Evaluation into Legal Evidence
The trial of John Wayne Gacy included the psychiatric testimony of thirteen
expert witnesses including eight psychiatrists and five psychologists. The testimony
was lengthy and involved. There was agreement on the basic nature of John Gacy's
personality. However, there was fundamental disagreement about the nature of his
mental disorder.
Generally, the prosecution expert witnesses offered a diagnosis of a personality
disorder4 30 which had components of a narcissistic obsessive-compulsive, and anti-
social personality. The defense expert witnesses generally viewed the defendant as
suffering from a psychosis, all agreeing on some form of schizophrenia."'"
,30 DSM III differentiates between personality traits and personality disorders. "Personality traits
are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself. [These
are] exhibited in a wide range of important social and personal contexts." Personality disorders, on
the other hand, are traits which "are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant impairment
in social or occupational functioning or subjective distress. . . ." The personality disorders may be
seen during an episode of another mental disorder. The diagnosis of personality disorder should be
made only when the features are typical of an individual's long-term functioning and are not limited
to discrete episodes of illness.
DSM III contains a caution in the introductory section as to its purpose which is "to provide
clear descriptions of diagnostic categories to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate
about, study, and treat various mental disorders." DSM III warns that "the use of this manual for
nonclinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility, competency or insanity . . . must
be critically examined .. " DSM III at 305, 12.
"I DSM III lists the essential features of the schizophrenic disorders as "the presence of certain
psychotic features during the active phase of the illness, characteristic symptoms involving multiple
psychological processes, deterioration from a previous level of functioning, onset before age of 45,
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This section of the Article will consider in detail the psychiatric examination,
diagnosis and testimony of the expert witnesses. All the expert witnesses offered
diagnostic evidence which was provided by reference to the American Psychiatric
Association's current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM
III).
a. Defense Psychiatric Witnesses. The first defense expert called to testify was
Dr. Thomas Eliseo, a clinical psychologist.4 32 His examination of Gacy included
administering a number of tests.133 His resultant diagnosis was that Gacy suffered
from a surface personality of borderline schizophrenia. According to Dr. Eliseo,
a borderline personality is "a person [who] on the surface looks normal but has
all kinds of neurotic, anti-social, psychotic illnesses."
There was a great debate (at sidebar) during Dr. Eliseo's testimony on the ques-
tion of whether a borderline personality constitutes a mental disease. DSM I does
not list borderline personality as a mental disease. Thus, the prosecution argued that
in Illinois the diagnosis did not meet the insanity standard.
Dr. Eliseo further concluded that Gacy has an inner personality of paranoid
schizophrenia. He described such a personality as one "who basically sees the world
and a duration of at least six months." According to the DSM II1, the limits of schizophrenia are
unclear. DSM III at 181:
Schizophrenia always involves deterioration from a previous level of functioning during
some phase of the illness in such areas as work, social relations and self-care.. . . The major
disturbance in the content of thought involves delusions that are often multiple, fragmented,
or bizarre. . . . The major disturbances in perception are various forms of hallucination.
... Mhe most common of which is auditory frequently involving voices the individual perceives
as coming from outside the head.... [Schizophrenia] involves blunting, flattening, or inap-
propriateness of affect.... Although these affective disturbances are almost invariably present,
[in schizophrenia] their usefulness in making the diagnosis is limited because their presence
is often difficult to judge except when present in extreme form. . . . The sense of self that
gives the normal person a feeling of individuality, uniqueness, and self-direction is frequently
disturbed.
Violent acts performed by individuals with this disorder often attract public attention. However,
whether the frequency of such acts is greater than in the general population is unknown. Further,
schizophrenia is equally common in males and females. DSM III at 181-83.
.. Dr. Eliseo is in private practice in Illinois and examined Gacy at the request of the defense
attorneys. His first examination lasted 5Vz hours, and a second, shorter interview was conducted 4
days later.
"' Tests administered included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test (measures intellectual func-
tioning, thought processes, and ego functioning through evaluation of performance on ten sub-tests
which measure various dimensions of intellectual functioning), Rohrschach Test (a projective test that
assesses personality conflicts, ego function and structure, defensive structures, thought processes and
affective integration through the patient's associations to inkblots), Draw-A-Person test (a projective
test evaluating personality conflicts, self image, family perception, ego functions, intellectual function-
ing and visual-motor coordination through the use of the patient's drawings on blank paper), Thematic
Apperception Test (measurers personality conflicts and defensive structure through the use of the pa-
tient's stories made up after viewing stimulus pictures), Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
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as a place where you have to be constantly careful ... and feeling that at times
people are out to hurt you, and also feeling you are better than other people."
Dr. Eliseo testified that Gacy's inappropriate feelings and thoughts, his grandiose
thinking, his wanting to build a business and to be responsible and reliable and
strong were indicators that he was not an anti-social personality. Instead, he main-
tained that these characteristics and others support his diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia. Dr. Eliseo concluded that at the times of the alleged offenses, Gacy
was suffering from a mental disease as a result of which he lacked the capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law and to appreciate the criminal-
ity of his conduct.434 The effectiveness of Dr. Eliseo's testimony was undercut by
his admissions that he never reviewed any of the psychological test results or
psychiatric reports of Gacy, any background materials, any written memoranda
of confessions by Gacy or any of the police reports. Dr. Eliseo did not interview
family members or other lay witnesses. He also did not attempt to verify Gacy's
statements. Finally, Dr. Eliseo admitted that his diagnosis of psychosis was a guess.
A psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence Z. Freedman was the second defense expert.
4 35
The diagnosis 436 reached by Dr. Freedman was that Gacy was a "pseudoneurotic
paranoid schizophrenic. '4 31 He explained that this meant that Gacy's personality
,' The prosecution in cross-examination underscored Dr. Eliseo's judgment that between 1972
and 1980, Gacy lacked appreciation of the criminality of his conduct only at the time he killed his
victims. This cross-examination was as follows:
A: I was referring to when he committed the act, he did not know that it was wrong.
Q: Could you answer the question Doctor? So that an indication that a person who does
not understand that he has committed a crime?
A: Afterwards, he would understand.
Q: So, after the first one, in other words, he has now got a body and he has put it in his
basement and he sure didn't understand during the first one you say, but now he has buried
the body to hide it from the police and the public, and now he is going to kill again.
Do you think that is an indication that he didn't understand the criminality of his conduct
when he is killing the second time?
A: At the moment that he did it, he was not aware of the criminality.
Q: Or the third?
A: Yes, I think all of them, he did not.
Q: Right through to 33?
A:.Yes, sir, that he was in a state where he was psychotic for that period and all he thought
was to kill this person.
Q: He was psychotic for the whole period and all he could do was kill people?
A: No, not for the whole period, but during the time he actually went around and committed
the act, not for the whole eight years, or whatever it was, six years.
... Dr. Freedman is the Foundation's Fund Research Professor in psychiatry & chairman of the
Institution of Social & Behavioral Pathology at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Board
of the Center for the Study of Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago Law School and has done
extensive work in the area of criminology.
"S6 Dr. Freedman's interviews with John Gacy were conducted from Nov. 29, 1979 through Jan.
23, 1980 for 3-4 hours daily for an estimated total of approximately 50 hours. Additionally, he inter-
viewed Gacy's mother and younger sister.
411 On cross-examination Dr. Freedman conceded that "pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenia"
was not listed as a diagnosis in DSM III but was "subsumed" by other terms. Dr. Freedman did testify
1984] 1233
65
Herman et al.: People of the State of Illinois vs. John Gacy: The Functioning of
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
had a "psychotic core ... whose defense mechanisms ... resemble neurosis (and)
• . . in a sense serve to disguise the psychosis . . . ." Dr. Freedman defined a
"neurotic" as a person with some kind of incapacity or compulsion which disturbs
him or makes him unhappy or offends others, but which is not serious enough
to incapacitate the individual totally.
Dr. Freedman believed that Gacy was transformed from being neurotic to
psychotic in December, 1969, when his father died, and Gacy could not attend
the funeral because he was in jail. Dr. Freedman noted that at this time Gacy felt
that he was the failure his father had always predicted he would be. Dr. Freedman
testified that his diagnosis was, in part, premised upon reports of psychological
tests administered by Dr. Hartman, Dr. Traisman, Dr. Rappaport, and Dr. Eliseo
who also testified at the trial. He analogized his utilization of these reports to the
use of lab reports by an internist, in that these tests contributed to the general
information from which he derived his clinical impression, diagnosis, and plan of
treatment. The four series of tests considered by Dr. Freedman included Rohrschach
tests,"38 Thematic Apperception Test, 39 Genetic Factors Test, 40 and the Multi-phasic
Personality Test.'" The Rohrschach test, as analyzed by Dr. Freedman, indicated
abnormality. The Thematic Apperception Test revealed both sexual identity am-
biguity and an aggressive personality on the part of Gacy. While the Genetic Fac-
tor Test failed to reveal any abnormality in his chromosomal make-up, the Multi-
phasic Personality Test revealed various personality defects and deficiencies.
Additionally, Dr. Freedman examined Gacy's previous medical and
psychological history. During a psychiatric examination he extracted from Gacy
a life history consisting of his relationships with his parents, siblings and playmates
through his adolescence and young childhood. Throughout the interviews Dr. Freed-
man was able to observe Gacy's posture, facial expression and emotions while
talking.
Gacy reported a history of repeated health problems throughout his life. Dr.
Freedman believed that these problems were "taught" to him "probably by his
mother." When he was a pre-teen, Gacy had suffered syncope, or fainting spells,
and test results from an electroencephalogram administered at that time indicated
an abnormality in his brain wave record. His physician's diagnosis was psycho-
motor epilepsy, and Gacy was placed on dilanton and phenobarbital. The treat-
that his diagnosis was consistent with a diagnosis of borderline personality which he said was simply
another way of conveying the same type of diagnosis. He said that similar diagnostic terms were latent
schizophrenia and ambulatory schizophrenia.
"I The subject describes what is observed in a series of cards containing ink blots, providing a
basis for diagnosing personality disorders.
The subject is asked to examine a series of ambiguous pictures and to respond to questions
relating to each picture. The test reflects conscious attitudes and feelings.
440 A test to determine whether the subject has a normal chromosome/karyotype pattern.
"" A standardized personality test.
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ment prescribed by the physician did not relieve the symptoms, and the physician
then suggested to Gacy's mother that the cause of the fainting could be psychological
and recommended that Gacy be examined by a psychiatrist. Gacy's mother, however,
did not follow this advice. Dr. Freedman also discovered that around the same
time Gacy experienced the onset of his fainting spells, he had probably been sex-
ually molested by a friend of the family who was a contractor.
Dr. Freedman described Gacy's childhood as "tortured." His father was a
violent man, and his mother was a victim of the father's violence. Gacy's interests
followed those of family members who treated him kindly and he apparently
developed feminine instincts. He began collecting his mother's underpants at the
age of four or five and hiding them under the front porch. When he was caught
doing this, he was forced to wear the underpants around the house. In later
childhood, he collected neighbor women's underpants and hid them.
In Gacy's early childhood, when he and a girl cousin were playing "show me"
games an adult member of the family saw them, and Gacy was severely punished.
Dr. Freedman found it significant that Gacy's relationships with females were
punished.
The description of Gacy's father developed by Dr. Freedman was that the man
was a compulsive, hardworking, intelligent outdoorsman. Every night when Gacy's
father returned from work, he entered the basement, which he kept locked, and
drank alcohol. When he emerged he often beat his wife or his son. Although he
sometimes hit the younger sister as well, he was most "brutal" to Gacy.
Dr. Freedman formed the opinion that as a result of this brutality, Gacy
developed projective denial. This "is a way of surviving otherwise unbearable cir-
cumstances by putting it out of your awareness." Projection involves "ascribing
to another a feeling you yourself have." An example of Gacy's denial projection,
according to Dr. Freedman, was his insistence that he was "bisexual;" he pro-
jected his own homosexual feelings onto his partners and came to regard regular
homosexual activity as a form of masturbation.
In a final discussion on Gacy's childhood, Dr. Freedman cited studies of violent
defendants which indicated that the two most difficult kinds of fathers for a boy
were a very harsh, punishing father, and a father whose behavior was erratic
(sometimes harsh, and sometimes not); Gacy's father was both.
His early medical problems restricted Gacy from many activities. Both Gacy's
health problems and his negative self-image were significant in his choice of vic-
tims. Dr. Freedman believed that the resemblance among his victims indicated that
"a certain type of target was psychologically very important to him." Muscular
teens, represented a contrast to Gacy, who as a teen, was flabby and felt inade-
quate. At the same time, Gacy viewed his victims as "trash." After he had sex
with them, he experienced a frightening sense of his own homosexuality. In re-
counting the murders to Dr. Freedman, Gacy showed no affect or empathy with
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his victims. Dr. Freedman described Gacy as a "driven man" who "worked harder
and harder to relate to his business, to people, to clubs, anything that would keep
him from looking into himself. . ....
Dr. Freedman was of the opinion that Gacy used both alcohol and Valium.
These substances block the neo-cortex and interfere with the functioning of the
super ego (that part of the personality which keeps one behaving properly in public).
As a result of Gacy's use of these drugs, some of his psychological defenses were
lowered. At the time he killed Robert Piest, Gacy was under considerable stress.
Dr. Freedman stated that this stress coupled with the use of alcohol, ether,
chloroform, or Valium had the potential to break down parts of Gacy's personal-
ity functions. When Gacy killed Piest, he violated his own sense of self-protection
by going to a place where he was well-known and where he was observed by a
number of people. These circumstances would suggest to a normal person the great
likelihood of being apprehended for criminal acts. The failure to consider self-
protective measures was consistent with a diagnosis of pseudo-neurotic paranoid
schizophrenia. Dr. Freedman described a "psychosis" as the most severe form of
mental illness, involving a distortion of the thinking processes or the behavioral
processes; "schizophrenia" is characterized by distortion between ideas and acts,
and the feelings which would ordinarily accompany them. According to Dr. Freed-
man, this distortion was apparent in Gacy. When discussing the murders with which
he was charged, Gacy evidenced a kind of pride in being able to overcome his
muscular young victims whom he called "stupid."
Dr. Freedman testified that he believed Gacy had suffered from a chronic pro-
gressive mental disease from 1969 to the present. It was quite possible for Gacy
to engage in daily activity while people were unaware of his deep illness. He fur-
ther testified that this mental illness developed as a result of a split between feeling
and action, and that the origin of this split might lie in his inability as a child
to be able to predict the hostility of his father or to resolve his conflicting feelings
for his father. Dr. Freedman would not give an opinion on whether Gacy could
conform his behavior to the requirements of law or appreciate the criminality of
his acts, noting that this is a legal matter, not a psychiatric matter.
The prosecution attempted to discredit Dr. Freedman's testimony by showing
that he had testified as to the ultimate question in another trial and that the jury
had rejected his judgment. In an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury,
Dr. Freedman explained that he considered the ultimate question to be a legal ques-
tion rather than a psychiatric one, and therefore, outside his area of competence.
On cross-examination, Dr. Freedman testified that in a previous case he had given
an opinion as to whether or not the defendant could conform his conduct or ap-
preciate the criminality of his acts. On redirect, Dr. Freedman explained that he
was able to do this because he had observed the defendant "reenact" the crime
under hypnosis, and having viewed this "live reenactment" of the crime, he was
certain that the defendant had committed the crime during a dissociative state of
psychotic reaction. Dr. Freedman said that he did not have an opportunity to observe
such a "live reenactment" by Gacy and therefore lacked a similar basis for an
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opinion. When cross-examination resumed, the prosecution established that not-
withstanding Dr. Freedman's opinion on the ultimate question in the prior case,
the jury nonetheless found the defendant guilty.
The third expert witness for the defense was Dr. Robert Traisman, 4 2 a clinical
psychologist, who on the basis of a battery of psychological tests44 3 found Gacy
to suffer from homosexual conflicts, a marked feeling of masculine inadequacy,
sexual confusion, a lack of empathy, a lack of emotional control when under stress,
and a strong potential for emotional or ego disintegration with expressions of hostile,
dangerous impulses. Dr. Traisman's formal diagnosis was that Gacy suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia and a sociopathic personality.
When asked by the defense whether an individual with the diagnosis given by
Dr. Traisman could appear normal in the everyday world, the witness answered
that it was possible because certain people are "ambulatory schiiophrenics." Dr.
Traisman also testified that schizophrenics do well in structured settings (like prison),
and that he would not consider it necessary to change his diagnosis if he were told
Gacy killed someone and buried the body. Dr. Traisman did not believe that Gacy
was narcissistic, although he was self-centered. Dr. Traisman provided this descrip-
tion of John Gacy: "I just simply think that the primary illness in this man is
his lack of a conscience, his swiss cheese super ego, his paranoid schizophrenia,
his flight into rage of a hostile, violent destructive nature." Dr. Traisman further
offered the opinion that although Gacy might know the nature of his antisocial
acts, for example that he had killed someone, he might not be able to control his
conduct. He concluded his testimony by saying that a psychiatrist using his test
results as part of a full psychiatric evaluation, would be able to address the issue
of legal responsibility more fully.
The fourth witness, Dr. Richard Rappaport, a psychiatrist, did draw on Dr.
Traisman's test results and did testify more fully on the ultimate question.444 Dr.
Rappaport ordered an electroencephalogram and a chromosomal analysis. Addi-
"I Dr. Traisman is a clinical psychologist in private practice. One of his principal areas of practice
involves working with school systems in the administration of tests to ascertain presence or degree of
emotional disturbance in children and adolescents. He also administers these psychological tests to adults
and administered a battery of tests to John Gacy at the request of one of the defense psychiatrists.
441 Dr. Traisman spent three and one half hours with Gacy administering these tests; he read no
background material, and interviewed no other person. He administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale, the Rorschach Ink Blot Test, the Draw-a-Person Test and the Thematic Apperception Test. See
supra note 33. Dr. Traisman also administered the Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt test (a projective visual
motor development test that assesses conflicts of ego function and structure and organic brain damage
based on the patient's reproduction of geometric figures).
'4 Dr. Rappaport is in private practice in Chicago, he was previously employed by the Illinois
Department of Corrections as a consultant involved in group therapy with inmates at Statesville Prison
in Joliet, Illinois. Dr. Rappaport interviewed John Gacy for sixty-five hours over a five month period.
Each interview lasted from two to three and one-half hours. In addition to other interviews Dr. Rap-
paport directly administered sodium amytal (Sodium amytal produces a semi-hypnotic state which lowers
the repression barriers so the subject can recall things from the unconscious part of the mind) (truth
serum) to Gacy. See supra note 443 for a description of tests relied upon by Dr. Rappaport.
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tionally, Dr. Rappaport read all past medical reports, police records, psychological
examination reports, witness statements, statements by Gacy and examinations by
other psychiatrists. Dr. Rappaport testified that Gacy manifested characteristics
of thought disorder, that he suffered from a psychological inducement of medical
problems, ambivalence, flattened affect and paranoid delusions. The witness stated
that Gacy projected repressed parts of himself onto others, and then raged against
them. Dr. Rappaport's diagnosis was that at the time of the killings, John Gacy
was suffering from a mental disease, borderline personality disorder44 with a sub-
type psychopathic personality, and episodes of paranoid schizophrenia. The witness
stated that in his opinion as a result of his mental disease, Gacy was unable to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the killings.4"
Dr. Rappaport stated that there were three questions which he sought to answer
through his examination of John Gacy. The first was whether a mental disease
or defect existed, to which he testified that one did exist. The second was whether
Gacy had substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The
third was whether Gacy was able to conform his conduct to requirements of law.
Dr. Rappaport testified that, in his opinion, the first and at least one of the latter
two must be answered in the affirmative in order to say that a person is insane.
This formulation essentially composes the legal test for insanity in Illinois. 44,
In defining "defect," Dr. Rappaport stated that with the use of this term one
is "talking about a question of retardation . . . [t]here could be a congenital defect,
such as a piece of the brain missing." From the examinations performed, Dr. Rap-
paport concluded that no defect existed; therefore, he judged that the "major ques-
tion was whether or not there was a mental disease." Dr. Rappaport testified that
"the definition of mental disease is that there's a psychological or behavioral syn-
drome, which is characterized by symptoms which cause distress or difficulty in
"I Borderline Personality Disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III of the
American Psychiatric Association as a personality type in which there is instability in a variety of areas,
including interpersonal behavior, mood, and self-image. Interpersonal relations are often intense and
unstable, with marked shifts of attitude over time. Behavior is frequently impulsive and unpredictable
and is potentially physically damaging. Moods are unstable. There may be problems relating to being
alone, and chronic feelings of emptiness and boredom. According to Dr. Rappaport the characteristics
of the borderline personality are impulsiveness, ability to adapt to structured situations, seeing only
one aspect of oneself or someone else at a time, brief psychotic episodes sometimes caused by stress,
fatigue or use of alcohol. In addition, the witness said that a borderline personality such as Gacy's
is manifested by illogical responses, difficulty in interpersonal relationships, primitive ego defense
mechanisms such as projection, denial and splitting.
,' The prosecution objected to Dr. Rappaport being permitted to testify as to Gacy's sanity at
the time of his offenses on the ground that the witness lacked a factual basis for each separate killing
as to the existence of a psychotic state. The prosecution also objected to Dr. Rappaport's testimony
to the effect that Gacy had a history of drug and alcohol abuse on the ground that the witness had
no personal knowledge of Gacy's use of alcohol or drugs. The prosecution attempted to discredit Dr.
Rappaport's testimony by suggesting that he solicited business as an expert witness and was willing
to violate the court's order prohibiting interviews by those involved in the case.
,41 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 1005-1-11 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
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relating to people." This testimony was objected to by the State, the objection
sustained, and the testimony stricken. Dr. Rappaport then restated his definition
of mental disease as a "[p]sychological or behavioral syndrome, which consists
of certain symptoms which produce this conflict or disease in the individual, or
disability in an individual." Dr. Rappaport further stated that in his view mental
disease should-not be defined in such a way that it would exist just by virtue of
the fact that someone continues to commit crimes.
Dr. Rappaport defined his diagnosis of borderline for the court and jury as
a serious mental illness falling somewhere between neurotic and psychotic behavior.
He explained that a borderline person can conduct a much more normal life than
a psychotic person, but that psychosis occurs from time to time. He explained in
some detail the characteristics of a borderline personality and how these were
manifested in John Gacy. Dr. Rappaport believed that his diagnosis of borderline
was not inconsistent with Dr. Freedman's diagnosis.
Seven characteristics of the borderline personality were identified: (1) intense
affect (hostility or depression); (2) impulsive behavior (usually episodic in the form
of self-mutilation, drug overdose, chronic alcoholism or promiscuity); (3) social
adaptiveness (consists of identity disfusion in which the person cannot put the dif-
ferent parts of himself together and so sees only one part of another person); (4)
brief psychotic episodes (micro or mini psychoses which are transient in nature
and often occur as a result of rage); (5) bizarre dereistic or illogical findings (the
person has no concern for outside reality); (6) difficulty in inter-personal relation-
ships (waiver between gross superficiality and intense dependency) and (7) use of
primitive ego defenses.
Dr. Rappaport described these characteristics in greater depth. In terms of the
first, intense affect, John Gacy's depression was characterized by a sense of
loneliness. It was during these moments that Dr. Rappaport observed the greatest
amount of affect from Gacy; during these periods, in order to protect himself from
his feelings of loneliness, he would surround himself with many people (parties
with friends or bodies of victims). Dr. Rappaport described this activity as a super-
ficial way to prevent depression.
In regard to the second characteristic, impulsive behavior, there is no time be-
tween thought and act. This was manifested in Gacy's impulses over which he had
no control.
The third, social adaptiveness, was the part of John Gacy's personality, ac-
cording to Dr. Rappaport, which allowed him to adapt himself well in his work
situations. There was a lack of self-image which permitted Gacy at one moment
to admit to the murders and at another moment to state he could not have done
the murders. In terms of others, he can only see one characteristic and cannot im-
agine that the same person could feel love and hate or be angry and happy.
The chief difference between the fourth feature, brief psychotic episodes, and
full blown psychotic paranoid schizophrenia is that Gacy's psychotic episodes were
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short, lasting only a few hours. In general, Gacy could function in an apparently
normal way but the psychotic episodes would re-occur, often triggered by rage.
During these episodes, Gacy would build up a scenario as a result of stress, fatigue,
or internal stress (feelings demanding expression); and he would begin to think
that he was his father and that the victims were himself as a boy. Gacy identified
with his father by assuming the role of the aggressor, and acted out his father's
role on the victims. When questioned whether this rage could have been self rage
or directed against himself, Dr. Rappaport responded: "Definitely."
In explaining the fifth feature, bizarre dereistic or illogical findings, Dr. Rap-
paport pointed out the inconsistencies in the psychological tests administered by
Dr. Traisman. Dr. Rappaport testified that such inconsistent results are typical of
the borderline personality. Dr. Rappaport also testified that such inconsistency is
consistent with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.
Difficulty in interpersonal relationships, including marital problems such as
those Gacy experienced, is also typical of the borderline individual. The waivering
between gross superficial relationships and very dependent ones, according to the
witness, leads the borderline individual to a stage where he finds himself becoming
dependent; he then tries to manipulate, devalue, and depreciate the object of his
dependency and to dispose of the relationship. In these personal relationships, a
borderline like Gacy will try to mimic what he thinks would be a normal relation-
ship because he has no sense of himself.
Another characteristic, the use of primitive ego defenses, is "very crucial" in
understanding the borderline personality. Primitive ego defenses are those defenses
used by a child or someone who is severely retarded. They are primarily projective
identification, gross denial, and splitting, which means that two ideas can exist
at the same time in the same person, but in two separate areas of the mind. Since
a borderline person has difficulty integrating love and hate feelings regarding the
same person, he splits them so that at times he feels only one emotion or the other.
Projection, on the other hand, is a process of attributing one's own feelings to
someone else. Projective identification is a more regressed form of ego defense,
seen in the borderline person, so that even though he projects his feelings to another,
he also simultaneously maintains the same feelings himself.
Gross denial is the ego defense which allowed Gacy to relate sexual experiences
with men and then to maintain that he was not homosexual himself, as though
there was no inconsistency between his judgment and his behavior. Dr. Rappaport
testified that these three primitive ego defenses are all unconscious processes which
permitted Gacy as a borderline to defend his ego against anxiety.
Dr. Rappaport testified on the question of free will as it relates to the con-
scious and unconscious parts of the mind. According to the witness, there is "repres-
sion barrier," which is that part of the mind that keeps some ideas or thoughts
from reaching the conscious part of the brain. People repress painful thoughts.
In further clarifying his diagnosis, Dr. Rappaport indicated, through use of a drawing
board, how a psychiatrist looks at the individual mind as though it was an onion;
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the psychiatrist peels back layers to discover the various parts of the personality.
An antisocial personality or psychopathic personality was one of the outer layers
of John Gacy which, according to Dr. Rappaport, might mislead one into con-
cluding that underneath this layer, there is another layer resulting from the influence
of experiencies in Gacy's early life, including his experience as middle child in the
family, and the harsh punitive and critical treatment by his father. Dr. Rappaport
referred to the practice of Gacy's father of going to the locked basement to drink
everyday after work, after which any incident could trigger rage, which often was
directed at John or his mother. Alcoholism was the source of this behavior, and
the general atmosphere in the house was violent and upsetting, including beatings,
recriminations, and disapproval. The father's disapproval, accusations, and
recriminations, according to Dr. Rappaport, went to the extent that if it rained
when father and son planned to go fishing, the rain was John's fault; if they were
painting and the paint ran, it was John's fault.
In this deeper layer of Gacy's personality, Dr. Rappaport said that the father's
locked basement was very important; no one was ever allowed in it, and there were
"locks on top of locks." There was a mystery about it that affected John Gacy.
Also in this inner core were parts of the early life, such as Gacy's hording
his mother's underpants at age four to five, and his mother punishing him for
this behavior by making him wear her underpants around the house. This aspect
of his personality was acted out later when at the age of sixteen or seventeen, Gacy
began stealing and collecting women's undergarments.
Another of the type of experiences which had a lasting impact was when at
the age of eight, John and his sisters were left at home alone while their mother
worked and their father was in the hospital. For Gacy this was a frightening ex-
perience of being abandoned with the father ill, and the mother absent. On one
occasion, Dr. Rappaport said, Gacy's mother became angry with the children and
hid in the basement for hours while the children became frantic; John stood at
the basement door crying.
According to Dr. Rappaport, the early phase of John Gacy's life produced
a castration anxiety which emerged during the Oedipal period.44 8 This anxiety was
heightened by the abuse of the father.
The defense rested following Dr. Rappaport's testimony. The defense case in
chief consisted of seven days of testimony from seventeen witnesses.
b. Prosecution Rebuttal-Psychiatric Witnesses. The prosecution called a
number of witnesses to establish Gacy's homosexual activity with various victims.
All were of the opinion that Gacy was in control of his actions. In addition, witnesses
were called to show past efforts by Gacy to deny or conceal this activity.
The Oedipal period is that period in which the child desires a sexual relationship with his mother
and is fearful that the father will castrate him.
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The first witness testified about criminal activities with Gacy in Iowa in 1966.
The most significant aspect of the testimony was Gacy's promise to pay the witness's
outstanding car loan if he would assault one of the complainants in the then pend-
ing Iowa sodomy case. Gacy gave the witness a can of chemical disabling spray
and identified the intended victim in a high school yearbook. Another former
employee testified about an occasion in Iowa in 1967 when Gacy showed him stag
films, and approached him with a carving knife, but then became apologetic and
dropped the knife. Later Gacy chained and chocked him, but subsequently released
him.
The prosecution then called a prison counselor from the Iowa penitentiary where
Gacy had been incarcerated. The counselor testified that Gacy adapted well to prison
life and became a leader with the prison service organization. A fellow inmate also
testified that Gacy claimed that he was in prison for showing pornographic films
to adolescent girls; but that throughout his prison term he talked about his business
plans after release.
The prosecution's first expert witness was Dr. Leonard Heston"4 9 who had in-
terviewed Gacy for three to four hours in 1968 while Gacy was incarcerated in
Iowa for a sodomy conviction.4s° Dr. Heston diagnosed Gacy in 1968 as an anti-
social personality and felt he did not suffer from a psychosis. He described the
antisocial personality as characteristic of a person who comes into repeated con-
flict with society and social norms. This condition manifested itself in Gacy through
the trouble he experienced in school, his marriage and other aspects of his life.
Dr. Heston testified that Gacy was sane under Iowa law.
Dr. Heston disagreed with the diagnosis of Dr. Lawrence Freedman that Gacy
was "pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenic." According to Dr. Heston this
diagnosis was a "fad" some years before, but is no longer included in the classifica-
tion of DSM schizophrenia.
The defense during cross-examination criticized Dr. Heston maintaining that
he should have been able to discern the seriousness of Gacy's disturbance at the
time of his initial examinations in 1968 and that proper evaluation could have shown
Gacy's need for psychiatric treatment and prevented his later crimes. The defense
in cross-examination elicited an admission from Dr. Heston that certain
characteristics of sociopaths and psychopaths were not found in Gacy's life history.
The defense further established that certain findings had been made by a prosecu-
tion expert, Dr. Hartman, in 1979 which were not identified by Dr. Heston in 1968,
and that those findings might justify a different diagnosis. Finally, Dr. Heston
", Dr. Heston is a Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Minnesota. He ordered an
encephelogram and chest and shell x-rays, all of which were negative. He also performed a physical
examination and took a family history from Gacy.
", Dr. Heston stated that he had not examined Gacy since the time of his Iowa imprisonment
although he had reviewed reports of the other experts testifying at trial.
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admitted that the medical experts who examined Gacy in 1979 described a more
complex personality structure in Gacy than Dr. Heston had in 1968.
Dr. A. Arthur Hartman,"5' a clinical psychologist, then testified that as a result
of the tests and interviews he conducted, it was his opinion that John Gacy's affect
was within the normal range. He further stated that there were times during the
evaluation when Gacy showed emotional variability and even anxiety, but at no
time did he present loss of contact with reality or evidence of bizarre or peculiar
behavior during the evaluations. Dr. Hartman reached a diagnosis of psychopathic
or antisocial personality"52 with sexual deviation and minor symptoms of paranoid
hysterical reactions. In Dr. Hartman's opinion, Gacy never had suffered from a
mental disease of the psychotic type. He testified that Gacy was sane, able to con-
form his conduct to law, and able to appreciate the criminality of his actions.
Dr. Hartman testified that although he employed a diagnosis set out in DSM-
III, he did not feel bound by the classifications in DSM-II. He testified that "[t]here
are as many classifications as there are people," and that the classifications in DSM-
III cannot describe a complex personality. He stated that John Gacy was a very
complex person and that what was really significant was not a label taken from
DSM-III, but rather a detailed psychological description of the individual.
Dr. Hartman stated that in expressing more concern and hostility over the
destruction of his house and barbeque pit than he did about the bodies found under
4" Dr. Hartman is a clinical psychologist and an Associate Professor of Clinical Psychology at
Boston University Graduate School. He formerly held the positions of Director or Chief Psychologist
of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County and Chief Psychologist at the Psychiatric
Institute of Cook County in the Juvenile Psychiatric Department.
He interviewed Gacy for twenty-five hours over a two-month period. He administered the Bender
Visual-Motor Gestalt test (requiring immediate reproduction from memory), the Rohrschach Ink Blot
Test, the Draw-a-Person Test, the Rotter Sentence Completion Test, the Thematic Appreception Technique,
the Rosenzqeiz Picture Frustration Test, a Hand test and an informal word association test. See supra
notes 433 and 443.
DSM III defines antisocial Personality Disorder as having as the essential feature:
a history of continuous and chronic antisocial behavior in which the rights of others are
violated, persistence into adult life of a pattern of antisocial behavior that began before the
age of 15, and failure to sustain good job performance over a period of several years (although
this may not be evident in people who are self-employed or . . . students or housewives).
• . . Lying, stealing, fighting, truancy, and resisting authority are typical childhood signs
[of the Disorder]. In adolescence, unusually early or aggressive sexual behavior, excessive
drinking, and use of illicit drugs are frequent. In adulthood these kinds of behavior continue,
with the addition of inability to sustain consistent work performance or to function as a
responsible parent and failure to accept social norms with respect to lawful behavior. After
age 30 the more flagrant aspects may diminish, particularly sexual promiscuity, fighting,
criminality, and vagrancy .... The Disorder is often extremely incapacitating, resulting in
.. . institutionalization, more commonly penal than medical. It is possible, however, for
individuals who have some of the features of this disorder to achieve political or economic
success; but these people virtually never present the full picture of the disorder . ..
DSM III at 317-18.
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his house, Gacy evidenced a psychological phenomenon called displacement. Gacy
could not express his anxiety or fear about the bodies which were found, but he
could express it about the condition of his house and yard.
Dr. Hartman stated he believed that Gacy could have controlled his violent
behavior. He pointed out that in exhibitionism and voyeurism there is a compul-
sion which produces a tension and causes the individual to repeat the deviant acts,
but, these are not irresistible impulses. Dr. Hartman said it was more likely that
such control would break down in a psychotic person but that he did not believe
Gacy was psychotic. However, on cross-examination Dr. Hartman admitted that
it was possible that Gacy's psychosexual conflict could be so extreme at times that
it could compel him to kill.
The next expert witness for the State was Dr. Robert A. Reifman 411 who diag-
nosed Gacy as having a narcissistic type personality disorder. He defined narcissism
as a condition in which a person loves himself very much, has superficial charm
and intelligence, but constantly needs attention and has an exaggerated sense of
self-importance. While the narcissistic person does not suffer from delusions and
irrational thinking, he lacks remorse or shame for his conduct, is subject to temper
tantrums, lacks empathy, and has an inability to feel compassion for others but
expects special consideration from them. According to Dr. Reifman, narcissistic
personality type is not a mental disease. Dr. Reifman testified that his diagnosis
was comparable with a diagnosis of antisocial personality. On cross-examination
Dr. Reifman conceded that the symptoms of narcissism are similar to those of a
borderline personality.
Dr. Reifman testified that his diagnosis was not consistent with a diagnosis
of borderline personality because a borderline does not function well in society
and leads a chaotic life. He also testified that his diagnosis was inconsistent with
a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia because the schizophrenic person loses touch
with reality and that such persons are not usually violent.
During his testimony, Dr. Reifman stated that Gacy did not act on an irresisti-
ble impulse since there was evidence of planning in his crimes as evidenced by the
trenches that Gacy had employees dig under his house to be used as graves. Dr.
Reifman also dismissed any possibility of temporary insanity since such a condi-
tion could not occur thirty-three separate times. Dr. Reifman testified that the facts
of the murders alone provide a basis for judgment that Gacy could not have been
psychotic, or in a brief psychotic episode, or a multiple personality, or having an
irresistible impulse. He also stated that "There is no doubt in my mind that when
he came in for his interview he was trying to fake a multiple personality." Accord-
ing to Dr. Reifman a diagnosis of multiple personality was rejected because of
the fact that Gacy was able to provide considerable information about the slayings.
"' Dr. Reifman is a psychiatrist and Director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court
of Cook County. He interviewed Gacy for sixteen hours, ordered an electroencephalogram (which was
normal) and read the reports of other expert witnesses.
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The fourth expert witness for the state was Dr. David C. Garron,11 who testified
that in his opinion, Gacy was competent in all areas. Although Gacy was subject
to mood changes more often than usual, there was little evidence of poorly con-
trolled impulses. He stated that he found no evidence of brain damage. Dr. Garron
stated that he found no evidence of impulsive or explosive personality, and no
evidence of delusions or hallucinations. On redirect examination, Dr. Garron testified
that his formal diagnosis would be hysterical or histronic character which he stated




The State then called Dr. Richard Rogers4 56 who diagnosed Gacy as having
an obsessive-compulsive disorder and a hypomanic disorder, with possible sexual
sadism. He described obsessive-compulsive disorder as an anxiety in which the per-
son shows either "obsessions" or "compulsion" (repetitive behaviors that may seem
senseless). He defined sexual sadism as a disorder in which a person derives sexual
satisfaction from intentionally inflicting physical or psychological pain on another,
often accompanied by fantasies about the humiliation and hurt the other is suffer-
ing. Dr. Rogers defined hypomania as a nonpsychotic disorder in which the person
either has elevated or irritable moods.
Dr. Rogers pointed to Gacy's encounters with two surviving victims and with
Robert Piest, as evidence of sexual sadism. Gacy described handcuffing, raping
and having accompanying thoughts of hurting or killing one victim but finally allow-
ing him to go free after keeping him handcuffed for two or three hours. The other
surviving victim, was put into a board and chain device for the purpose of sexual
slavery. Robert Piest was handcuffed, while Gacy attempted fellatio against Piest's
will.
Dr. Rogers disputed the reliability of several tests administered by other expert
'5' Dr. Garron is a clinical psychologist and Professor of Psychology at Rush Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Center in Chicago. He specializes in neuropsychology, a science that attempts to cor-
relate abnormalities in behavior to disease or injury of the brain.
He performed the following tests in making his evaluation of Gacy: Wechsler Memory Scale, Form
i (determines orientation as to time, date, identity, who is president, etc.); Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test (determines extent of vocabulary); Memory test (items are shown, removed and the subject asked
to name the items he remembers); Stanford Binet Picture Absurdities Test (a standard I.Q. test which
involves seven pictures of people doing something incorrectly); Minnesota Differential Aphasia Sentence
Production Test (the subject is asked to put seven certain words into a sentence); Spreen Benton Tight/Left
Test (measures brain damage); Reading and Dictation test (involves a sentence in print and then in
script); Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test (the subject observes several shapes and is then asked to
copy them); Frontal Lobe Test (subject asked to imitate rhythmic tapping and to quickly draw loops
across a page) and the Rorschach Ink Blot Test.
The defense objected to Dr. Garron's testimony on the question of non-organic disorders since
Dr. Garron had examined Gacy in his capacity as a neuropsychologist and that the opinion of Dr.
Garron lacked a factual basis. This objection provided a basis for Gacy's subsequent appeal. Brief
and Argument for Defendant-Appellant.
4S6 Dr. Rogers is a clinical psychologist at Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital in Chicago and
is affiliated with the Isaac Ray Center. He interviewed Gacy for fifteen and one-half hours and read
police reports and statements of witnesses. He administered the Schedule of Affective Disorders in
Schizophrenia (SADS) test and took Gacy's psychosexual history.
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witnesses. He testified that there is reliable evidence that it is possible to fake the
Rorschach test and that it is possible to get thousands of interpretations from the
Rorschach. He noted that any score above twelve on the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory suggests "faking" by the subject. Since Gacy had a score
of fourteen, the results of the test were virtually useless. Dr. Rogers also testified
that an "empirical study" had concluded that the Draw-a-Person Test had no value.
In regard to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Dr. Rogers quoted from a work
by Wechsler himself which states: "The most outstanding single feature of a
sociopath's test profile is systematic high score on the performance as compared
to the verbal part of the scale." Dr. Traisman, a defense witness, had labelled
this difference "not significant."
Additionally, Dr. Rogers also disputed the diagnostic conclusions of defense
witnesses Dr. Eliseo and Dr. Traisman and faulted them on their analysis of various
test results. On cross-examination, the defense sought to establish that the diagnostic
instrument used by Dr. Rogers covered only twenty-six disorders, and did not in-
clude borderline personality; the defense also established that the instrument used
did not establish the existence of psychosexual, impulse control or dissociative
disorders.
Dr. James Lewis Cavanaugh, Jr., 45 7 the State's next expert witness character-
ized Gacy as a well organized, very intelligent person who was "a little compulsive."
He thought it was significant that Gacy had developed a celebrity status in jail,
had obtained special privileges from guards and related to other prisoners in a
friendly and jovial manner. Dr. Cavanaugh diagnosed Gacy as suffering from a
mixed personality disorder, marked by pervasive narcissism, an obsessive compulsive
quality, an antisocial quality and a hypomanic quality.
4"1
Gacy's personality traits which he deemed to be consistent with his diagnosis
of narcissistic personality disorder, included: grandiose sense of self-importance
or uniqueness (Gacy's behavior in the jail setting); preoccupation with fantasies
of unlimited success, power or brilliance, beauty or ideal love (Gacy demonstrated
a preoccupation with success); exhibitionism (Gacy surrounded himself with a large
number of young people in a "loose cadre"); an indifference to others or meeting
41' Dr. Cavanaugh is a psychiatrist at the medical college of Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center in Chicago. He is the director of the section on the Law in the Department of Psychiatry, which
includes the Isaac Ray Center. He interviewed Gacy for eighteen hours and read the police reports
and the reports of other experts, including Dr. Heston who had examined Gacy in Iowa.
"I Dr. Cavanaugh also reported Gacy's history of alcohol and drug abuse, and that there was
data consistent with a clinical opinion of sexual sadistic behavioral pattern. The witness indicated that
the origin of Gacy's obsessive-compulsive behavior lay in his "pathologic" relationship with his father.
Dr. Cavanaugh stated his opinion that Gacy ultimately became convinced that he could not be caught
because he believed that "his social and sexual adjustment patterns [were] generally characteristic for
society, and therefore, normative." The defense on cross-examination established that Dr. Cavanaugh
rejected a diagnosis of borderline personality because he found insufficient symptoms, and further estab-
lished that he relied on an instrument which measured a limited number of characteristics and did not
provide a basis for a diagnosis of borderline personality.
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defeat with feelings of either cool indifference or rage, inferiority, shame, humilia-
tion or emptiness, antisocial characteristics such as chronic antisocial behavior in
which rights of others are violated (truancy during adolescence, expulsion from
school, delinquent behavior, lying, thefts, vandalism, chronic violations of the rules
at home); obsessive-compulsive features (an inability to express warm or tender
emotions, inappropriate preoccupation with trivial details, rules, schedules, or lists).
Dr. Cavanaugh stated that his diagnosis did not constitute a finding of disease
or defect. 4 9 Further, Gacy was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.
46
During his testimony, Dr. Cavanaugh described what he viewed to be a basic
problem between psychoanalytical theory and criminal responsibility. He explained
that psychoanalytic theory maintains that behavior is determined by prior life ex-
periences. The proponents of psychoanalytic theory maintain that it is possible to
predict or to reconstruct the reasons certain types of behavior patterns, thought,
feelings, and fantasies occur by examining the past experiences of the individual.
Therefore, it is difficult to assess personal responsibility since responsibility flows
not just from the individual, but also from all the other people and events in the
person's past. On the other hand, the law is based on the concept of freewill, and
"therefore, individuals are responsible for their behavior irrespective of what has
gone before" and only those unable to form an intent are able to escape respon-
sibility for their conduct.
In questioning about whether John Gacy was a paranoid schizophrenic, Dr.
Cavanaugh stated that the "sum total of his life" negated that diagnosis; he described
schizophrenia as a "cancer of the mind" which is a "downhill deteriorative course
in which an individual is tremendously impaired in terms of [his] cognitive ability
... thinking ability ... emotional ability ... interpersonal skills ... frequently
unable to function independently in society, frequently requiring hospitalization."
"I On cross-examination Dr. Cavanaugh testified that in his opinion, a personality disorder is
a mental illness and implies a mental disease, but that a mental illness was not the same as a mental
disease.
,60 Dr. Cavanaugh testified that even assuming the existence of the defense experts' findings of
schizophrenia or borderline condition, he found no evidence whatever to support a causal relationship
between these supposed conditions and the claim of the defense that Gacy lacked the ability to ap-
preciate or conform.
Under questioning by the prosecution, Dr. Cavanaugh stated that in his opinion, John Gacy cur-
rently did not present an "imminent danger" to others and therefore could not be committed if he
was acquitted by reason of insanity. Dr. Cavanaugh further stated that if Gacy were committed, and
he was the examining doctor at the institution to which Gacy was committed, he would recommend
Gacy's release. This testimony formed a basis for Gacy's subsequent appeal, where it was argued that
this statement denied Gacy a fair trial in violation of the due process clause. See Brief and Argument
for Defendant-Appellant at 145-153. The State maintained that this testimony was invited by the defense
by its opening argument where it was stated that Gacy belonged in a mental institution, and in any
case if there was error it was cured by the trial judge's admonition to the jury to disregard the testimony.
See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee at 147-152. See also P. Galloway, Gacy's Fate if Not
Guilty by Insanity Aired at Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, March 7, 1980, at sec. 1, p. 6, col. 1.
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Dr. Cavanaugh admitted that his interviews and review of the records revealed
that Gacy had at least five of the symptoms which support a diagnosis of
schizophrenia.
c. Defense Surrebuttal-Psychiatric Witnesses. On surrebuttal the defense first
called Dr. Tobias Brocher4 61 who diagnosed Gacy's condition as what has been
described in recent literature as a borderline condition-a type of paranoid
schizophrenia. Gacy's affect; according to Dr. Brocher, is "very flat.., he didn't
have any real feelings for other people, he was very egocentric, kind of autistic."
According to Dr. Brocher, when Gacy's view of reality is threatened, he becomes
angry immediately; during the interview, his affect toward others was "cold,...
kind of an emptiness which is filled with words." In addition, Dr. Brocher em-
phasized Gacy's grandiosity-unreal ideas of personal greatness which are close
to delusions. For instance, he felt that he was fulfilling a service to society by dispos-
ing of "human trash," namely homosexuals.
Dr. Brocher described John Gacy's "super ego" as being like "a swiss cheese
with big holes in it." The "superego," constitutes the basic moral sense or con-
science of the person and involves learned notions of right and wrong. Parts of
his mind are "very controlled" and in other areas "he has no impulse control."
Dr. Brocher stated that the "do's and don'ts" are learned in early childhood but,
if there are developmental gaps or defects, then at a later time the individual is
unable to control his emotions ("a pre-symptom of a beginning psychosis").
Dr. Brocher explained that the development of schizophrenia is a very long,
slow process in which there are various stages characterized by deviate behavior.
Usually something was missing in the childhood of schizophrenics. Gacy lacked
a secure masculine identity and had instead a "very punishing father," a "sadistic
father." According to Dr. Brocher, the important aspect in the development of
Gacy's schizophrenia is the splitting process during which he denies he is a homosex-
ual and projects his homosexual impulses onto other persons (his sexual partners).
Because Gacy views these homosexual impulses of his own as "bad," this "bad"
part of himself needs to be destroyed. He projects this "bad" part of himself onto
the other person. Thus, because this bad part of himself needs to be disposed of
and since the other person is the bad part of himself, he disposes of that person.
Dr. Brocher testified that "only persons who are psychotic can split off so far
that they negate reality" and that splitting like this is a totally unconscious matter.
When testifying as to his diagnosis, Dr. Brocher explained that borderline is
a schizophrenic process and that according to European terminology it would be
called a "paranoia," which is characterized by grandiose and delusional ideas. The
witness stated that this diagnosis is difficult because the intellect of the subject
Dr. Brocker is licensed to practice psychiatry in Germany and in Kansas. He is Director of
the Center for Applied Behavioral Sciences at the Menninger Foundation where he teaches forensics.
He interviewed Gacy for one day, read statements made by Gacy to the police and read the psychiatric
and psychological evaluations of several other expert witnesses.
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is functioning adequately which results in the person appearing to be normal, but
because of the deeper disturbance, his actions are very different than the subject
perceives or states them to be. According to Dr. Brocher, the onset of the borderline
condition in John Gacy, as is typical of borderlines, was very early in childhood.
Such a person becomes fixated at about the age of three to five at which time
the intellectual process continues, but the emotional growth stops. When a child
is "beaten up or is under very strong, strict education, sadistic education ... there
is no possibility to correct this experience."
Dr. Brocher agreed with Dr. Rappaport's diagnosis except for the finding of
antisocial subtype which Dr. Rappaport described. According to Dr. Brocher, this
characteristic develops in time into a full psychosis. He noted studies performed
on people in prison who had a sociopathic personality, and who later developed
a full psychosis.
Dr. Brocher criticized Dr. Cavanaugh's report as concluding with a "more or
less labeling diagnosis." Dr. Brocher disagreed with Dr. Cavanaugh's dismissing
the psychosomatic episodes in Gacy's life; according to Dr. Brocher, Gacy's
psychosomatic illnesses are a sign that he cannot resolve his internal conflicts so
he "dumps" them on his body. Dr. Brocher also stated that the hypomanic symp-
toms described by Dr. Cavanaugh were in fact prepsychotic stages. Perhaps the
most significant criticism of Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony was his dismissal of the
possibility of irresistible impulses after finding that there was a defect in the con-
scious functions of Gacy. Dr. Brocher questioned how Dr. Cavanaugh could say
these impulses which he termed "aggressive, massive aggressive and homicidal im-
pulses" could be controlled consciously when he saw a defect in the consciousness.
Dr. Brocher stated that his diagnosis explained the apparent ambiguity in Gacy's
conduct: that when John Gacy commits his crimes he "treats other people...
like he was treated [as] a child, on the other hand, in certain areas he behaves
as if he would be the better mother or the better father . . . and wanted to give
to others what he didn't get." This explains why Gacy dressed as a clown and
entertained children during the same period of time he was murdering young men
and teenagers.
The last expert witness called by the defense was Dr. Helen Morrison.462 She
diagnosed Gacy as suffering from "mixed or atypical psychosis. '4 63 Dr. Morrison
462 Dr. Morrison is in private practice in Chicago. She interviewed Gacy for about fifty hours
over a three-month period. She also reviewed the police reports, statements of witnesses, Gacy's medical
and educational records and transcripts of other psychiatric testimony and reports of psychologists.
Dr. Morrison also interviewed Gacy's mother, younger sister, and Jeff Rignall, one of Gacy's surviving
victims.
"I Dr. Morrison based this diagnosis on eleven criteria:
(1) primitive psychotic defense mechanisms shown by splitting (evidenced by Gacy's lack of
memory for certain factors, his hot and cold grandiosity combined with feelings of inferior-
ity, and his hypochiases);
(2) aggression expressed in polar attributes which accompany splitting (evidenced in Gacy
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stated that her diagnosis was inconsistent with those given by other expert witnesses
who labelled Gacy as pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenia or as borderline per-
sonality or having mixed personality disorder because her diagnosis included elements
of various psychoses. Dr. Morrison stated that John Gacy could not conform his
conduct to law, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts,
and suffered from a mental disease continually throughout commission of all the
crimes.
On cross-examination of Dr. Morrison the Prosecution focused on the defini-
tion of "atypical psychosis" from the DSM-III. The prosecution established that
Dr. Morrison had not used the term "atypical psychosis" in her report to the court
nor did the terms "atypical psychosis" or "mixed psychosis" appear in the diagnostic
conclusion of her written report. The prosecution also establishes that the defini-
tion of "atypical psychosis" in DSM-III differed from the one employed by Dr.
Morrison. She explained that there were two types of catatonic behavior: one type
where the persons sits in one spot and doesn't move; and another type where the
person is excited and extremely active. Dr. Morrison also described the type of
hallucination she believed Gacy suffered. She stated that when Gacy committed
his murders, he "felt that he saw the parts of him that were split off, that were
despicable parts, he saw the parts of his father that he felt were destructive, terrify-
ing parts," hallucinations she termed "psychological hallucinations." Dr. Morrison
also defined psychosis under cross-examination as a "misperception of reality,
basically." She testified that Gacy was psychotic each time he committed murder.
When asked if she believed John Gacy would have killed Robert Piest if there had
by a "hateful and a powerful destructiveness" combined with a weak way of expressing ag-
gression);
(3) difficulty in maintaining object constancy i.e., a child being unable to develop a separate
and independent identity from a parent (Gacy's inability to maintain an identity separate
from that of his mother was the basis for his homosexuality);
(4) inability to differentiate one's childhood from one's adulthood (Gacy developed intellec-
tually but not emotionally, continuing to react to fear or pain as an infant would);
(5) a defense against anxiety characterized by a flight into activity (Gacy functioned well
in penal institutions because he felt safe there. This also explained his obsession with detail,
list-keeping and timing everything down to the second);
(6) -character defenses against oral needs i.e. the need for omnipotence flowing from a feeling
that no one will take care of you so you must be independent (Gacy's father who should
have been his protector was unpredictable .while his mother was abused and threatened by
her husband and left the family several times);
(7) self-object serving as a substitute for what is missing in an individual's psychological structure
(manifested in Gacy by his inability to differentiate between himself and a parent);
(8) pathologic omnipotence (a psychotic defense maneuver that helps the individual deal with
feelings of helplessness, frustration, threat or disintegration);
(9) grossly inconsistent and variable perception of others (manifested in Gacy by contradic-
tions from one sentence to the next);
(10) projection of parts of self - i.e. an incapacity to relate to other people (people were
inanimate objects to Gacy);
(11) spnatic destructiveness (Gacy's emotions were inappropriate "laughter if someone were
dying, then crying if a flower were crushed").
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been a uniformed policeman in the home with him at the time, Dr. Morrison
answered that he would have killed him anyway.
d. Prosecution Surrebuttal-Psychiatric Witnesses. On surrebuttal, the State
called Dr. Jan Fawcett 464 who testified that he found Gacy to be cooperative and
at ease socially. However, Dr. Fawcett indicated that when asked a question, Gacy
would answer part of it and claim not to be able to remember the rest. Dr. Fawcett
believed that Gacy could remember more than he said he could. Dr. Fawcett con-
curred with Dr. Cavanaugh's diagnosis of mixed personality disorder with alcohol
and drug abuse.
Dr. Fawcett testified as to what he viewed to be difficulties in using past acts
as a basis for judging responsibility. He said that psychodynamic theories are very
useful clinically in treatment and in understanding how people behave, "but they
don't in themselves explain the individual's behavior in the sense of causation."
According to Dr. Fawcett, this method of analyzing behavior is retrospective and
mistakenly tends to explain things as if no other outcome is possible.
Dr. Fawcett defined "psychosis" as a condition in which the thoughts of an
individual are interferred with, fragmented, disassociated or loose; this condition
is manifested by delusions which are contrary to reality. He stated that hallucina-
tions such as hearing voices, or believing that a force is inside one's body control-
ling him are also common. According to Dr. Fawcett, a psychotic person usually
has a difficult time functioning in the day-to-day world.
When asked to comment on Dr. Brocher's diagnosis of "prepsychotic condi-
tion," Dr. Fawcett stated that the DSM-III lists the following for prodomo symp-
toms of psychosis: onset of bizarre beliefs, unusual feelings of clairvoyance, decline
in capacity to relate to others, a change in thinking, and withdrawal from social
relationships. He testified that he did not find these symptoms present in Gacy.
Dr. Fawcett disagreed with Dr. Helen Morrison's diagnosis of "mixed psychosis,"
as well as with her description of the psychological hallucinations suffered by Gacy.
Dr. Fawcett said the term psychological hallucination as used by Dr. Morrison does
not meet the criteria which is used in the diagnosis of a psychosis. According to
Dr. Fawcett, "psychological hallucination" is a descriptive term which is useful
clinically but does not establish the real presence of such hallucinations.
Dr. Fawcett stated that over and above a psychodynamic theory, a solid history
and solid observations of the individual are necessary to make a diagnosis. Dr.
Fawcett concluded that based on his observations and review, Gacy did not have
a mental disease, and that he could appreciate the criminality of his conduct and
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
64 Dr. Fawcett is a psychiatrist and is a professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry
at First Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center in Chicago. He examined Gacy at Dr. Cavanaugh's
request after reviewing all of the psychiatric and psychological documents and police reports. He inter-
viewed Gacy for seven hours on three separate occasions within a two-week period.
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The final witness was Chicago police officer James Hanley, who testified that
he met John Gacy in 1971 at a restaurant where Gacy was working, and that Gacy
could have heard his name in conversation. Gacy had confessed that he picked
up many of his victims in an area frequented by homosexuals while portraying
himself as a police officer called Jack Hanley. The implication of the police of-
ficer's testimony was that Gacy simply had used the officer's name as a disguise,
so if any of his victims had checked with police, they would have learned that
there was indeed an Officer Hanley.46/ When the State rested, the jury had heard
a total of 101 witnesses, 79 for the prosecution and 22 for the defense.4 6
C. Closing Arguments
In its closing arguments, the defense asked the, jurors to put aside anger and
hatred, and not to find Gacy guilty on the basis of hysteria. 4 7 The defense re-
counted examples of Gacy's erratic conduct to support their contention that he
acted like a man with a mental disease. It was argued that Gacy's actions, including
inviting a policeman into his house, were not the actions of a sane man. The defense
maintained that Gacy "had the drive of a madman. He was driven by perverted
obsessions and compulsions he could not control." It was observed that Gacy "tried
to consume all of his time. He knew there was a raging disease inside his mind."
The defense attacked the prosecution's expert witnesses, labeling them "mechanics
for the state." It was argued that these psychiatrists "have no business making
moral judgments. Only God can judge this man's blackened soul."
Defense counsel characterized Gacy as "a 'madman' who had been reaching
out, saying 'Stop me before I kill again.' " Gacy "tried so hard when he was a
little kid. He tried so hard to be good" yet "he was caged in his own flesh. He
was eaten up by this raging illness." Counsel argued that a man "does not have
to look like a bulging-eyed monster to be insane . . . . Mr. Gacy is not an evil
man. He has done some evil things."
Counsel appealed to the jury to save his client's life urging them not to "decide
this case with revenge, passion, or fear. Commit yourself to your laws." Counsel
implored the jury to find a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity so that Gacy
could be studied. Counsel pleaded, "take the first step to have him studied, to
try to prevent something like this from happening again." Then counsel concluded
by reading a passage from Robert Louis Stevenson's "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,"
about the compulsively evil Hyde, about how Hyde, could not distinguish between
right and wrong. Counsel ended his argument by quoting from the story: "If I
am the chief of sinners, then I am also the chief of sufferers."
"5 See P. Galloway, Gacy Case Heading for Jury, Chicago Sun-Times, March 11, 1980, sec. 1,
p. 3, col. 2. See also KILLER CLOWN at 327.
66 See J. Fritsch, Cop Rebuts Gacy Split Personality, Chicago Tribune, March 11, 1980, sec.
2, p. 1, col. 5.
"4' See R. Simon, Jekyll-Hyde Tie In: A Final Gamble by Gacy's Side, Chicago Sun-Times, March
12, 1980, sec. 1, p. 4, col. 3.
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The theme of the prosecution's closing argument was that Gacy was evil, not
insane. The prosecution attacked the use of the insanity defense. One of the pros-
ecutors told the jury: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you John Gacy is nor-
mal . . . . We consider him abnormal . . . but because he is abnormal doesn't
mean he doesn't know the difference between right and wrong .... There is quite
a difference between being abnormal and legally insane." He went on to suggest
that anyone who kills is abnormal but the very manner of Gacy's killings estab-
lished that he was not insane but a premeditated murderer; the prosecutor main-
tained that "These killings were planned. They were calculated and then they were
covered up. Seldom, if ever, has anything been so cold, so calculating, so cunning
over such a long period of time as John Gacy." Gacy had chosen to engage in
homosexual activity, then he killed his sex partners when he feared they might in-
form police; he killed "to escape detection." The jury was reminded of Gacy's
sodomy conviction, and the fact that Gacy had vowed to a friend at the time of
his release that he "would never go to prison again." The prosecution concluded
that Gacy's use of the insanity defense was a "fraud," "a defense of convenience"
which Gacy concocted and laid the foundation for with his statemenfs to police
about his other self known as "Jack."
The prosecutor continued by describing Gacy as an "evil" man; he called Gacy
"evil, vile, base, mean, and diabolical." He turned to the defendant and exclaimed:
"John Gacy, you are the worst of all murderers because your victims were the
young, the naive, the unassuming;" he went on to say accusingly: "you have pilfered
the most precious thing parents can give-human life." As to Gacy, the prosecutor
observed: "A rat is a rat is a rat. He was and he is and he hasn't changed." Another
thrust of the prosecution's argument was a call for retribution for Gacy's victims.
The prosecutor placed photographs of each of the twenty-two identified victims
on a large display board which he called the "gallery of grief." The prosecutor
pointed to each photo and said: "This was murder! This was murder! Murder!"
The prosecutor concluded by urging the jury: "Justice implores you to find John
Gacy guilty of murder. Murder in the worst degree."
In a rebuttal closing argument a second prosecutor argued that Gacy was respon-
sible for his crimes; he argued that "There is no evidence to support insanity in
this defendant at the time of the crime, other than the crimes themselves." The
* prosecutor argued that Gacy consciously chose to be a homosexual, consciously
chose his victims, consciously decided to kill, consciously disposed of the bodies
to escape detection. Counsel maintained that a person who functioned as well as
Gacy in everyday life could not have the severe mental disease which defense
psychiatrists ascribed to Gacy.
The prosecutor criticized the defense experts for failing to provide any causal
explanation of Gacy's killings except a general invocation of determinist
psychoanalytic theory. The prosecutor said: "When you turn that around, what
it really means is that no one is responsible for his actions. We can't run society
that way." He accused defense witnesses of "stringing together paragraphs and
sentences and long words." He dismissed testimony about blackouts and epileptic
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seizures as "nothing but a smokescreen." He observed to the jury: "Can you pic-
ture the defendant in an epileptic seizure writhing around on the floor tying the
three knots in the rope?"
The prosecutor then addressed the defense's reference to the Jekyll and Hyde
metaphor and to the plea for sympathy for Gacy. The prosecutor called to the
jury's attention how Dr. Jekyll grew to enjoy taking the potion that turned him
into Mr. Hyde, giving him "the power of playing God, the power of deciding who
will live and who will die." Similarly, the prosecutor said, Gacy sought the ultimate
power of life or death: "He could torture victims to within seconds of their death
and still maintain that Godlike power to let them live."
Again, the prosecutor urged the jury not to express sympathy for Gacy, but
concern for his victims. As he removed the photographs of Gacy's victims from
the large display board, he urged: "We are not asking you to show sympathy.
No matter what you do you can't bring back these lives." He pleaded with the
jury: "Don't show sympathy! Show justice! Show the same sympathy and pity
this man showed when he took these lives and put them there!" With that, the
prosecutor tossed the photographs onto the trap door of the crawl space that had
been introduced into evidence by the prosecution." 8
D. The Verdict and Post-Conviction Hearing
The jury deliberated for one hour and fifty minutes.469 John Gacy was found
guilty on thirty-three counts of murder, one count of deviate sexual assault, and
one count of indecent liberties.
468 See J. Fritsch, Convicted of All 33 Murders, Chicago Tribune, March 13, 1980, sec. 1, p.
1, col. 4, providing an account of this dramatic gesture which concluded the trial of John Gacy:
The five-week trial ended Wednesday with a dramatic flourish when Kunkle [the chief pro-
secutor] in his final argument, flung the photographs of the 22 identified victims into the
hatch to the crawlspace, which had been placed on the courtroom floor about 6 feet from
the jury-box.
"Don't show sympathy. Don't show pity," Kunkle thundered. "Show justice. Show
the same sympathy and pity this man showed when he took those lives and put them there."
Kunkle then stunned the hushed courtroom when he threw the picture into the hatch
and they resounded with a thud.
"You didn't have the power to change the fact," the prosecutor said. "But you can
control the future of this villain."
"You can do justice for the people of the State of Illinois. You represent the people
of the State of Illinois. If you allow this evil man to walk the earth, then God help us all."
69 An account of the jury's deliberations was provided by one juror and reported in P. Galloway,
Gacy: No Hard Feelings Toward Prosecutors; Chicago Sun-Times, March 16, 1980, sec. 1, p. 34, col.
I:
"After we retired to deliberate," Charles E. Hanson said, "we elected our foreman, and
we took a vote. It was unanimous for conviction. Then we had to sign those 35 verdict forms."
Each juror signed each form, a total of 420 signatures.
"That took us quite a while," Hansen said. "We talked about the insanity defense then,
while we were signing. Nobody felt he was insane."
Hansen is supervisor of data processing for the Woodward Governor Co. in Rockford,
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On the day following the jury's verdicts the court proceeded to hold a death
penalty hearing as required under Illinois law.' 70 The hearing, over the objection
of the defense, was presented to the same jury which had made the guilty deter-
mination. The prosecution requested the death sentence in the cases of twelve of
the murders which occurred since the present Illinois capital punishment statute
went into effect. 7 ' After opening statements, the prosecution and defense advised
where the jury was selected. On Friday, he talked about his impressions during the-31 days
of the trial.
I think Gacy's main problem was his homosexuality. We didn't think he had a mental
disease, which you need to be insane. I thought he was a big con man, really," Hansen said.
This was a description repeatedly used by the prosecution in opposing the defense's
insanity position.
"He organized his life too well. I thought it was obvious he had control of himself
and his life. If he was insane, it should show up in some part of his life besides the killings.
You should be able to see it. But it wasn't ever apparent he had a mental disease."
"And the accuracy of that drawing he made in the Des Plaines police station impressed
me."
The crude diagram Gacy drew for police after his arrest of the locations of the bodies
under the crawl space of his house was close to being exact.
Hansen said that the first week of the trial, when the grieving families of the victims
took the witness stand, was the most unsettling for him. Many of the mothers wept, and
one collapsed.
Hansen said the jury members got so they could pick out members of the victims' families
who regularly attended the trial.
Hansen was asked what effect some moments in the closing arguments had. One of
them came when Assistant State's Attorney Terry Sullivan pointed at Gacy and called him
a "predator." Gacy laughed.
Another was when Kunkle removed the photographs of the 22 known victims from a
large exhibit. He told the jury to have the same "sympathy and pity" for Gacy that he had
for the victims. Then he tossed the photos into the crawl space hatch, which was on the
courtroom floor as an exhibit.
"The dramatic stuff didn't do much for me," Hansen said. "And when Gacy laughed,
I think it affected the players more than us. It amused me. It's like they're playing a role."
The jury took only one hour and 50 minutes to find Gacy guilty ...
,,0 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 9-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1979) provides in part:
where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine the existence of factors set forth in Subsection (b) [Aggravating Factors Necessary
For Sentence of Death] and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated
in Subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
1. before the jury that determines the defendant's guilt; or
2. before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the proceeding if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the jury that determined the defen-
dant's guilt; or
3. before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.
' See ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 9-1(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1979) which provides in part:
A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18
or more and who has been found guilty of murder may be sentenced to death if:
(3). the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals ... regardless
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the jury that there were broad stipulations entered into between the parties including
that: "All 6f the evidence, all of the physical evidence, all of the testimony, all
of the evidence that you heard during the course of the trial would be admitted
or stipulated to by the parties for your use in this hearing in reaching your deter-
mination. It will be stipulated that you may consider all of that evidence as though
it has been presented here again over for your consideration." Both the prosecu-
tion and defense then rested.
In its argument, the defense urged the jury to reject the death penalty on the
basis of the sole mitigating factor that the murders were "committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution." The closing argument
of the defense had three principal themes. First, counsel urged that it would be
legally and morally wrong to execute a sick man. Second, to execute Gacy would
be to engage in an act of mere revenge. And third, Gacy's life should be spared
so that he could be an object of scientific study in order that future similar crimes
might be prevented. The prosecution's closing argument carried two dominant
themes. First, that a prison sentence would not be an adequate punishment for
Gacy's acts of murder, rape and torture. Second, that if Gacy were sentenced to
imprisonment for life, he would have an opportunity to repeat his crimes. The
jury decided in two hours and ten minutes to impose the death sentence. Following
the death penalty hearing, the trial judge sentenced John Gacy to natural life in
prison for each of the remaining twenty-one counts of murder.
VI. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE GACY APPEAL
Although the primary focus of this Article has been on the insanity defense
as it operates in the trial context, several issues raised by Gacy in the appeal of
his conviction and sentence can be profitably explored herein because they directly
impacted on the trial process. These issues had a direct bearing on the trial testimony
of the expert witnesses in that they constrained or broadened the scope and areas
that the expert witnesses could cover in their testimony. These issues, their effects
and legal justifications will be addressed in this section. The specific focus of this
section will be limited to issues raised concerning expert testimony and psychiatric
matters in the context of the Gacy case.
Under an Illinois constitutional provision, a defendant sentenced to death has
the right of automatic appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.47 2 Gacy's appeal raised
numerous issues concerning trial court errors which will not be addressed in this
Article. The appeal is presently pending.
of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated
acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person
or of separate premeditated acts. . ..
' ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 4(b).
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The first issue to be discussed will be the propriety and effect of the trial court's
order that allowed the prosecution psychiatric expert witnesses to recount statements
made to them by Gacy during examinations, while denying the privilege to defense
experts. The second issue regards the propriety and legal effect of permitting a
state psychiatrist to testify about the dispositional alternatives and procedures if
Gacy were to be found not guilty by reason of insanity. The third issue to be ad-
dressed in this section of the Article concerns the testimony by expert witnesses
as to Gacy's fitness to stand trial. The final issue considered involves the failure
of defense counsel to present psychiatric evidence to establish mental disorder as
a mitigating factor at the death penalty hearing.
A. Recounting the Statements Made by Gacy to Expert Witnesses
1. Appellant's Argument
Gacy asserted three alternative arguments regarding the expert testimony at
his trial: 1) that he was denied due process of law, his right against self-incrimination,
and his right to present a defense, because the experts who testified for the State
were permitted to recount in their testimony the statements made to them by the
defendant, while the experts who testified for the defense were forbidden from
referring to or recounting such statements; 2) that he was denied his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination when his statements to State experts were
disclosed to the jury; and 3) that he was denied his rights to be free from self-
incrimination and to due process of law because of the failure of the trial judge
to instruct the jurors that the statements made to the expert -witnesses by him could
only be considered with reference to his mental condition. These three arguments
are premised upon the same contention regarding the unfairness towards the defen-
dant of allowing only the State's experts to testify regarding the basis for their
conclusions from the statements of this defendant. Therefore, they will be treated
together.
At trial the judge ruled that expert witnesses testifying for the State would
be allowed to recount statements made to them by John Gacy, while the defense
expert witness were not permitted to testify regarding such statements.473 Gacy
asserted that this "astonishing ruling violated every notion of fundamental fairness
in trial practice." 47 ' He argued that this ruling deprived him of his rights to due
process of law, to be free from self-incrimination, and to present a defense, as
guaranteed by the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
The judge based his ruling on the premise that the statements made to the
defense expert witnesses were "self-serving."" According to Gacy, however, any
evidence which a defendant seeks to introduce on his behalf is, by definition, "self-
"' Record at 690-92, 2603-04, 2610-12, 2618-27, 2641-43, 1662-63, 2731, 3055, 3062, 3064-65, 3083,
3096, 3105, 3310-11, 3328, 3346-67, 3348, 3363, 3364, 3368-70, 3435-38, 3572-73, 4820.
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serving." Thus, Gacy asserted that "merely saying that something is self-serving
... is stating the obvious, and the exclusion of evidence must therefore have some
more substantial basis than this." 76 In addition, Gacy contended that statements
made by him to the prosecution's experts were just as likely to be self-serving as
those made to the defense experts. As such, if the statements made to the defense
experts are to be excluded, so also should the statements made to the prosecution
experts.
Gacy further contended that permitting the State experts to use the defendant's
statements while forbidding the defense to do so "put the defense at a
disadvantage,""" since the credibility of the prosecution experts was enhanced
because they were able to testify regarding the basis for their diagnosis. 7  Gacy
cited a series of decisions supporting his contention that there was a need to allow
defense expert witnesses to testify regarding the underpinnings of their medical con-
clusions. For example, in United States v. Albright,479 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that "if resort to medical opinion is to be had, and, indeed it
is to be encouraged, the law would lack common sense if it diminished the usefulness
of medical opinion by erecting obstructions to its completeness and certainty.1
48 0
Gacy contended that not allowing defense psychiatrists to testify regarding his
statements to them constituted such an obstruction.
Next Gacy maintained that in addition to placing the defendant at a disadvan-
tage, the double standard implied in the judge's ruling, infringed upon the defen-
dant's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination. 48 ' Gacy asserted that the
fifth amendment rights require that a "fair-balance" ought to be maintained be-
tween the rule allowing the defense to introduce psychiatric medical testimony and
the requirement that the defendant submit for examination by the prosecution ex-
pert witnesses. If the State is the only party allowed to use the defendant's statements
there is no balance, and the fifth amendment is implicated "in the same way that
it is where only the State examines the defendant. ' 42 Moreover, the defendant
claimed that his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when
476 Id.
477 Id. at 135.
.78 Id.
479 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
110 388 F.2d at 726 n.9.
48: Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 137. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
"I Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 137-38. See United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir.
1969) where the court held that allowing a prosecution psychiatrist to testify about statements made
to him by the defendant was permissible and not a Fifth Amendment violation because the defendant's
psychiatrists had also been permitted to testify about statements made to them by the defendant; State
v. Whitton, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey asserted that
there was no bar to a defense psychiatrist recounting statements of the defendant, and since defense
psychiatrists could do so, state psychiatrists could do likewise without violating the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 219, 210 A.2d at 772.
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the jury was allowed to hear repeated references regarding inculpatory statements
made by him to State psychiatric experts. '83
Next, Gacy argued that his right against self-incrimination was violated because
he was not warned of his fifth amendment rights, nor of the uses to which his
statements might be put, prior to his being examined by State experts.4 " The use
of statements made by the defendant to a psychiatric expert witness are limited
by Illinois statute to the issue of insanity.4 85 Any use of such statements for pur-
poses other than the issue of mental illness, according to Gacy is violative of the
defendant's constitutional rights."86
Gacy asserted that in this case the jurors were not informed regarding the pro-
per use and consideration of the defendant's statements as indicative solely of mental
condition. Even if the jury had been so informed, Gacy contended that such an
instruction would have been ineffective in this case since the jurors heard only
damaging inculpatory statements, and it was unrealistic to expect the jury to
disregard the statements or to believe that the jury would limit its use of these
statements solely to the issue of insanity.
487
Alternatively, Gacy argued that the failure to give a limiting instruction to the
jury regarding the use of statements made by him to psychiatric experts strictly
for the assessment of the defendant's mental condition, was a violation of his fifth
and fourteenth amendment rights. '88 The defendant asserted that this omission was
even more damaging at the sentencing phase than at the trial itself, since the jurors
were told that they could use the evidence introduced at trial in its totality to decide
on the appropriate sentence.489
At the sentencing hearing, the jurors may have considered the incriminating
statements for answering questions such as: 1) whether Gacy would be dangerous
in the future; 2) whether he faked insanity; 3) whether he was generally of "low
moral character;" 4) whether he was callous and did not show any remorse; 5)
whether he was a liar; 6) whether he had committed other criminal acts in addition
to the ones with which he was charged.4 9 If indeed the jury did use the informa-
tion provided from the statements Gacy made to State expert psychiatrists for pur-
poses other than the assessment of the defendant's mental state, Gacy claims his
constitutional rights were violated.
49'
4" Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 138.
41, Id. at 139.
411 Id. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-16 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
4" Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 140. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir.
1975); State v. McGauthan, 617 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
4" Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 140.
411 Id. at 142.
411 Id. at 143.
490 Id.
,11 Id. at 144. See People v. Ehler, 114 Ill. App. 2d 171, 252 N.E.2d 227 (1969) where the appeals
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2. Appellee's Arguments
The State asserted that, contrary to Gacy's contention, the prosecution expert
witnesses testified to very few statements made by Gacy and that overall this
testimony did not contain inculpatory information. '92 As confirmation of this asser-
tion, the State pointed to the fact that Gacy did not mention anywhere in his brief
any of his statements that appeared in the testimony of the prosecution experts
which in any way prejudiced him.493 Furthermore, the prosecution contended that
since the only real issue at Gacy's trial was the issue of his insanity, the jury could
not have used the information it obtained from the State experts' testimony for
any other purpose other than the assessment of Gacy's mental condition. '94 Similarly,
at sentencing, the State contended that the only contested mitigating factor was
his alleged extreme emotional disturbance. Since mitigation based on extreme emo-
tional disturbance is similar to the defense of insanity, the jury would have used
the experts' testimony for the purpose of assessing the defendant's mental condi-
tion, and thus be in compliance with the Illinois statute and with constitutional
principles.4 9
The State contended that the trial judge's ruling that the defense psychiatrists
would not be allowed to testify regarding the statements made to them by Gacy
was supported by Illinois law. 9 , According to the prosecution, "any order admit-
ting statements by Gacy to defense psychiatrists would have violated well estab-
lished principles of Illinois law." 97 In general, statements by a patient to a treating
physician are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, but statements
to a physician examining the patient solely for the purpose of testifying at trial
are not.4 9' This principle has also been applied to psychiatric testimony presented
by examining psychiatrists in cases where the defendant has asserted the insanity
defense.4 99 The State cited People v. Hesteri50 as illustrative of this point. In that
case the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
court stated that "incriminating statements... [made to a state psychiatrist and contained in his report]
should not be given to the jury beyond those clearly necessary to show mental conditions, and the
jury should then be advised that the statements are not submitted for their truth, and the issue of
guilt." Id. at 177, 252 N.E.2d at 232.
492 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 128.
411 Id. at 130.
414 Id. at 130.
411 Id. at 131.
496 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 131. See People v. Noble, 42 Ill. 2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969);
People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1969).
4" Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 131.
411 Id. at 132. See Dickson v. Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co. 42 Ill. 2d 103,
245 N.E.2d 762 (1969); Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co., 24 IIl. 2d 383, 182 N.E.2d
211 (1962).
4" Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 132.
Soo 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968).
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The reason for the court's refusal to allow [the psychiatrist's] opinion on [the defen-
dant's] suggestibility was that the psychiatrist was not a "treating" physician but
rather an examining doctor secured solely for the purpose of giving testimony on
the defendant's behalf at the forthcoming trial. . . .It is our rule that a doctor
who examines a patient merely for the purpose of qualifying as a witness ordinarily
may not testify as to his medical opinion based on subjective symptoms described
by the patient because of the absence of his relationship of the normal trustwor-
thiness accompanying symptomatic descriptions by a patient to a treating physician.5 0'
The State concluded that this "was a particularly appropriate case in which
to exclude statements made by the defendant to his own examining psychiatrists," 5"2
since Gacy was a highly intelligent and manipulative person who could have
statements favorable to him introduced into evidence via the defense psychiatrists'
testimony.
According to the State, the record did not support Gacy's contention that the
prosecution expert witnesses were allowed to quote statements made by Gacy to
them, while defense psychiatrists were not.50 3 Thus, the State insisted, the trial judge's
order could not have given the State an advantage. The State claimed that overall,
the expert witnesses on both sides refrained from testifying concerning statements
made to them by Gacy. The prosecution asserted that on the few occasions the
experts testified regarding the defendant's statements, the defense experts quoted
him more often than the prosecution witnesses." '
The State asserted that Gacy's fifth amendment rights were not violated since:
1) the issue was waived because Gacy did not object at trial on fifth amendment
grounds; 2) the issue was moot because the prosecution expert witnesses did not
testify on direct examination to statements made by the defendant regarding his
crime; and 3) the overwhelming weight of authority indicates that when a defen-
dant asserts an insanity defense and supports it with expert witnesses he waives
his fifth amendment right to object to the admission of his statements to the pros-
ecution's experts.
50 5
The State argued that it was well established that when the insanity defense
is raised, the defendant may be required to submit to psychiatric examination by
State psychiatrists who may testify at trial regarding those examinations." 6 This
is the governing principle in most federal courts50 7 and in Illinois, where this rule
0, Id. at 509-10, 237 N.E.2d at 479.
02 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 133.
:03 Id. at 135.
004 Id.
'o Id. at 137. See People v. Hicks, 44 Ill. 2d 550, 256 N.E.2d 823 (1970); People v. Burkman,
33 Ill. 2d 150, 210 N.E.2d 537 (1965).
,00 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 138.
507 Id. See United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d
43 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974). The following statement
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has been codified 08 and interpreted by several court decisions." 9 The Illinois statute
provides that a defendant does not have to submit to court-ordered examination,
but if he refuses to do so, he may be precluded from introducing the testimony
of his own psychiatric witnesses. The statute further provides that statements made
during a court-ordered examination are to be used only for the limited purpose
of ascertaining the defendant's mental status, and not as evidence that the defen-
dant had committed the crime. According to the State, this statute "fully protects
a defendant's fifth amendment rights, since when an insanity defense is raised,
the fifth amendment does not prevent a court from ordering a psychiatric examina-
tion or prevent the examining psychiatrists from testifying about their interviews
with the defendant." ' 10 This concept finds support in People v. Krauser"1' where
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that "where the defense imposed is insanity,
evidence of the facts disclosed at a physical and mental examination of accused
by physicians . . . does not vitiate the constitutional privilege of accused not to
be a witness against himself." '
The State contended that Gacy's claim that his fifth amendment rights were
violated by the admission of psychiatric evidence at the sentencing hearing was
waived since Gacy never objected on any grounds to the introduction of particular
evidence at the hearing.-" 3 The State pointed out that not only did the defendant
not object to the admission of this evidence, but he stipulated to it."" Further the
State maintained that the failure to object to this testimony cannot be considered
either plain error or incompetence of counsel. The State's argument is that this
procedure was a matter of tactics consistent with Gacy's contention that the
psychiatric evidence was favorable to him as indicative of an impaired mental con-
dition which was the defendant's main mitigating favor advanced at sentencing."' 5
The State next asserted that the psychiatric evidence was admissible at sentenc-
ing for the same reasons that rendered it admissible to trial. Since Gacy stipulated
to the psychiatric evidence contained in the testimony of his experts, the prosecu-
from Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) is illustrative of the position taken by Federal
courts: "We therefore specifically hold that by raising the issue of insanity, by submitting to psychiatrist
and psychological examination by his own examiners, and by presenting evidence as to mental incompe-
tency . . . the defense raised that issue for all purposes and the government was appropriately granted
leave to have the defendant examined by experts of his choice and to present their opinions in evidence."
Id. at 720-24.
101 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-16 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
509 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 139. See People v. Williams, 38 Il. 2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224
(1967); People v. Carpenter, 13 Il1. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958); People v. Krawser, 315 Il. 485,
146 N.E. 593 (1925).
s10 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 139.
315 Ill. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925).
Id. at 506, 146 N.E.at 603 (1925).
s Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 142.
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tion was entitled to introduce the evidence presented by its experts." 6 The State
further maintained that decisions from federal courts support the theory that a
defendant may be required to submit to a psychiatric examination at sentencing
and that the evidence thus obtained may be admitted for the limited purpose of
ascertaining the defendant's mental condition. 17
The State asserted that Gacy's reliance on Estelle v. Smith" '1 was misplaced
since in that case at the death penalty hearing the defendant did not rely on emo-
tional or mental impairment as a mitigating factor. In Estelle v. Smith the United
States Supreme Court vacated a death sentence on the grounds that Smith's at-
torney had not been given a report of the psychiatrist's examination and that the
defendant had not been given required warnings prior to the examination nor in-
formed that the examination could be used in the sentencing hearing. In Smith,
the psychiatrist was called by the State to testify regarding the defendant's future
potential for dangerousness, not on the issue of insanity or emotional disturbance.
The United States Supreme Court in that case recognized that the result might be
different where the defendant relies on psychiatric evidence to show insanity or
emotional disturbance:
Nor was the interview analogous to a sanity examination occasioned by a defen-
dant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense. When
a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric
testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has to
controverting his proof of an issue that he had interjected into the case. 1 9
The additional differences between Gacy's case and Estelle v. Smith are that in
Smith the psychiatric examination was conducted without the knowledge and con-
sent of the defense attorney and the defense objected to psychiatric testimony at
the death penalty hearing. 2
Finally, the State asserted that Gacy's failure to offer an instruction to the
effect that his statements to psychiatrists could be considered only on the question
of mental condition constituted a waiver of that issue.521
In summary, the State's argument was that: 1) the psychiatrists who testified
for both sides generally refrained from recounting Gacy's statements to them; 2)
Gacy was quoted more often by the defense experts than by the prosecution ex-
perts; 3) none of the statements presented into evidence by the State psychiatrists
prejudiced Gacy either at trial or at the sentencing hearing; 4) there was no viola-
5s36 Id.
517 Id. at 144. See United States v. Jones, 640 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1981); Hallis v. Smith, 571
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1978).
'' 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
451 U.S. at 462.
11 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 145.
2I Id. at 146.
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tion of Gacy's fifth amendment rights in the admission of testimony regarding Gacy's
statements to State psychiatric experts; and 5) since Gacy relied on expert psychiatric
testimony regarding his impaired mental condition, the prosecution had the right
to have the defendant examined by its own psychiatrists who are to testify to the
results of such examinations.
3. Appellant's Reply
Gacy asserted that his objection to the judge's ruling allowing the prosecution
experts to testify to Gacy's statements referred notonly to their recounting to the
jury incriminating statements, but also to the State experts being permitted to quote
any of the defendant's statements in either their direct, cross or re-direct testimony."'
Further, Gacy maintained that contrary to the State's contention, there were many
of his comments testified to by the prosecution experts. 23 Gacy contended, on the
other hand, that defense psychiatrists were consistently prevented from referring
to the defendant's statements and as such this ruling had been "terribly prejudicial"
to the defense. 2'
Gacy challenged the assertion that the judge's ruling was required by any Il-
linois law forbidding introduction of statements made to an examining physician,
since the rule was not applied equally to both sides. Furthermore, the defense con-
tended this rule had been modified by recent court decisions holding that experts
may testify to opinions based on hearsay and may testify to that hearsay in defend-
ing their conclusions."-' According to Gacy these cases give experts on both sides
the prerogative of using the defendant's statements to substantiate their testimony.
Gacy argued that the claim that the law required his statements to defense
psychiatrists be ruled inadmissible because they were hearsay and "self-serving"
was refuted by the Illinois Appellate Court decision in People v. Vanda.1 6 In this
case the court held admissible such statements "where . . . they are offered to
show' defendant's mental state rather than the literal truth of the defendant's
assertions." '27 Gacy pointed out that the court in Vanda had observed that "[w]e
find the term 'self-serving' to be something of a misnomer because any evidence
or testimony offered by any party to a lawsuit is logically and necessarily 'self-
serving' to that party's case." 528 Gacy went on to argue that even though Vanda
ruled that exclusion of evidence consisting of the defendant's letters in that case
was harmless error, that in his own case the exclusion of his statements to defense
psychiatrists was very prejudicial. The prejudice, it was argued, was a consequence
of the enhanced credibility of the State experts compared to the defense psychiatrists.
522 Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 49.
... Id. at 49, 52-57.
114 Id. at 60.
32S Id.
,26 111 I11. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982).
Id. at 556, 444 N.E.2d at 614.
s, Id. at 557, 444 N.E.2d at 615-16.
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Gacy also argued that he had not waived this objection even though his counsel
had not cited the fifth amendment as a basis for his objection.
529
Gacy restated his argument that even if the jury would have been given a limiting
instruction regarding the use of the experts' testimony for the purpose of establishing
mental health only, it would have been insufficient. The defense contended that
the jurors would have likely ignored such a limiting instruction and therefore "the
only solution to this problem [was] a ban on the recounting of defendant's statements
by experts.
' 5 °30
B. State Psychiatrist Permitted to Testify Regarding the Dispositional
Provisions Afforded to Gacy after a Finding of Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity
1. Appellant's Argument
Gacy asserted that he was denied a fair trial and due process when the jury
heard the uncontested testimony presented by Dr. James Cavanaugh about the likely
effect of an insanity acquittal in this case.53 1 Dr. Cavanaugh, one of the State
psychiatrists testified that it was "absolutely impossible" to guarantee that a per-
son who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and then civilly committed
to a mental hospital would remain there permanently. 3 Gacy contended that con-
trary to the court's charge, the defense did not waive this issue because Mr.
Amirente, one of Gacy's attorneys objected to the prosecution's question, while
Mr. Motta, Gacy's other attorney, objected to the psychiatrist's answer.1
33
It was argued that the impact of Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony was exacerbated
when on cross-examination the defense attorneys were hampered in determining
the basis for the psychiatrist's opinion. Dr. Cavanaugh's most startling comment was
that "if [Gacy] was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would not meet
the State's involuntary commitment standards (and therefore) if the law were fol-
lowed . . . he would have to be released. ' 5 3 When the defense attorneys tried
to pursue the basis for the psychiatrist's opinion, the court sustained the prosecu-
tion's objection, and thus this testimony was left untested by cross-examination.
Gacy maintained that this "uneven handed application of evidentiary rulings"
denied him a fair trial and due process since the jury was in effect told that if
Gacy were to be found insane, there were no guarantees that he would be per-
manently committed, while the defense was prevented from inquiring as to the basis
of this contention. 35 Even though the judge commented that this line of discussion
5Z9 Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 62.
530 Id. at 63.
:31 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 146.
'" Id.
3' Record at 494.
"I Record at 4705.
3' Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 148.
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"was not very helpful," the jurors were in effect invited to speculate about the
defendant's fate.
36
Although the court attempted to redress the situation with an instruction to
the jury which read: "I instruct you to disregard any comment by any attorney
or testimony by any witness regarding what would happen to this defendant should
you return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity," 53, Gacy maintained that
the jury was left with the overwhelming fear that Gacy might soon be free to roam
the streets if acquitted.
2. Appellee's Argument
The State asserted that Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony was properly allowed to
stand on the following grounds: 1) it merely informed the jurors of what they already
knew and what they had been specifically told during jury selection; 2) the testimony
was invited by Gacy's opening statement; 3) any prejudice was cured by the trial
court's instruction to the jury to disregard the matter." 8
The State maintained that most lay persons know that persons civilly commit-
ted are likely eventually to be released. Furthermore, the jurors in this case, at
the request of the defense, were informed during the voir dire process that if Gacy
were acquitted on grounds of insanity he would be subject to a commitment hear-
ing, and that, even if he was confined to the Department of Mental Health, he
could be released in the future. 39 Thus, the State asserted that the jurors were
not given new information by Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony.
The State maintained that Gacy opened the door to the dispositional discus-
sion when the defense attorneys told the jury during the opening statement that
"this man belongs in a hospital for the rest of his life." s40 According to the pros-
ecution, such an assertion was misleading, in that it may have given the jurors
an impression that the judge could order Gacy's indefinite commitment. Accord-
ingly, the State contended that it was proper for the prosecution to produce evidence
that there are no guarantees that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity
and committed to an institution will remain in that institution for the rest of his
life. Next, the State asserted that even if the testimony of the State psychiatrist was
in any way prejudicial the error or prejudice was cured by the judge's instruction
to the jury to disregard the entire subject.
54
1
The State denied Gacy's contention that his attorneys were not allowed to prop-
erly cross-examine Dr. Cavanaugh; it was asserted that their proposed cross-
536 Id. at 149, 152.
s" Record at 4719.
:3, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 148.
1' Record at 691.
140 Record at 78.
541 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 149. See People v. Williams 66 I11. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801
(1977); People v. Youder, 44 Ill. 2d 373, 256 N.E.321 (1969).
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examination was outside the scope of direct and "amounted to an attempt to in-
struct the jury on the law of involuntary commitment."5 2 The State maintained
that on direct examination it had not explicitly inquired into the implications of
Gacy's being remanded to the custody of the Department of Mental Health if ac-
quitted, but had only addressed the general question of the possibility of life-long
commitment to a mental institution. Therefore, the State contended, the specific
question of whether Gacy met the Illinois standard for civil commitment was out-
side the scope of the direct examination.5 13 Further, the State maintained that defense
attorneys' questioning was an attempt at impeachment on a collateral matter, and
that defense counsel "had no right to get into an argument with Cavanaugh on
a collateral matter."5" ' In conclusion, the prosecution asserted that the People were
properly allowed to correct the mistaken impression given by the defense during
the opening statement.
C. Testimony Regarding Gacy's Fitness for Trial
1. Appellant's Argument
Gacy asserted that over the defense's repeated objections, the court allowed
the psychiatric experts to testify that Gacy was fit to stand trial, and that this
testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial . 5  The standards for fitness to stand trial
and for sanity at the time of the offense are different. 46 In ascertaining whether
a defendant is fit to stand trial the issue is whether the defendant is able to par-
ticipate in his own defense and in general, function appropriately during the trial
process. On the other hand, finding insanity entails that the defendant was not
criminally responsible for the offense with which he was charged. A defendant may
be suffering from a mental disease or defect and yet be found fit to stand trial.54 7
Thus a finding of fitness to stand trial is not relevant to the issue of the defen-
dant's sanity at the time of the offense. The issue at Gacy's trial was his mental
state at the time of the crimes and not at the time of the trial. Therefore, whether
he was found fit to stand trial was "irrelevant and immaterial" to the issue of
sanity.' Gacy cited as support for his contention, section 4244, title 18 of the
United States Code which expressly prohibits the introduction of such evidence.'
94
Further, Gacy contended that the credibility of defense psychiatrists was severely
"I Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 150-51.
14' Id. at 151.
",4 Id. at 152.
'"I Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 153.
141 Id. at 154. See People v. Nichols, 70 Ill. App. 3d 748, 388 N.E.2d 984 (1979).
"I Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 155. See People v. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 381 N.E.2d 677
(1978).
"Is Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 155. See People v. Ward, 19 Ill. App. 3d 833, 313 N.E.2d
314 (1974), rev'd on other grounds 61 111. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975) where the appellate court
held that the defense counsel's questioning of defendant regarding his mental condition at the time
of trial was irrelevant to his insanity at the time of the offense. 19 I11. App. 3d at 839, 313 N.E.2d a 320.
5,9 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1982).
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undermined because of the apparent inconsistency between a defense expert's
testimony to the effect that Gacy was insane at the time of his crime, but fit to
stand trial, while the prosecution psychiatrists testified that he was both sane at
the time of the crimes and fit to stand trial. 5 0 According to the defendant, the
jurr might have been more inclined to give greater weight to the evidence presented
by the State experts because of the apparent consistency present in their testimony.
Therefore the admission of testimony regarding Gacy's fitness to stand trial was
prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial."'
2. Appellee's Argument
The State maintained that the psychiatric testimony regarding Gacy's fitness
for trial was properly admitted because in the context of this case it had probative
value and had no prejudicial impact on the defense."5 2 According to the prosecu-
tion, the testimony that Gacy was found fit to stand trial was probative because
it showed (1) the circumstances under which the psychiatrists had first examined
and evaluated Gacy and therefore what methodology was used; and (2) the defen-
dant's ability to understand the nature of the charges against him which was rele-
vant, though not dispositive, on the question of his ability to appreciate the criminal-
ity of his conduct.
55 3
Moreover, the State asserted that the evidence regarding Gacy's fitness to stand
trial did not prejudice him. Since all the psychiatric experts conceptually agreed
that Gacy was fit to stand trial and that he was of superior intelligence and ability,
sprecific questions regarding fitness did not prejudice the defense.
Furthermore, the prosecution contended that even though there is a great dif-
ference between the statutory definitions for fitness to stand trial and for insanity,
a psychiatric determination that Gacy understood the nature of the proceedings
against him and was able to participate in his defense gave an indication regarding
the "workings 6f Gacy's mind" similar in importance to psychological test results." 4
Thus, according to the State, this testimony had probative value and was properly
admitted unless it was outweighed by the prejudice it might have caused to the
defense. s The State contended that Gacy was in no way prejudiced by the testimony
regarding fitness since, even in its absence, the jury would have concluded from
Gacy's actions and from the other evidence presented that he was completely aware
of the proceedings against him and that he participated fully in his defense.
Further, the prosecution asserted that no Illinois statute, rule or precedent pro-
"' Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 156.
, Id.
2 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 153.
3 Id.
31' Id. at 154.
"I Id. at 155. See People v. Monroe, 66 Il. 2d 317, 362 N.E.2d 295 (1977); People v. Lefler,
38 Il1. 2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827 (1967).
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hibited questioning a psychiatric expert witness regarding his findings concerning
the defendant's fitness to stand trial. Federal court decisions on this topic have
held that the government may ask the psychiatrists relevant questions regarding
their findings on the defendant's fitness." The State maintained that Gacy misstated
the effect of 18 U.S.C. section 4244 which, it was asserted, states only that the
jury must not be informed of a prior judicial determination of competence to stand
trial and does not prevent a psychiatrist from testifying regarding his examination
of the defendant's fitness to stand trial. The same rule has also been adopted in
Illinois. 5 7 Therefore, the State concluded that the psychiatrists' testimony regard-
ing Gacy's competence to stand trial was properly admitted.
3. Appellant's Reply
Gacy denied the State's assertion that evidence of his fitness to stand trial was
probative, and observed that the State cited no case authority supportive of its
position that this evidence was relevant to the issue of the defendant's insanity.
Furthermore, Gacy asserted that contrary to the State's contention that there is
no Illinois precedent, "which forbids questioning of a psychiatrist at a sanity trial
concerning his finding that the defendant is capable of understanding the charges
and assisting in his own defense," 558 such precedent can be found in the Illinois
Appellate Court's decision in People v. Ward.5 5 9 In Ward the court held that
psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's fitness to stand trial was immaterial
to the question of sanity. 60 Gacy also cited the Illinois Supreme Court decision
of People v. Murphy56 ' for the proposition that it did not necessarily follow that
one who is fit to stand trial is not suffering from a mental disease or defect.
5 62
Gacy challenged the State's contention that this evidence was not prejudicial
to him because the jury would have realized the defendant's intelligence and ability
to help in his own defense regardless of the psychiatric evidence. Gacy maintained
that the testimony regarding his fitness for trial was not equivalent to performance
evidence indicative of his intellect since a finding of competence "has a ring of
legal significance which would have been given greater weight by the jury than
merely testimony that the defendant was intelligent.
' 5 63
Further, Gacy asserted that the State's interpretation of federal court opinions
"1' Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 156. See, e.g. United States v. Hoe, 586 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir.
1978); United States v. Fortune, 513 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032
(5th Cir. 1971).
' Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 157. See, e.g., People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N.E.2d 526 (1946);
People v. Bechtel, 297 Ill. 312, 130 N.E. 728 (1921).
" Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 66.
"' 19 Il. App. 3d 833, 313 N.E.2d 314 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 61111. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d
171 (1975).
"1 19 II1. App. 3d at 838, 313 N.E.2d at 319.
561 72 Ill. 2d 421, 381 N.E.2d 677 (1979).
162 Id. at 422, 381 N.E.2d at 678.
,63 Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 67.
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on this issue was incorrect. As an example he cited United States v. Fortune6 4
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "We
must ... emphasize that trial courts should be vigilant in minimizing unnecessary
reference to competency issues. References that are irrelevant and are elicited in
bad faith may indeed have prejudicial effect on the defense's right to a fair trial
on the issue of insanity.
565
D. Post-Trial and Death Penalty Hearing
Gacy challenged the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty in his




Gacy asserted that his death penalty hearing was perfuctory because the defense
"virtually conceded the outcome of the death penalty hearing." Gacy argued that
the sentencing hearing should have shifted the jury's attention from its finding that
he was sane and guilty, to a determination of whether his life ought to be spared
based on the statutory definition of the major mitigating factor that "the murder[s]
[were] committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to
prosecution."5 67 Gacy contended that his attorneys completely abdicated their respon-
sibility by not developing a theory of mitigation. In fact, no expert witnesses were
called to support such a theory. According to Gacy, this omission was remarkable
in view of the fact that virtually all the psychiatrists for both sides indicated that
Gacy had committed the crimes because of some extreme form of mental or emo-
tional disturbance although they were not specifically questioned on the issue.
Gacy asserted that counsel should not have entered into a stipulation which
permitted the jury to consider all the testimony presented at trial rather than call-
ing witnesses to specifically testify to the issue. None of the psychiatric experts
had been specifically examined at trial regarding the issue of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance. Gacy noted that his defense attorneys did not even direct
the jury's attention to the specific passages in the expert testimony that supported
the mitigation theory.
In addition to the mental health issue, Gacy further argued that there was ad-
ditional mitigation evident which should have been presented. Such evidence would
include Gacy's traumatic childhood experiences, his successful business career and
his charitable and civic work. Additionally, Gacy asserted that defense counsel's
164 513 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1975).
35I Id. at 888-89. See also United States v. Hoe, 586 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1978) (where the court
upheld the admission of evidence of defendant's fitness for impeachment purposes).
.66 Brief for Defendant-Appellant.
16 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 9-1(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
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incompetence was further evidenced in the fact that no jury instruction was tendered
to enumerate the nonstatutory mitigating factors.
2. Appellee's Argument' 68
The State maintained that Gacy's contention of incompetence of counsel was
intrinsically inconsistent in the context of his arguments on appeal. It was sug-
gested that the major inconsistency in Gacy's argument involved his claim that
defense attorneys because of incompetence had not introduced testimony at the
death penalty hearing regarding mitigating factors, while in another argument, Gacy
alleged that there was sufficient mitigating evidence presented to require that the
court vacate Gacy's death penalty.
The State contended that every consideration that could have been presented
in mitigation had been presented in mitigation had been presented to the jury since
the trial testimony was admitted in its entirety at the sentencing hearing. The pros-
ecution maintained that Gacy's attorneys acted properly when they decided not
to recall defense psychiatrists because their testimony regarding Gacy's mental state
had already been rejected by the jury. Furthermore, the state contended that con-
trary to the defendant's assertion prosecution expert witnesses did not testify that
Gacy suffered from extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but rather from a
personality or character disorder. The State argued that Gacy's lawyers were justified
in concluding that their client would not have been helped by additional or repetitive
psychiatric testimony.
In fact, the State contended that recounting the testimony presented by defense
psychiatrists would be counterproductive. The jury deliberated only briefly, in-
dicating that it gave little weight to the psychiatric evidence which had been
introduced.
The prosecution argued that the failure to present evidence was not in itself
conclusive proof of incompetence of counsel. Particularly, failure to present
psychiatric evidence or to ask any particular questions of a psychiatrist does not,
according to the State, demonstrate incompetence of counsel.
3. Appellant's Reply 69
Gacy denied the State's contention that there was an inconsistency in his argu-
ment. Gacy again asserted that counsel was incompetent for not introducing
mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. In the alternative, Gacy contended
that there was enough mitigating evidence which could be inferred from the evidence
presented at trial. The jury may not have been completely aware of it since it was
not directly presented at the sentencing hearing. Gacy asserted that this deficiency
could not have been cured by merely stipulating that everything presented at trial
,68 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee.
,69 Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant.
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was to be considered at sentencing. Such an approach would not have provided any
guidance to the jury. Thus, Gacy argued, it was incumbent upon the defense at-
torneys to bring to the jury's attention what was meant by mitigating evidence.
Further, Gacy contended that the fact that the jury rejected defense psychiatrists'
diagnoses regarding Gacy's impaired mental condition on the issue of insanity, did
not mean that the jurors necessarily would have rejected the testimony concerning
the extreme mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor at the death
penalty hearing. Further, Gacy argued that even though prosecution psychiatrists
found Gacy sane they may have been willing to testify that he was suffering from
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The condition of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance as described in the death penalty statute, need not amount to
mental illness.
VIl. CONCLUSION
The trial of John Wayne Gacy on thirty-three counts of murder provides a
unique opportunity to examine the nature and functioning of the insanity defense.
Having confessed and assisted the police in locating and identifying his victims,
Gacy was limited to a defense of insanity. Within the context of the case, both
the principles and practical limits of the insanity defense emerge. The case clarifies
the legal principle.underlying the insanity defense. While no one involved in the
case disputed the fact that Gacy suffered from a mental disorder, the trial makes
clear that the insanity defense requires establishing mental disease or defect in the
defendant which has the causal consequence that the defendant was unable to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law.
All the principals in the trial accepted the need to show the presence of a psychotic
condition and not merely a personality disorder or psychopathology. They con-
ceded the limited exculpatory function of the defense which was treated as requir-
ing some delusional condition or lack of understanding of the wrongful nature of
his conduct on the part of Gacy.
Equally instructive is the opportunity to observe the limited acceptance of
psychiatric insight and explanation as a relevant consideration in the legal proceeding.
As Gacy's psychiatric profile indicates, he is a very complex and profoundly dis-
turbed person. Nevertheless, psychiatric witnesses failed to produce a consensus
in their view of the nature and the diagnosis of his disorder. Even more significant
is the difficulty which these experts faced in translating their psychiatric insights
into legal evidence. Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the case is the reported
indifference of the jury to the complex psychiatric testimony presented in the case.
John Gacy, independent of the verdict in his trial, presents a challenge to the
legal system. There is first the need to derive some insight from the case to provide
improved police responsiveness not only to missing person reports, but also the
complaints of victims who are members of an identifiable subculture or minority.
Second, there is a need to develop criteria to identify and a means to deal with
persons who manifest traits and behavior of the type characteristic of Gacy and
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observed as early as the time of his Iowa sodomy conviction. Finally, there is a
need for greater study, development of treatment programs, and formation of an
effective and acceptable public policy for dealing with persons identified or
characterized as having a personality disorder.
Even though the only real legal issue presented to the jury was the defense
of insanity, the Gacy case reveals the manner in which the operating law trans-
forms cases into procedural disputes. While the appeal of Gacy does raise issues
about the weight of evidence on the issue of insanity, and questions of legal com-
petence about the adequacy of counsel especially in the death penalty phase of
the trial, it is interesting to observe the effort given to challenging the adequacy
of warrants, the proper scope of authorized searches, evidentiary rulings limiting
scope of testimony, and the propriety of prosecutorial arguments and tactics. Given
the media and newspaper coverage of the case, the public is of course convinced
that Gacy is guilty, as there is a tendency for the public to view the insanity defense
as well as the procedural objections raised on appeal to be mere technicalities which
the guilty use to escape their just punishment. This was the apparent view of the
jury to Gacy's insanity defense; reports about the jury's deliberation suggest they
did not properly consider the evidence and testimony related to the defense of in-
sanity. This case shows that there is a continuing need to provide the public with
an explanation of the significance and meaning of the insanity defense.
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